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Using Silicon Valley as a case study, this dissertation examines how activists
influenced by the environmental movement reconfigured urban culture in the
American West. Machines in the Valley argues that the spatial influences of the
region’s urban development gave rise to modern environmentalism that arose
to criticize growth, but along the way failed to ultimately shape growth poli-
cies. While high technology sought to introduce a new urban form predicated
on “clean and green” industries and an environmental urbanism, the premise of
“clean” industry proved elusive.
High technology industrialization emerged as a key component of eco-
nomic and urban development in postwar era, particularly in western states seek-
ing to diversify their economic activities. Industrialization produced thousands
of new jobs, but development proved problematic when faced with competing
views about land use. The natural allure that accompanied the thousands coming
West gave rise to a modern environmental movement calling for strict limitations
on urban growth, the preservation of open spaces, and pollution reduction. These
views on land use lay at the center of these conflicts. Conflict over the Santa
Clara Valley’s land use tells the story not only of Silicon Valley’s development,
but Americans’ changing understanding of nature and the environmental costs of
urban and industrial development during the postwar era.
The dissertation makes three contributions. First, it challenges the “Rise
of the Right” narrative that argues for the collapse of growth liberalism in the
1970s. Instead, Silicon Valley demonstrates that a suburban liberalism was forged
in high-tech regions. Furthermore, the suburban liberal character of Silicon Valley
challenges the view of suburbs as bastions of conservativism. The suburbanites
of the Valley maintained a belief in the role of government, quality-of-life, civil
rights, and environmental quality in their communities. Second, it brings “nature”
into the story of Silicon Valley, arguing for the concept’s role in the shaping of the
region. Third, the study expands the story of Silicon Valley beyond the usual nar-
ratives of key figures of the technology industry. By focusing on the development
of Silicon Valley in the postwar era, this study uncovers the ways the political
economy of Silicon Valley was laid after World War II.
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Imagine your own future:
You can see a web of parks throughout the cities replacing the freeways and streets
that once dominated. You can see agriculture become diversified again, with a great
variety of crops grown together, replacing the old reliance on mass produced single
crop operations that are highly dependent on pesticides, machines, and cheap farm
labor....
More fruits and vegetables have insects on them instead of poisons. They can be
brushed off or swallowed accidentally without harm...
Economists rethink growth and know that ”growth for the sake of growth is the
ideology of the cancer cell” as Edward Abbey pointed out...
There is less spectator sport and more participating...
People are healthier. Fewer coronaries strike the people because walking and bicy-
cling and swimming keep them fitter...
Many of the people who were producing automobiles have been shifted into the
housing or building industry. Their main job is restructuring the urban wastes to
planned cities, restoring land to good agricultural use, building high-quality clus-
tered dwellings at the edges of the good agricultural land, using recycled materials
from the old buildings. People ride the short distance to their work and have a chance
to farm a little in the sun. There are legs and arms and abdomens where the flab was,
and the air is once again transparent...
The job of the garbage man and junk man is elevated to the stature of recycling
engineer, looping systems in such a way that materials cause no environmental de-
terioration...
Advertising serves to inform, not to over stimulate, and is believable again...
So much for one view of the future—more Utopian than likely, unless people want
it that way...
The thing people must realize above all is that the solution to our environmental
crisis involves simple, small measures by many people in accelerating sequence.
—Friends of the Earth, ”Projections for a Tenable Future,” 1970
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We found that the things that needed the most attention were those close to people—
physically as well as emotionally. In seeking to translate people’s yearning for natural
beauty into practical programs, the primary challenge is the environment where
most people live and work—our cities and the suburbs and countryside around
them. —Laurence Rockefeller, Beauty for America, 1965
More than ever before, scholars, scientists and planners are concentrating on the
natural and the human environment. The most hopeful sign of all, however, is that
this is not a revolution imposed from above but one rising from the bottom. In every
city and in thousands of towns and obscure neighborhoods, there are housewives
and homeowners banding together to fight, block by block, sometimes tree by tree, to
save a small hill, a tiny brook, a stand of maples. The fight to preserve the spectacles
of nature—the majestic rivers, the remote mountains, the wild canyons—is 100 years
old. The struggle to save the modest beauty of men’s own backyards is new and
promising.
—Ben Bagdikian, ”The Rape of the Land,” Saturday Evening Post, June 18, 1966.
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1Introduction: The Nature of Landscape
A geographer speaks as though his knowledge of space and place were derived ex-
clusively from books, maps, aerial photographs, and structured field surveys. He
writes as though people were endowed with mind and vision and no other sense
with which to apprehend the world and find meaning in it. He and the architect-
planner tend to assume familiarity—the fact that we are oriented in space and
at home in place—rather than describe and try to understand what ”being-in-the-
world” is truly like.1 —Yi–Fu Tuan
The subtle, intangible, but soul-deep mix of landscape, smells, sounds, history . . .
that constitute a place, a homeland.2 —Charles Wilkinson
Wallace Stenger felt developers betrayed his homeland. From his house
in the Santa Cruz foothills, the Stanford creative writing professor lamented the
changes occurring to the Santa Clara Valley in 1965, condemning the urban sprawl
that had overtaken the former farmland. “The orchards that used to be a spring
garden of bloom down the long trough of the Santa Clara Valley,” he wrote, “have
gone under so fast that a person absent for five years could return and think
himself in another country. . . . The once–lovely coast hills reaching down the
Peninsula below San Francisco have been crusted with houses in half a lifetime,
the hilltops flattened, whole hills carried off to fill the bay, the creeks turned
into concrete storm drains.”3 In Stegner’s lifetime, the valley had transformed
1Yi–Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1997): 200–201.
2Charles Wilkinson, The Eagle Bird: Mapping a New West (New York: Pantheon, 1992), 137–138.
3Wallace Stegner, “The Clouded Skies of Lotus Land,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 26,
1965, quoted in Michael Friedly, “‘This Brief Eden’: A History of Landscape Change in California’s
Santa Clara Valley” (PhD Thesis, Duke University, 2000), 5. Stegner’s novel All the Little Live Things,
was written based on the Santa Clara Valley. The novel’s character, Joe Allston, lamented the
bulldozers, subdivisions, and scars that cut into the Earth. Remarking on the work of the fiction’s
land developer, Allston said that the hills were “mutilated and ruined” and “only a land butcher
2from prime agricultural land to a place known for urban sprawl, traffic jams, and
manufacturing facilities. Stegner felt so betrayed by the changes to the land that
he wished to be buried not in California—the place that had so deeply shaped his
writing and identity—but in his summer home of Vermont.4
Like many living in the Santa Clara Valley, Stegner was a newcomer to
this place. Born in 1909 in north-central Iowa, he came to California to teach in
the creative writing program at Stanford University. In Stegner’s imagination the
Santa Clara Valley had fallen far from its once pristine grace. He wrote of “a park-
like oak forest reaching southward from a clean bay” when the Ohlone people
occupied the region. “The climate was mild and benevolent,” Stegner wrote of
this place, “the bay full of shellfish. The creeksides tangles grew wild berries
and the oaks provided the wherewithal for unlimited acorn flour.” He not only
celebrated this imagined pre-European landscape, but the post-European one as
well. As fields of wheat and fruit groves planted by Spanish missionaries began
to transform the Bay Area into an agricultural landscape, Stegner celebrated these
as “a glory” in which pears, prunes, apricots, cherry blossoms, and apples were
an improvement to the land. Looking from the window of his home, the land he
witnessed was now more asphalt than plowed field. New economies defined new
landscapes in the Santa Clara Valley. “This brief Eden,” as Stegner referred to the
Valley, fell to the original sin of industrialization.5
Frederick E. Terman interpreted the landscape differently. The Stanford
University provost and dean of engineering—often referred to as the “Father
of Silicon Valley”—saw suburbanization and expansion of industry in the Santa
could have proposed and carried it out. . . . There would be no restoring what he had ruined. It
reminded me too painfully; it made me sick to look.” Stegner, The Little Live Things, (New York:
Viking, 1967), 14–15.
4Jackson J. Benson, Wallace Stegner: His Life and Work (New York: Viking, 1996), xii. See also
Friedly, “‘This Brief Eden’,” 4–5.
5Benson, Wallace Stegner, xi. On the area’s historical ecology, see William S. Cooper, “Vegeta-
tional Development upon Alluvial Fans in the Vicinity of Palo Alto, CA,” Ecology 7 (January 1927):
11.
3Clara Valley not as signs of degradation, but rather signposts towards a new
prosperous future for Stanford, for Santa Clara County, for California, and for
the nation. Rather than representing encroaching sprawl, the nascent Stanford
Industrial Park and the lands around the university, were, in the words of one
booster, a “pleasant place” of “broad lawns, employee patios, trees, flowers and
shrubs, walls of glass, recreational clubs” that stood in contrast to the “smoke–
stacks, noise, coal cars, soot and other things” found in the industrial East and
Midwest.6 The landscape appeared campus–like and suburban, amenities that re-
flected the values of Stanford and surrounding suburban communities. Although
complaints of traffic and air pollution had become common by the mid–1960s,
Terman dismissed these criticisms. The Industrial Park had done much for the
Bay Area’s economy, and Terman felt congestion and air pollution were “really a
pretty small price to pay.”7
These competing visions of the Santa Clara Valley landscape reflected widely-
held and conflicting ideas about the future of a political project called Silicon
Valley. The Valley represented a new feature of the American West, an economic
and political project marrying a pastoral idealism with the building a new high
tech urbanism. In the face of postwar residential growth and industrial devel-
opment, the Santa Clara Valley’s landscape changed remarkably. The arrival of
machines in the Valley—bulldozers and computers—transformed the landscape
once again, and in the process sparked important discussions with national impli-
cations about creating an idealized high-tech metropolitan region that balanced a
vision of the California Dream with the high tech suburbs.
Silicon Valley also represented an important national project in post-World
War II America as the urban industrial model of the Northeast and Midwest that
6Quoted in John M. Findlay, Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture After 1940
(University of California Press, 1993), 130.
7Terman, quoted in Findlay, Magic Lands, 141.
4had dominated the organizing principle of American society from the late 19th
century began to decline. As the old industrial cores of the Rust Belt decayed,
discourse about what to do with this flagging industrial economy emerged in
the 1960s and 1970s. How would America rebuild its economy, communities, and
spirit of innovation? A moment of possibility emerged for Silicon Valley, pointing
to the significance of the local becoming nationally significant.
The engineers, scientists, academics, and other knowledge professionals
who congregated into the suburbs led to a convergence of ideals and attitudes
about natural beauty, open space, livable and sustainable cities, and access to
leisure. These political causes animated both liberals and conservatives, who found
common ground—if not common goals—for their region. The San Jose city coun-
cil Republican Virginia Shaffer, for instance, based her anti-growth politics on
homeowner interests—levying criticism against inadequate city services, rising
tax burdens for suburbanites, as well as the rapid pace of growth for growth’s
sake. Less than ten years after Shaffer’s election, Democrat Janet Gray Hayes’ as-
cent to the San Jose mayor’s office reflected a continued criticism of the city’s
growth orientation. These suburbanites catalyzed grassroots environmental polit-
ical activity for a range of causes, rooted in a belief that their region was unique
among the nation’s high-tech suburbs. Santa Clara Valley activists who got their
start in the fair housing movement of the 1950s found themselves becoming open
space advocates by the 1960s, arguing that these places mattered for creating liv-
able and equitable cities. Open space and environmental movements organized
throughout the Peninsula, reacting to changes in the land by working through tra-
ditional channels of political power. Their activity was felt through many policies
and laws later adopted by the federal, state, and regional governments, including
stricter regulations on high-tech pollutants and open space and growth control
5laws.8
Suburban activists pursued environmental causes for open space, leisure,
and protection from pollution, which largely reflected the class identity and pri-
orities of affluent suburban liberals. These suburban environmentalists enjoyed
what they did—working jobs at research and development labs, earning a better-
than-average paycheck, living in affluent homes and exclusive communities, and
enjoying leisure time and access to open space—because of federal policies emerg-
ing from pro-growth New Deal liberalism and the Cold War military-industrial-
academic complex. Environmental activists achieved many victories, including
widespread protection of wilderness areas, shifting the growth priorities of city
councils and planning commissions, and forming an environmental politic that
influenced the outcomes of local and national elections. Yet their failings under-
line the political forces that constrained their activities. Furthermore, their neglect,
willful or otherwise, of issues surrounding race and gender highlights the limits
of their vision for a high tech urbanism predicated on freedom from the problems
decaying postwar American cities.9 Environmental campaigns to offer quality-
of-life benefits largely served the affluent suburbs rather than the inner cities or
barrios. Silicon Valley’s small yet influential populations of Latinos, African Amer-
icans, and Asian Americans dealt with a different side of Silicon Valley—one far
more segregated, discriminatory, polluted, and hazardous to human health.
The story told here is about a particular place and an expression of envi-
8On the emergence of environmentalism from within American suburbs, see Christopher C.
Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Nature and the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Adam Rome, Bulldozer in the
Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2001); Joseph L. Arnold, The New Deal in the Suburbs: A History of the Greenbelt
Town Program, 1935–1954 (Cleveland: Ohio State University Press, 1971);, Andrew R. Highsmith,
Demolition Means Progress: Flint, Michigan, and the Fate of the American Metropolis (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 2015).
9On the decline of American cities, see Robert M. Fogelson, Downtown: Its Rise and Fall, 1880-
1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001); Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Suburban Crisis:
Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
6Figure 1: The boundaries of Silicon Valley.
ronmental politics limited by the cultural orientation of its proponents. I do not
venture into efforts of the San Francisco Bay’s conservation, fights over the Bay
Area Rapid Transit (BART) transportation system, or open space battles beyond
Santa Clara County. My focus is on a specific valley, the Santa Clara Valley, where
the core of Silicon Valley emerged among growth and corporate interests. Sili-
con Valley is an amorphous, ever-changing place that has undergone continuous
reshaping since its beginnings in the 1940s as high technology firms expanded
throughout Santa Clara, San Mateo, and San Francisco counties on the Peninsula.
I define Silicon Valley by its economic and industrial activity in semiconductor
plants, microcomputer manufacturing, and software development. The borders
of Silicon Valley today could easily extend northward into San Francisco, whose
high-tech industry is rapidly growing, and as far south as Morgan Hill and as
far to east as Fremont or Oakland. But for the majority of the history examined
ahead, the bulk of high tech industrial activity largely occurred in Santa Clara
7County. For the purposes of this study, Palo Alto borders Silicon Valley at the
northern end of the county and San Jose bounds it to the south (see Figure 1).
Between and including these two cities, the greatest concentrations of high tech
manufacturing took place. Here is where the landscape changed so dramatically,
and the visions espoused by Stegner and Terman initiated the greatest conflict.10
This study is largely focused on local history. Yet it also attempts to ex-
amine these changes at various scales: neighborhood, city, region, and nation.
Heeding Andrew Needham’s call that the history of suburbanization must look
beyond cities to understand how suburban growth affected places beyond their
borders, I suggest we can best understand the history of Silicon Valley not only
from its unique local contexts but also by seeing how the valley shaped both re-
gional and national political trends. Although any one of the cities of Santa Clara
County—which numbered 14 municipal corporations by the 1990s—would work
well for analyzing the trends in environmental politics, by thinking about these
changes as a regional level reveals how metropolitan places shaped one another
across space. In Silicon Valley, several centers of high tech activity emerged to
serve new businesses and their affluent employees—Palo Alto, San Jose, Santa
Clara, Mountain View, Sunnyvale.
Silicon Valley became a gold standard for its suburban form of high-tech
urbanism, cited by journalists, scholars, critics, and pundits throughout the coun-
try as an example of a friendly business climate, suburban retreat, and economic
powerhouse. Places as varied as Atlanta, Georgia, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
Cleveland, Ohio, Omaha, Nebraska, Bangalore, India, Mission Hills in the Guan-
dong Province of China, and Shenzhen, China, have all looked to Silicon Valley
10I am comprising a database of Silicon Valley tech companies between 1940 and 1990, which
currently numbers close to 2,000 companies culled from archival sources, city directories, and
industrial pamphlets and guidebooks. The bulk of these companies are located in the northern
end of Santa Clara County. See Chapter 2 for more discussion about the spread and location of
these companies. The full database is online at https://github.com/hepplerj/machinesvalley/
blob/gh-pages/data-files/sv-companies/sv_companies.csv.
8as a vision for their futures—sometimes even going so far as to model their archi-
tectural designs after the Spanish villa and ranch aesthetic of Stanford University.
Across the United States, places borrow the “Silicon” moniker to describe the “Sil-
icon Forest” of Oregon, the “Silicon Desert” of Arizona and the Southwest, and
“Silicon Prairie” to variously describe similar suburbs in the Midwestern states,
Texas, or Wyoming—markers of place meant to represent regions grounded in
high tech.11 Silicon Valley represents not only an example of a modern city, but
also an alluring model for promoting economic and urban revitalization through
technological industrial growth.
That promise has been consistently applied to cities in the American West.
Electronics became a key component of the West’s new economy as it shifted
away from its historical extractive industries of mining, lumbering, and agricul-
ture towards service, tourism, and knowledge work.12 Throughout the West elec-
tronics manufacturers established headquarters, manufacturing facilities, and re-
search offices, often courted by pro-growth advocates in city governments. These
new industries pointed to the West as the leader of the nation’s economic future
predicated on a Cold War defense industry.13 Western cities were not replicat-
ing the steel age industries of the Midwest and East, with their smokestacks and
11See, for example, Margaret O’Mara, “Silicon Valleys,” Boom: A Journal of California 1 (Sum-
mer 2011) http://www.boomcalifornia.com/2011/06/silicon-valleys/; Gordon B. Dodds and
Craig E. Wollner, Silicon Forest: High Tech in the Portland Area, 1945–1986 (Portland: Oregon His-
torical Society Press, 2000); Heike Mayer, “Planting High-Technology Seeds: Tektronix’s Role in
the Creation of Portland’s Silicon Forest,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 106, no. 4 (December 2005):
568–593; George Ernest Webb, Science in the American Southwest: A Topical History (Tucson: The
University of Arizona Press, 2002); Stuart W. Leslie, “Regional Disadvantage: Replicating Silicon
Valley in New York’s Capital Region,” Technology and Culture 42, no. 2 (April 2001): 236–264;, Gor-
don B, Craig Wollner, and Marshall M Dodds Lee, The Silicon Forest: High Tech in the Portland Area,
1945-1986 (Portland: Oregon Historical Society Press, 1990).
12Joseph E. Taylor III, “The Many Lives of the New West,” Western Historical Quarterly 35, no.
2 (Summer 2004): 141–165; Carl Abbott, Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995); Carl Abbott, How Cities Won the West: Four Centuries
of Urban Change in Western North America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008);
Carl Abbott, The New Urban America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1981), 15–56.
13Kevin J Fernlund, ed., The Cold War American West, 1945-1989 (Albuquerque: University of
New Mexico Press, 1998).
9large industrial structures that aided the earlier urban industrial age. Fueled by
government policies promoting research and development, home ownership, and
new jobs, these cities embraced pro-growth policies that attempted to balance
pastoralism with industrial expansion. The courting of white-collar, middle-class
Americans led to explosive growth in new urban centers in the West.
High-tech industrial development was widely welcomed and considered a
preferred alternative to the dirty industry of the Northeast and Midwest. The so-
considered “clean” industries held the appearance of suburban areas with broad
lawns, trees, low-rise buildings, and hidden parking lots. Thanks to strict build-
ing guidelines laid out by Stanford University as well as city regulations on new
construction, new high technology industries appeared more like a college cam-
pus than an industrial manufacturer or research center. But the promise of clean
industry proved elusive as smog, radiation, water contamination, intense energy
and water usage, traffic congestion, and rising housing and utility costs became
common features of living in the Valley.
The reliance on high-tech industrialization masked environmental hazards.
Throughout the Rust Belt, the environmental effects of industrialization left very
visible signs of potential threats to air and water quality. High tech industrial-
ization promoted itself as a clean and modern alternative to the older, smog-
producing form of industrialization, yet came with its own costs. Electronics
manufacturing relied particularly upon liquid and gas chemicals, which were
often stored on-site, shipped in on freight, lightly regulated by federal or state
rules, and were potentially invisible hazards to human health. By removing the
green hue with which high-tech industries colored their activities, quality-of-life
and social justice environmentalists targeted high tech industry and debated with
boosters and industrialists about the industry’s impact on communities.
This work focuses on the grassroots politics produced by environmental
10
degradation, suburbanization, and the interplay between local and national inter-
ests in the emergence of “environment” in American politics. California thinks of
itself as a trendsetter constantly reflecting and recreating the California Dream.
Ideas about pastoralism and the promise of high tech industrialization repre-
sented an attempt to create this “good life,” which played out on the landscape
through competing conceptions of community and a broader conversation over
the future of American economy, society, and innovation. By bringing the envi-
ronment, broadly construed, into the story of Silicon Valley and connecting it to
the politics of growth, development, and community, I examine the ways in which
people interacted and reacted to changes in their communities.
Although this study is tightly focused on a specific region, it has greater
bearing on our understanding of the inherent tension within land use regimes
and Americans’ growing awareness of environmental issues during the postwar
era. The study of Silicon Valley offers us a chance to examine the emergence of a
mid-twentieth-century economy in the American West whose effects dominate in
the twenty-first. Technological innovation, market forces, waves of migration, gov-
ernment investment and regulation, and fragmentary politics defined the Ameri-
can political economy in the postwar era. Few of the industrialists, suburbanites,
politicians, and activists in the pages ahead may have identified themselves as
environmentalists, but Silicon Valley’s political history demonstrates the ways in
which “the environment” became an ever-present issue in American postwar pol-
itics.
The grassroots approach of this work reveals that environmentalists often
cared less about the standard political affiliations of Republican and Democrat
and more about their identities as homeowners and taxpayers. Environmental his-
torians have often considered environmental history to be the domain of Demo-
cratic politics, and environmental issues often laid at the feet of the liberal political
11
agenda. However, environmental politics between the 1950s and the 1970s often
belied political affiliations. Suburban residents concerned with environmental is-
sues were often unified in their vision of aesthetics, health, protection of children,
pollution, and toxics. The history of Silicon Valley also is at odds with the con-
ventional narratives of the 1970s “Rise of the Right” accounts and that suburbs
primarily fostered a conservative political culture. Suburban liberalism continued
to persist alongside the New Right in northern California. Rather than a rejec-
tion of the liberalism evident in southern California’s Orange County, Santa Clara
County liberals fostered government intervention to serve their political inter-
ests.14 These suburban liberals, in some ways, anticipated the “New Democrats”
under Bill Clinton in the early 1990s.15 Yet the variety of suburban liberalism of
Silicon Valley underscores the limits of its adherents’ vision. Their priorities for
quality-of-life improvements largely revolved around middle-class homeowners
and high tech industry. The goals of environmental, feminist, labor, and racial
justice activists went largely ignored.
By underscoring the local grassroots movements in environmentalism, the
study reveals the variety of distinct and overlapping, evolving and organic local
politics that intersected at regional, state, and national environmental discussions.
Environmentalism, then, is a local experience, and those local struggles became
a primary driver for national change. Yet, much of the environmental activism in
Silicon Valley was reactionary rather than pace setting. The origins of an ecolog-
14On the rise of the New Right and suburban politics, see: Kevin M. Kruse and Thomas Sugrue,
eds., The New Suburban History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Lisa McGirr, Subur-
ban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001);
Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2005); Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt
South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the
Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
15Bill Clinton and other “New Democrats” also adopted Silicon Valley as a poster for the “New
Economy.” See Sara Miles, How to Hack a Party Line: The Democrats and Silicon Valley (University
of California Press, 2002). On the role of suburban liberals shaping American politics, see Lily
Geismer, Don’t Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the Democratic Party (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2015).
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ical consciousness and energy for political action in Santa Clara Valley suggests
ideologies that predated much of the nation’s eventual environmental sentiments
in the 1970s.16 These politics emerged out of a combination of interests, animated
by the rapid growth of the technological economy, raising questions for people
living in the community.17
Writing about environmental politics in the Bay Area also offers us ways to
think about local politics. It might, as Richard Hofstadter once said, have “some-
thing to say that might help us.”18 The story here is, ultimately, about the practice
of politics in postwar America. Around kitchen tables, within ad hoc coalitions,
in letter campaigns and newspaper editorials, people talked about the changing
environment around them. Amenities and cultural ideals about the Bay Area—
climate, atmosphere, suburban, middle-class—had attracted newcomers and de-
lighted old–timers. But the rise of industry, the influx of new residents, the explo-
sion of suburban development, and the devastation of orchards led both groups
to question what sort of changes they were welcoming to the Valley. Some of
these organizations were short-lived, such as the Citizens Committee on Regional
Planning or United Palo Altans, while others existed much longer to continue
influencing California politics, such as California Tomorrow and the Committee
for Green Foothills. These environmental organizations emerged directly from
environmental changes occurring in Santa Clara Valley.
Simultaneously, entrepreneurs, urban planners, university administrators,
and city leaders offered an alternative vision to the landscape: one that was in-
16I am not alone in suggesting the Bay Area anticipated the broader environmental movement.
Historian Margaret O’Mara has noted that the Bay Area became “home to some of the environ-
mental movement’s most important early battles and precedent–setting land–use planning mea-
sures.” Margaret Pugh O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next
Silicon Valley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 139.
17The importance of suburbs in fostering environmentalism has been argued by other historians,
in particular Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible. and Rome, Bulldozer in the Countryside.
18Hofstadter quoted in Christopher Lasch, “Consensus: An Academic Question,” Journal of
American History 76 (September 1989): 458.
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creasingly urban and industrial rather than rural and agricultural—but no less
idealized. Often times support for growth was couched in the language of national
defense: Cold War defense spending poured into Stanford University, for exam-
ple, which eagerly sought out military contracts in research and development.
Stanford administrators responded to citizens critiques of land development pro-
grams by dismissing their concerns as less important than national defense con-
cerns. Unplanned urban growth and economic development characterized much
of Santa Clara Valley in the latter half of the twentieth century. California vot-
ers became increasingly aware of the environmental considerations urban growth
and industrial development had for the region, leading to political activism, new
environmental regulation laws, and community referendums.19
The pages ahead fill a void in the history of the American West by bring-
ing nature and high tech urbanism closer together. Historians of the West have
noted the importance of the “information revolution” to coastal California’s de-
velopment, but have done little to dive into its history. William Robbins noted
almost two decades ago the “explosive expansion of the high–tech sector” that
there existed “a new rural West—centered in the information revolution” were
transforming urban prosperity and suburban poverty.20 Earl Pomeroy’s posthu-
mously published The Far West in the Twentieth Century includes a brief history of
the semiconductor industry and its outgrowth from military investments.21 John
Findlay was among the first western historians to place Silicon Valley into histor-
19On the rise of the modern environmental movement, see Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and
Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1987), 13–19; Hal Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment
in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 131–159; Ted Steinberg, Down to Earth: Na-
ture’s Role in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 239–261; John Opie,
Nature’s Nation: An Environmental History of the United States (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College
Publishers, 1998), 404–433.
20William Robbins, “Creating a ’New’ West: Big Money Returns to the Hinterland,” Montana:
The Magazine of Western History 46 (summer 1996): 66–72.
21Earl Pomeroy and Richard Etulain, The American Far West in the Twentieth Century (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2008).
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ical context, writing about how people created, and were affected by, urban cul-
ture. In particular, Findlay analyzes how urban environments were planned, built,
managed, and used, and how inhabitants made sense of cities. Findlay’s analysis
used Silicon Valley as one of his case studies, focusing on Stanford University and
suburban landscapes to understand the ways that residents used the pastoralism
of the university as a retreat from the chaos of urbanization. Margaret O’Mara
extended the story in one of her case studies analyzing the success and failure
of places that attempted to replicate Silicon Valley’s success. O’Mara focused on
how Stanford University played an important role in shaping land–use policies in
Palo Alto and surrounding communities, and contextualizing the reasons behind
Silicon Valley’s success owing to pleasant climate, a white–collar workforce, the
space to expand suburban areas, and proximity to a research university.22
Historians have begun to explore the social and cultural consequences of
Silicon Valley. Glenna Matthews addressed issues of gender, labor, and class in
Silicon Valley, focusing her lens on immigrant women who worked in canneries
and high-tech industries to “test [the] reality behind the [area’s] glitzy image.”
Her focus on unionization of workers and their efforts towards social justice illus-
trates a dimension of the story not otherwise told. On issues of race in Northern
California, Stephen Pitti has examined Mexican Americans and the long history of
race relations and labor issues in the Bay Area. And Cecilia M. Tsu examined the
agricultural past of Santa Clara Valley, studying Asian immigrants in Santa Clara
Valley to examine the overlapping ideologies of race, gender, and labor between
1880 and 1940. These works have helped to uncover the story of Silicon Vally that
have been ignored or gone unknown—race relations, social justice, labor, gen-
der, and politics.23 These works help to build my own by taking into account, in
22Findlay, Magic Lands, 117–159; O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge; Annalee Saxenian, Regional Advan-
tage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Harvard University Press, 1996).
23Glenna Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream: Gender, Class, and Opportunity
in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Stephen J. Pitti, The Devil in
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particular, the class and gendered dimensions of Silicon Valley’s origins and post-
war development. While Matthews primarily looks to blue-collar women inside
the manufacturing facilities and canneries of Santa Clara Valley, I turn my gaze
to white-collar professional women as leaders in promoting an environmental
politic.24
Other writers and observers have attempted to draw lessons from Silicon
Valley’s growth and development, but those works have targeted audiences inter-
ested in the entrepreneurs famous to the region. Tech journalist Robert Cringely,
biographer Walter Isaacson, journalist Michael S. Malone and other popular writ-
ers have highlighted the importance of specific individuals in shaping the tech-
nology industry, but such works tend to celebrate individuals and companies
rather than contextualize the Valley’s history.25 Historians of business have of-
Silicon Valley: Northern California, Race, and Mexican Americans (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2004); Cecilia M. Tsu, Garden of the World: Asian Immigrants and the Making of Agriculture in
California’s Santa Clara Valley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). See also Aaron Cavin’s
excellent study of race and citizenship in Silicon Valley among Mexican Americans and Asian
Americans. Aaron Cavin, “The Borders of Citizenship: The Politics of Race and Metropolitan
Space in Silicon Valley” (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2012).
24The exception in Matthews’ work is Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream,
chap. 6. For additional work on gender, class, and race in Silicon Valley, see Christian Zlolniski,
Janitors, Street Vendors, and Activists: The Lives of Mexican Immigrants in Silicon Valley (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2006); Marcia Lynn Douglass, “The Myth of Meritocracy: Race,
Class, and Gender in Silicon Valley” (PhD Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1991);
Nancey Green Leigh, “What Happened to the American Dream? Changing Earning Opportuni-
ties and Prospects of Middle-Class Californians, 1967-1987,” California History 68, no. 4 (December
1989): 240–247; Cecilia Tsu, “‘Independent of the Unskilled Chinaman’: Race, Labor, and Fam-
ily Farming in California’s Santa Clara Valley,” Western Historical Quarterly 37, no. 4 (December
2006): 474–495; Herbert G. Ruffin, Uninvited Neighbors: African Americans in Silicon Valley, 1769–
1990 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014); Glenna Matthews, “The Fruit Workers of the
Santa Clara Valley: Alternative Paths to Union Organization During the 1930s,” Pacific Historical
Review 54, no. 1 (February 1985): 51–70.
25Michael S. Malone, The Valley of Heart’s Delight: A Silicon Valley Notebook, 1963–2001 (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 2002); Michael Malone, Betting It All: The Entrepeurners of Technology (New
York: Wiley, 2001); Malone, Bill & Dave: How Hewlett and Packard Built the World’s Greatest Company
(New York: Portfolio, 2007); Robert Cringely, Accidental Empires: How the Boys of Silicon Valley Made
Their Millions, Battle Foreign Competition, and Still Can’t Get a Date (New York: HarperBusiness,
1996); James Wallace, Hard Drive: Bill Gates and the Making of the Microsoft Empire (New York:
HarperBusiness, 1993); David A. Kaplan, The Silicon Boys: And Their Valley of Dreams (New York:
William Morrow, 2000); Leslie R. Berlin, “Robert Noyce and Fairchild Semiconductor, 157–1968,”
Business History Review (Spring 2001): 63–100. Very few of these books address issues of women or
gender, often reflected in the book titles. On the centrality of women and gender in the history of
computing, see Nathan L. Ensmenger, The Computer Boys Take Over: Computers, Programmers, and the
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fered more nuanced approaches to the Valley’s history.26 Furthermore, scholars
have looked to the countercultural and libertarian origins of the Valley’s politi-
cal culture, whose ethos and energies likewise shaped the environmental politics
described ahead.27 My work intervenes in this discussion by placing suburban
liberals into the history.
Few environmental histories have focused on local environmental histories,
except in cases of single local campaigns. Most histories focus their geographic
scale far above the local community, giving their attention to national legislation,
federal agencies, or large environmental organizations. Those works that attempt
to give attention to local action—namely Samuel Hays’s classic Beauty, Health, and
Permanence—address topics so briefly as to only give local activism but a few
pages of discussion. The larger goal of such works has been to connect places
and controversies to the wider national narrative. Other works have focused their
lenses on single states or controversies, such as William Robbins’s two volumes on
Oregon and Andrew Hurley’s Environmental Inequalities, a study of environmental
racism in Gary, Indiana. By focusing on Silicon Valley, I add to the historiogra-
phy on local environmentalism and look at the ways grassroots politics helped
form state and national changes in policy, discourse, and ideology. If the Valley
represents a promise for cities to jumpstart their economies, it also represents a
Politics of Technical Expertise (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010); David Alan Grier, When Computers Were
Human (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). On criticism of Silicon Valley, see Clifford
Stoll, Silicon Snake Oil: Second Thoughts on the Information Highway (New York: Doubleday, 1995).
26See, especially, Leslie R. Berlin, “Robert Noyce and Fairchild Semiconductor, 1957-1968,” The
Business History Review 75, no. 1 (april 2001): 63–101. Berlin argues for the importance of Robert
Noyce and the development of the integrated circuit in fostering a business culture in Silicon
Valley. As Founder of Fairchild Semiconductor and Intel, Noyce represented an important public
figure for the semiconductor industry that helped create a culture of innovation, creativity, and
collaboration.
27See, in particular, Fred Turner, From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole
Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital Utopianism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Fred
Turner, “Where the Counterculture Met the New Economy: The WELL and the Origins of Vir-
tual Community,” Technology and Culture 46, no. 3 (July 2005): 485–512; Eric James Vettel, Biotech:
The Countercultural Origins of an Industry (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006);
John Markoff, What the Dormouse Said: How the Sixties Counterculture Shaped the Personal Computer
Industry (New York: Viking, 2005).
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pace-setting location for land use and regulation.28
The lacunae of this dissertation stands at the intersection of urban devel-
opment, postwar suburbanization, recreation and leisure, business history, and
American environmentalism, arguing that the politics of growth intersected with
a powerful nostalgia about the countryside of Santa Clara Valley. Environmen-
tal critics argued that industrialization and real estate development served to ruin
the environment, introducing sprawling places that wrought ecological havoc and
erased a sense of community identity. These debates highlight the malleability of
landscapes. More broadly, these attempts to define the landscape shape the polit-
ical, cultural, and social norms that tend to shape space and geography. As other
historians of space and place have noted, the spatial structures used to order the
world produce a metageography that relies on myths and half-truths in order to
create a narrative of place.29
That malleability forms my core analytical framework. In order to recover
conflicts among communities, I have imposed some order onto the analysis. In
particular, the concept of landscape has helped me unravel how and why com-
munities vied over land use. The geographer D. W. Meinig refers to landscapes
as “a naı¨ve acceptance of the intricate intermingling of physical, biological, and
cultural features which any glance around us displays.”30 Cordoned off sites for
28Margaret O’Mara says that Silicon Valley was “home to some of the environmental move-
ment’s most important early battles and precedent-setting land-use planning measures”. O’Mara,
Cities of Knowledge, 131. The work that is closest to mine, and is owed a debt for his pathbreaking
work, is Richard Walker, The Country in the City: The Greening of the San Francisco Bay Area (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 2007), whose work illuminated the workings of a “green” political
culture in the Bay Area. Walker’s work does not focus primarily on Silicon Valley, however. His
work ranges from the vineyards in Marin to the Bay conservation controversies. Walker’s title is
consciously drawn from Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1973).
29Susan Schulten, Mapping the Nation: History and Cartography in Nineteenth-Century America
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 3; Mark Lewis and Ka¨ren Wigen, The Myth of Conti-
nents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Ka¨ren Wigen, A
Malleable Map: Geographies of Restoration in Central Japan, 1600–1912 (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 2010).
30Donald Meinig, ed., The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1979), 2.
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military installations, polluted grounds, and wildlife refuges hold just as much
meaning as neighborhoods and city districts defined for particular uses or per-
ceived of in particular ways. The Santa Clara Valley—indeed, much of the Amer-
ican West—contain what Richard White has called “hybrid landscapes” where
cultural ideologies clash over conflicting uses of natural resources. The hybrid
landscape is neither purely wild nor purely built, but instead a construction of
natural and cultural systems that shape and create place.31 People define places
by embedding ideas on the landscape. In cities, urban planners lay down grids of
roads, zones, and regulations that divide cities along labor, leisure, and consump-
tion, thus imbuing certain places with particular meaning.32
Promoters, boosters, business leaders, residents, and government constructed
physical and conceptual boundaries around competing landscapes in Silicon Val-
ley. These landscapes were designed to promote a particular metropolitan future
31Richard White, “From Wilderness to Hybrid Landscapes: The Cultural Turn in Environmen-
tal History,” The Historian 66 (September 2004): 562–664. In Richard White’s survey of trends in
environmental history, he argues historians reject any hard division between culture and natural.
Instead, they examine how cultural forces shape landscapes. Kenneth Olwig has argued that land-
scape is a physical and cultural manifestation, where “environment, economics, law, and culture
are all important,” and symbolic, “to be perceived, read, and interpreted on the ground, in writ-
ten texts, and through artistic images.” Kenneth R. Olwig, “Recovering the Substantive Nature
of Landscape,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers (December 1996): 645. See also
Donald Meinig, “The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes,” in The Beholding Eye: Ten Versions
of the Same Scene, ed. Donald Meinig, pp. 43–45; Keith H. Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places, p. 110.
William Cronon has argued the same phenomenon happens when Americans construct and then
preserve wilderness to suit ideas of sublime nature while disregarding less–striking landscapes.
See William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in
Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. Cronon, (New York: Norton, 1996),
69–90. See also Sharon Zukin, Landscapes of Power: From Detroit to Disney Land (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1991). The literature on space and place is vast. See, for example, Henri Lefeb-
vre, The Production of Space, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith, (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992);
Lewis, and Wigen, The Myth of Continents; Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the
Production of Space (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Edward Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Re-
assertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1989); David E. Sopher, “The Landscape
of Home,” in The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays, ed. by D. W. Meinig,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 129–149; Meinig, Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes.
32Lefebvre, 68–168; Cameron Blevins, “Space, Nation, and Triumph of Region: A View of the
World from Houston,” Journal of American History (June 2014);, Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The
Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977); Michel de Certeau,
The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. by Steven Rendall, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984); John A. Agnew and James S. Duncan, eds., The Power of Place: Bringing Together Geographical
and Sociological Imaginations (Unwin Hyman, 1989).
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and were enacted through federal policies and city regulations, ranging from the
establishment of wilderness areas and environmental protection to the particu-
larities of zoning decisions that enacted cultural, environmental, and economic
patterns. Places were designed for specific intents, but the conceptual and the
geographic converged on the landscape. The conflicts over the landscape belied
the clean lines on physical maps. The actual boundaries were far messier and
complex.
These competing landscapes formed the cultural and political underpin-
nings of Silicon Valley’s environmental politic. In the Santa Clara Valley, the cre-
ation of new landscapes resulting from perceptions of the region as farmland,
electronics manufacturer, suburban paradise, and natural paradise shaped the
Valley’s environment. The underlying and conflicting connections among these
landscapes shaped environmental, cultural, and political identities.33 Landscapes,
in Meinig’s words, are “a great exhibit of consequences,” and are “symbolic, as ex-
pressions of cultural values, social behavior, and individual actions worked upon
particular localities over a span of time.”34 By viewing Silicon Valley this way, I
argue for the significance of nature in shaping space and perceptions in the craft-
ing of a suburban high-tech urbanism. Rather than echo Lewis Mumford’s claim
that “as the pavement spreads, nature is pushed away,” I argue that the creation
of landscapes was both natural and social.35 Nature and cities are not distinct
entities, and any separation among them is nearly futile but ever-changing and
33Historian Hal Rothman and economist Thomas Michael Power have explored the larger ram-
ifications of this shift in the American West. See Hal Rothman, Devil’s Bargains: Tourism in the
Twentieth-Century West (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997), 17; Thomas Michael Power,
Lost Landscapes and Failed Economies: The Search for a Value of Place (D. C. Washington: Island Press,
1996).
34“Introduction,” in Meinig, Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes.
35Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (1938; reprint, San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, 1970), 253.
See also Williams, The Country and the City, Smith, Uneven Development, 55–58;, Eric Monkonnen,
America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities and Towns, 1780–1980 (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1988), 3; William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New
York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 7.
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shifting in complex ways.36
Overlapping Landscapes of Santa Clara County
Figure 2: The overlapping landscapes. The map depicts urban areas (tan), open space
(green), Superfund sites (large dark circles), and toxic and chemical leaks and spills (small
red circles). Map by author. Interactive version at http://dissertation.jasonheppler.
org/visualizations/rivers/. Data courtesy NHGIS, the Bay Area Conservation Lands
Network, and U.S. Census.
These landscapes in conflict are explored through community studies fo-
cusing primarily around San Jose and Palo Alto, arranged in six chronologically
thematic chapters. The first two chapters explore the structural and political forces
that created the political culture of suburban environmentalists in Silicon Valley.
The idealized pastoralism of the Santa Clara Valley was a significant draw for
nineteenth century boosters and town builders, a theme that continued well into
the postwar era. That vision sought to build cities in tune with the natural world,
36I am influenced here also by Ari Kelman’s terrific study of New Orleans and the Mississippi
River. Kelman sees nature and the city as inseparable, arguing that “New Orlean’s waterfront
represents a mingling of built and natural environments, and that the production of space in New
Orleans has been both a natural and social process.” See Ari Kelman, A River and Its City: The
Nature of Landscape in New Orleans (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 1–17.
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first through farming and later through leisure and aesthetics. These foundations
paved the way for a variety of grassroots activism. The remaining chapters ex-
amine how suburbanites confronted, challenged, and conformed to new political
and environmental realities, including the collapse of the farm economy, rampant
urban sprawl and industrialization that threatened the amenities that drew resi-
dents to the Valley, and the often-hidden health risks of airborne and waterborne
pollutants that obliterated suburbanites’ sense as privileged communities.
Silicon Valley has become a cultural center in the United States; the wealth,
political influence, environmental precedence, and place in the American imagi-
nation has led the Valley to take on an almost mystical quality in American life.
Cities and universities across the country and across the world try and mimic the
success of Silicon Valley and Stanford University. The Valley is synonymous with
the technology industry, an industry that has taken on ever increasing impor-
tance to the nation’s economy. Furthermore, the economic importance of regions
like Silicon Valley meant that places where suburban liberalism persisted also led
to shifts in political discourse at the state and national level in both parties as the
priorities of suburbanites and their employers took hold. These priorities not only
manifested themselves in economic policies like free trade, tax cuts, and contin-
ued investment into high-tech industry, but also through environmental policies
and regulations that filtered up from local issues.
This is not a history of prominent leaders often attributed to the cre-
ation of Silicon Valley—the veritable household names of David Packard, William
Hewlett, Robert Noyce, and Steve Jobs. But a note on the people that do appear
here merits some attention. Although the pages ahead dive little into business
leaders often credited with the origins of the Valley, the people that appear are
largely white, male, affluent elites. Race certainly plays a role in environmental
conversations in Silicon Valley, particularly among the largest community of color,
22
Latinos. Activism around environmental issues in Santa Clara County, however,
are not a major driving force of Latino politics in the postwar era. More polit-
ical energy is spent on issues related to housing, employment, citizenship, and
discrimination—and although “environment” appears within some of these is-
sues, my archival sources did not often reflect that. However, there does exist
ample evidence for future work on Silicon Valley and race. There is little work,
for example, on the role of Latino laborers working inside high tech manufac-
turing facilities who were exposed to harsh chemicals during the manufacturing
process.37
Many of the sources used in this study were drawn primarily from peo-
ple working within the confines of traditional political power. Local government
publications played a big role in framing the ways government leaders sought to
shape and define high tech suburbanization in Silicon Valley. Much of the source
material is drawn from, in particular, a documentary record surrounding land use
and environmental regulations and legislation. The evidence from these sources
rarely confronted issues surrounding race, at least as it applied to the environ-
ment. More often, these sources point to issues of housing, access to employment,
and segregated urban spaces.38
Based on my evidence, class and gender play much larger roles in the
37Some early work includes Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream; Ted Smith,
David Sonnenfeld, and David Pellow, eds., Challenging the Chip: Labor Rights and Environmental
Justice in the Global Electronics Industry (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006); Pitti, Devil in
Silicon Valley;, Zlolniski, Janitors, Street Vendors, and Activists.
38One of the archives I went through, for example, included the Don Edwards Papers at San Jose
State University. Edwards’ papers includes large amounts of material related to African American
and Latino housing issues in particular. See, in particular, Box 72 and Box 84 in the Don Edwards
Congressional Papers, San Jose State University. It’s certainly not the case that racial dynamics do
not exist in Silicon Valley. Important scholarly work, in particular by Ruffin, Uninvited Neighbors,
Tsu, Garden of the World, Pitti, Devil in Silicon Valley, and Cavin, “Borders of Citizenship.”, address
Silicon Valley’s issues of race and class. There may be other sources out there that bring to bear
new light on the racial dynamics of Silicon Valley’s environmentalism of this beyond the eviden-
tiary base I have dealt with, and moving forward with the book project I intend to seek these out
more fully. Brown and black communities were harder to get at, rarely mentioned in the power
dynamics of the white, affluent environmentalists of Silicon Valley.
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story ahead. The affluent, white-collar suburbanites drove much of the responses
to environmental laws and regulations. Planning and regulation largely benefited
these suburban white neighborhoods over ethnic enclaves. As the pages ahead
show, pollution was often offloaded to areas of cities away from high property
values, middle-class neighborhoods, and high tech industrial districts. Postwar
suburbanization largely benefited the white middle class, giving them a chance
to enjoy environmental amenities of suburban life while environmental costs were
shuffled onto non-white communities on the suburban fringe. This environmental
racism—the unequal distribution of environmental hazards along lines of race—
largely occurred within class privilege. In Silicon Valley, the environmental dan-
gers of flooding, subsidence, and sewage processing largely exempted middle-
class whites.39
Gender plays the bigger role in Silicon Valley’s urban environmental his-
tory than class or race. To a great degree, many of the earliest activists for the
environment were women. Whether starting out as affordable housing activists
in San Francisco or concerned about high tech pollution in their neighborhoods
threatening family health, women led the way in galvanizing political activity
around environmental issues.40 In the 1970s, the widespread ascent of women
into political office, especially in San Jose and Santa Clara County government,
led to the moniker “Feminist Capital of the World.” Lawyers, housewives, politi-
cians, scientists, engineers, and mothers such as Pam Tau Lee, Janet Gray Hayes,
39Laura Pulido, “Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban Development
in Southern California,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90, no. 1 (March 2000): 12–
40; Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1990); David N. Pellow and Lisa Sun-Hee Park, The Silicon Valley of Dreams: Environmental
Injustice, Immigrant Workers, and the High-Tech Global Economy (New York: New York University
Press, 2002); Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary,
Indiana, 1945–1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Laura Pulido, Envi-
ronmentalism and Economic Justice: Two Chicano Struggles in the Southwest (Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 1996); Marc Cooper, “Class War @ Silicon Valley: Disposable Workers in the New
Economy,” The Nation, May 27, 1996.
40Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream; Douglass, “The Myth of Meritoc-
racy.”.
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Mary Bowerman, Dorothy Erskine, and Lorraine Ross were central grassroots
activists. In public and private spheres—local government, neighborhoods, the
home—women developed a “green” political culture primarily revolving around
health. Janet Gray Hayes in particular plays a key role in the story ahead as
she and her suburban liberal allies built coalitions with environmentalists, labor
groups, and minorities to promote “smart growth” in San Jose. These female ac-
tivists shifted the grounds on which debates about sustainability, livability, open
space, leisure, and health took place, standing against pro-growth advocates in
city and regional government.
This history is about the history that Silicon Valley has inherited. The Valley
often thinks of itself as outside of history—always looking to the future, at the
forefront of change and progress. But the organization and imagination of Silicon
Valley—its landscape, its communities, its relationships—are inseparable from its
past. People here live with its history daily. We must recognize how desires for
beauty, nature, and pleasure shape our spatial history, landscape, and nostalgia
embodied in cities. Cities, the novelist Italo Calvino reminds us in Invisible Cities,
do “not tell [their] past” but are “like lines on a hand, written in the corners of
the streets, the gratings of the windows, the banisters of the steps, the antennae
of the lightning rods, the poles of the flags, every segment marked in turn with
scratches, indentations, scrolls.”41 Cities and the nature that surrounds them—
that is embedded in them—are reflections of past and present desires. To build
better cities, we must reflect the ways our landscapes match our aspirations.
41Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities, trans. (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1974), 11.
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Chapter 1
Nature, History, and the Origins of the Countryside
The whole valley was densely timbered, but the gigantic oaks had to make way for
the plow, to be succeeded by fields of grain, and these were followed quickly by vines
and fruit trees. —E. S. Harrison, 1888
Glorious oaks! Your days are numbered. The axe of Utility is already at your base.
Pass into the dreamy past of Love and tender Memories, and let your places be filled
by the grape, the prune, the apricot, and other fruits whose rich juices shall carry to
the end of the earth the life, drawn from the fertilizing mold formed by the countless
years of your lavishness of cast off leaves and twig. —Carrie Stevens Walter,1887
A veritable Paradise. —C. L. Lawrence, 1927
The San Francisco Peninsula followed—and in some ways led—the na-
tion’s shift in population moving westward. The location of World War II mili-
tary facilities drew millions to the Far West. But it also followed another wartime
trend—the militarization of industry. The twentieth-century American West, ac-
cording to Kevin Fernlund, “bristled with airfields, army bases, naval yards, ma-
rine camps, missile fields, nuclear test sites, proving grounds, bombing ranges,
weapons plants, military reservations, training schools, toxic waste dumps, strate-
gic mines, transportation routes, lines of communication, laboratories, command
centers, and arsenals.” The burgeoning industrial and military landscape in the
West demanded a population to support it. California alone accounted for the
most dramatic increase in population due to the militarization of its economy.1
1The San Francisco Chronicle estimated that nearly 40,000 acres of the Santa Clara Valley were
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Postwar prosperity encouraged widespread growth across the country. By
the 1950s many American cities experienced sprawling suburbanization, but what
was initially seen as a fulfillment of the American dream of homeownership be-
came viewed as an environmental disaster. Critics took aim at suburban growth
and environmental destruction, and nowhere was this change more obvious than
in the West. Metropolitan growth doubled the population in the region between
1940 and 1960. By the 1980s, the region was among the fastest growing in the na-
tion.2 Many westerners were unsettled by population growth, and raised concerns
about the disappearance of rural landscapes being replaced by sprawl.3 Western
political leaders such as Oregon Governor Thomas McCall condemned what he
called “sagebrush suburbs” and sought limits on urban growth in the state. Anti–
growth and environmental sentiments lay behind Bay Area residents placing new
limits on urban growth and condemning boosters that supported plans for urban
expansion.
The Bay Area witnessed some of the most dramatic urban growth. During
the 1940s, Santa Clara County experienced 66% growth in population, compared
to a California wide growth of 53%. By the 1950s those figures surged upward;
the population increased 121% in Santa Clara County compared to 49% statewide.
Subdivisions sprang up to accommodate the influx of new residents. Most of these
new subdivisions were located beyond existing city boundaries in unincorporated
areas. Between 1945 and 1950 county farmland decreased from 727,000 acres to
589,000—a reduction of 81%.4 During that same period, Santa Clara County cities
devoted to the fruit industry in 1895. “Santa Clara Valley: A Favored Section,” San Francisco Chron-
icle, July 29, 1895.
2Michael Friedly, “‘This Brief Eden’: A History of Landscape Change in California’s Santa Clara
Valley” (PhD Thesis, Duke University, 2000), 58.
3Mars, Reminiscences of Santa Clara Valley, 58.
4Today, the valley oak (Quercus lobata) is among California’s most threatened oak species,
largely because they grew on lands desired for suburbanization and agricultural development.
See Robin M. Grossinger, Charles J. Striplen, Ruth A. Askevold, Elise Brewster, and Erin E. Beller,
“Historical Landscape Ecology of an Urbanized California Valley: Wetlands and Woodlands in the
Santa Clara Valley” Landscape Ecology 22 (2007): 3.
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engaged in rapid annexations. San Jose annexed land thirty-two times between
1945 and 1950. During the same period, the City of Santa Clara annexed only
four tracts, but in 1951 annexed six tracts and another nine in 1952. Santa Clara
added 50 acres to the city in two years. In the same two year period, San Jose
annexed sixteen parcels that totaled over 1000 acres.5 Between 1945 and 1970,
San Jose approved over 1,400 annexations and expanded the city’s footprint from
fifteen square miles to 135 square miles. The city’s land area expanded by 900
percent.6
Populations surged simultaneously with industrial development. The com-
bination of defense industries, electronics research and development contracts,
Cold War defense agendas, abundant and inexpensive land, and cities willing and
able to support the rapid expansion of city infrastructure welcomed the arrival of
new industries. Industrial development began in the 1940s when the National
Advisory Committee on Aeronautics started construction of the Ames Research
Laboratory new Moffett Airfield. Stanford University leased its large land hold-
ings to industrial entrepreneurs and researchers who were active in developing
electronics equipment for military purposes. In just five years after the end of
World War II, fifty new electronics industries began in the Valley. International
Business Machines (IBM) established a card printing plant in 1948 in San Jose,
and Russell and Sigurd Varian, inventors of the klystron tube, founded Varian
Associates to manufacture devices.7 Other industrial developers founded their
companies on what would become the Stanford Industrial Park in the late 1950s.
Before the wartime transformations, however, Silicon Valley was known
instead as the “Garden of the World.” This landscape was constructed out of agri-
5Foote, Pen Pictures from the Garden of the World, 21.
6Mary McDougall Gordon, “ ‘This Italy and Garden Spot of All-America’: A Forty-Niner’s
Letters from the Santa Clara Valley in 1851,” Pacific Historian 39:1 (1985): 12.
7Friedly, “‘This Brief Eden’,” 317.
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Figure 1.1: North Santa Clara Valley looking east towards San Jose, 1962. Photograph
from Air–Photo Co., Inc., Palo Alto Airport, Palo Alto.
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culture and the creation of a “garden myth.”8 We can begin to understand how
the Valley was thought of as a desired place influenced by the Valley’s agricultural
productivity and climate. The past peculiarities of the Valley’s agriculture history
illustrates how nineteenth century Spanish, Mexican, and American settlers came
to define land use around climate and productivity. To understand the tensions
between users of the land—should a hillside be a research laboratory, suburb, or
preserved in a “natural” state?—a consideration of the “garden myth” helps ex-
plain later patterns of metropolitan development and environmental thought in
the twentieth century. As the lands became understood as an agricultural bounty,
it also influenced the shape and character of cities. The market towns of Santa
Clara Valley adapted to this landscape, seen specifically through San Jose and its
canneries and railroads or Saratoga and Los Gatos and “agricultural tourism.”
These places became defined by their “nature.” Before the Valley’s change to a
place for electronics, federal investments, and military geography, place was de-
fined by it’s natural surroundings, the definition of which remained contested
into the twentieth century.
the story begins with the land. As the Wisconsin glaciation period was ending
12,000 years ago, uplift resulting from the collision of the Pacific and North Amer-
ican tectonic plates started shaping the San Francisco Bay Area into its present
form. The collision forced the coastline northward along the San Andreas fault
and caused additional uplift along the entire coast, generating the coastal range.
The new coastal ranges interrupted the flow of air coming off the Pacific Ocean.
At the northern end of the Bay, a stubborn marine layer created by regular tem-
8On the emergence of the garden myth, see Mark Fiege, Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agri-
cultural Landscape in the American West (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999); Leo Marx,
The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1950).
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perature inversions that trapped cool, moist air caused regular fog to drift into the
mouth of the Bay. On the Pacific-facing side of the coastal ranges, the moisture-
heavy air allowed coastal redwoods to flourish, giving the Santa Cruz Mountains
a green vale year-round. Yet the range also produced a rain shadow for the flat-
lands of the Valley, where trees became scarcer and native grasses took their place.
The eastern half of the Valley rises again into the dry and khaki-brown Diablo
Range and it’s highest point, Mount Hamilton. The coastal ranges protected the
Valley from serious frosts, major storms, and excessive temperatures, giving the
region it’s reputation as one of the most temperate environments on the planet.9
The uplift of the coastal range reshaped the flow of water. As the glacial pe-
riod ended a single river flowed across the future Santa Clara Valley, meeting with
the Sacramento River to the east and flowing to the lowest point along the Coastal
Range. Glaciers never reached coastal California and did little to carve the land
into shape, but glaciers influenced the land as they began to melt. The melting
glaciers increased global sea levels, flooding the majority of ancient valleys and
creating the San Francisco Bay. Uplift allowed new trickles of water to slowly carve
paths into the landscape, but they remained narrow, shallow, and prone to flood-
ing. Most mountain run–off dissipated quickly into the well–drained alluvial soils
and replenished underground aquifers. Freshwater marshes, seasonally–flooded
meadows, forested wetlands, and riparian habitats were common natural features
on the Valley landscape. Nearly 5,000 years ago, the landscape of the present Bay
Area had largely taken shape.10
Below ground, the Valley was supplied by a regional aquifer consisting
of multiple Pleistocene aquifers grouped into upper and lower systems. These
groundwater systems were replenished primarily through precipitation, stream
9Amaury Mars, Reminiscences of Santa Clara Valley and San Jose´ (San Francisco: Artistic Publish-
ing Company, 1901), 76.
10Michael Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’: A History of Landscape Change in California’s Santa
Clara Valley,” (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 2000), 18.
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Figure 1.2: Reconstructed land cover map of the valley floor along Coyote Creek. From
Robin M. Grossinger et al., “Historical Landscape Ecology of an Urbanized California Val-
ley: Wetlands and Woodlands in the Santa Clara Valley,” Landscape Ecology 22 (December
2007): 112.
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channels, and, today, artificial recharge ponds. The presence of rock faults also
served as potential sources and barriers of hydrological flows. Twenty–six ma-
jor creeks flowed through the Valley, and the major rivers included the Arroyo
Hondo, Guadalupe River, and Pajaro River, which originated in the Santa Cruz
or Diablo Range and emptied into the Calaveras Reservoir, the San Francisco Bay,
and the Pacific Ocean respectively. A majority of the thirty–seven lakes now in
the Bay Area are artificial reservoirs. Two major dam projects, the Coyote Dam
built in 1936 and the Anderson Dam built in 1950, regulated watershed discharge
into the creeks and rivers. Changes in vegetation and habitats came about due to
changes in stream hydrology that included flood control efforts and summer wa-
ter releases from groundwater recharge associated with the Coyote and Anderson
dams.
The interactions of wind, air, and land shaped the layout of the Santa Clara
Valley. Between the Santa Cruz and Diablo mountain ranges, the Valley widens
out from 15 miles across at its northern point near the mouth of the San Francisco
Bay to 25 miles across at its southern end before the Diablo and Santa Cruz moun-
tains nearly converge to form the Coyote Narrows. Within these lands, the Valley
hosted a variety of lifeforms. Along the Valley floor, oak scrub, cacti, and a variety
of oak, willow, sycamore, and alder trees provided cover for wildlife and shelters
for native grasses. At higher elevations, a variety of conifers including coastal
redwoods (Sequoia sempervirens), ponderosa pine (pinus ponderosa), and sugar pine
(pinus lambertiana) mingled with white fir (Abies concolor) and black oak (Quercus
kelloggii) that carpeted the mountains in green. The plants of the Valley adapted
to the Mediterranean climate: perennial bunchgrasses die back every winter, leav-
ing only roots to help preserve water; oak trees have extensive root systems to
tap into groundwater supplies.11 The oak woodlands and chaparral ecoregions
11Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 20.
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provided habitats for acton woodpeckers, nuthatch, oak titmouse, and Pacific pal-
lid bats. The major waterways supported a diverse range of native fish species,
including Pacific lamprey (Lampetra tridentata), steelhead trout, chinook salmon,
Sacramento blackfish, and tule perch, among many others. Golden beavers and
raccoons shared the landscape with rabbits, squirrels, and other small species, as
well as a variety of snakes, lizards, spiders, and insects. Mountain lions, wolves,
and grizzly bears once hunted and lived in the valley, mingling with ungulates
such as elk and mule deer. Woodpeckers, wrentits, scrub jays, Chestnut-backed
Chickadees, and hundreds of additional bird species thrived in the Valley’s skies.
Human habitation of the Valley originated around 6,000 years ago. The
Ohlone people, Penutian-speakers that included the Miwok, Wintun, Maidu, and
Yokuts who likely migrated to the Santa Clara Valley from the eastern foothills of
the Central Valley, displaced or assimilated Hokan-speaking populations already
living in the area. When Spanish colonists arrived in the Valley in the 1760s,
Ohlone numbered between 7,000 and 26,000. They subsisted on the land by col-
lecting acorns from oak trees, hunted game, fished, and harvested clams and other
shellfish from the Bay. The discarded shells formed the famous shellmounds along
the Bay’s shores.12 The Spanish brought disease and warfare, which overwhelmed
Ohlone communities. In the fifty years between the arrival of Spanish missionaries
and the end of Spanish rule in 1821, Native populations declined by seventy-five
percent in the Bay Area.13
When Spanish colonial settlers first crested the Santa Cruz Mountains in
12For a map of the shellmound locations, see Matthew Booker and Allen Roberts, Shellmounds in
San Francisco Bay Area, 1909, Spatial History Project, Stanford University, https://web.stanford.
edu/group/spatialhistory/cgi-bin/site/viz.php?id=23.
13Matthew Booker, Down by the Bay: San Francisco’s History between the Tides (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2012), 22–26; Randall Milliken, A Time of Little Choice: The Disintegration of Tribal
Culture in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1769–1810 (Menlo Park, CA: Ballena Press, 1995); James J.
Rawls, Indians of California: The Changing Image (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986),
13–21; Albert L. Hurtado, Indian Survival on the California Frontier (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1990).
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the late-1760s, they saw a Valley hosting a range of ecosystems—coastal redwoods
and Douglas fir dominated the ridge of the mountain, giving way to chaparrel
shrub that occupied the rockier soils in the foothills. As the foothills smoothed
out into the flatlands of the valley, grasslands overtook the chaparrel and were
dotted with oak savannahs, cottonwoods, laurels, and willow groves. Nearer the
bay, salt marshes and vernal pools dominated the land. Franciscan missionaries
gave the Valley the name Llano de los Robles (“Plain of the Oaks”) as they es-
tablished missions throughout the Valley. The eighth mission established by Fray
Jose´ Murguı´a was given the name Mission Santa Clara de Ası´s (“Clare” or “Clara”
means “clear” or “bright”), giving the valley its current namesake.14
The Spanish also recognized the richness of the Valley soil. The alluvial
soils provided rich nutrients to the expanding agricultural presence in the Valley.
When George Vancouver nosed his ship into the Bay to visit Mission San Jose
in 1792, he admired the crops of wheat, maize, peas, and beans, “which had
been obtained with little labour and without manure.” The Mission’s gardens
contained peaches, apricots, pears, and fig trees. Vancouver noted the soil and
climate seemed “well adapted to most sorts of fruit.”15 Vancouver overlooked
Ohlone contributions to the land, noting only that they “still remained in the
most abject state of uncivilization.”16 But Ohlones had transformed the land—
they hunted game, trapped fish and netted waterfowl, harvested shellfish, planted
seeds, lit fires to control brush buildup, and perhaps collected salt from naturally
evaporating ponds for trade.17 European settlers expanded such transformations
on the land, establishing large plots of land for farms and ranches. By the time
Vancouver visited the missions, San Jose´ produced enough cattle and crops to
14Pedro Font, Font’s Comlete Diary: A Chronicle of the Founding of San Francisco (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1933), 323–324.
15George Vancouver quoted in Mel Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area: A Metropolis in Perspective
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 12.
16Vancouver quoted in Booker, Down by the Bay, 20.
17Booker, Down by the Bay, 21.
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fully support the mission as well as the Spanish presidios in Monterey and San
Francisco.
European animals also reshaped the land. A French merchant visiting the
Santa Clara and San Jose´ missions in 1828 estimated that twelve thousand cat-
tle and fifteenth thousand sheep grazed on the foothills. The perennial bunch-
grasses once common on the hillsides of the valley all but disappeared as animals
devoured them and allowed less-desirable grazing annuals to crowd out native
grasses. New plants transplanted from seeds brought along by the Spanish, either
intentionally or not, also took root in the Valley. The changing grasses also left
the hillsides more susceptible to erosion as long-established root systems deterio-
rated. Greater erosion changed the Valley’s waterways, allowing runoff to deposit
voluminous mud that destroyed roads and filled river outlets into the bay.18
Portions of the garden myth trace themselves to the waterscape, but also
to the great expanse of trees that once occupied the flatlands and valley hill-
sides. Oak trees once dotted the flatlands of the Santa Clara Valley and were
uniquely adapted to survive both the arid climate and human influences. Fires,
set by Ohlone and by storms, led oaks to adapt to burnings through thicker barks
and an ability to sprout new growth from root systems. Fires also released new
nutrients into the soils, allowing the hardier oak saplings to take advantage of the
lack of competition for fresh nutrients.19 The same climate and soils that proved
so nutrient-dense for crops were ideal for trees. The great collections of redwoods,
oaks, and riparian groves that grew along the Santa Cruz range and along rivers
18Booker, Down by the Bay, 24–26; Richard Walker, The Country in the City: The Greening of the San
Francisco Bay Area (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 26–28; Milliken, Time of Little
Choice, 72–74, 98–99, 148, 221; Daniel J. Pitti, The Devil in Silicon Valley: Northern California, Race,
and Mexican Americans (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 20–23. Californios especially
after independence from Spain in 1821 increased their reliance on the cattle industry, expand-
ing their presence to meet a demand for hide and tallow. Cecilia M. Tsu, Garden of the World:
Asian Immigrants and the Making of Agriculture in California’s Santa Clara Valley (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 18.
19Friedly, “‘This Brief Eden’,” 58.
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Figure 1.3: Mission San Jose by Henry Chapman Ford, ca. 1883. Courtesy of University of
Southern California Libraries.
in the flatlands commanded the attention of timberers who sought to realize for-
tunes from nature. Spanish missionaries used abundant wood sources primarily
for construction rather than selling timber in markets. Not until the arrival of
Americans in the mid-nineteenth century would logging become a commodity
for sale. Redwood City to the north of Palo Alto, for example, originated with the
establishment of a lumber wharf in the southwest end of the San Francisco Bay
in the 1860s, floating cut timber northward up the Bay to the shipping ports in
San Francisco. Timbermen like William Page arrived in California from New York
around 1860, relocating to Palo Alto in 1879 after he purchased a lumberyard and
timber lands near Mill Creek. Page’s Mill Road—now the scenic route Old Page
Mill Road outside Palo Alto—became a major thoroughfare for moving lumber
out of Palo Alto to the wharfs in Redwood City.20
Water played a central role in the Santa Clara Valley. Water, at times,
seemed too abundant. Heavy rains around 1791 flooded Mission San Jose´, forcing
20Ralph Hansen, “Historical Notes of Interest Surrounding Page Mill Road and Environs,” 1,
n.d., Folder 9, Box 1, Page Mill Co-ordinating Committee Records, Stanford University.
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the missionaries to relocate the settlement. Spanish missionaries would eventually
relocate San Jose three times to get away from an erratically flooding Guadalupe
River. But if water could be too abundant, it could also be fickle. The critical
growing months of summer also left the Guadalupe River devoid of water. Mis-
sionaries, usually with forced labor provided by Ohlone, constructed dams on
the Guadalupe to capture the waters when they flowed, which found its way into
canals and ditches to irrigated wheat fields.21 Not until the arrival of Americans
were wells sunk to tap into underground water supplies.
Figure 1.4: “Poplar City connecting the cities of San Jose and Santa Clara, Cal.” (San
Francisco: Thompson & West, 1876). Courtesy the David Rumsey Map Collection.
in 1821 mexico cast off spanish colonial rule, leading to the end of the mer-
cantile system and allowing foreign trade to expand. Mexican inhabitants of Cal-
21Clyde Arbuckle, Clyde Arbuckle’s History of San Jose: Chronicling San Jose’s Founding as California’s
Earliest Pueblo in 1777, Through Exciting and Tumultuous History Which Paved the Way for Today’s
Metropolitan San Jose (San Jose: Smith & McKay, 1985), 11; Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 112; Mars,
Reminiscences of Santa Clara Valley, 25.
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ifornia, known as Californios, adopted cattle as their central economic activity.
Trade in tallow and hides became the core enterprise of Californios. Following
the Mexican-American War, the Santa Clara Valley became part of America in
1848. American immigrants, primary Irish Catholics, began arriving in the 1840s
and quickly seized Californios property. Anglo-Americans ignored stipulations in
the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hildalgo that Mexican-held property would remain in
their hands. The passage of the California Land Act on March 3, 1851, placed the
burden of proof to property rights onto Californios who lacked both knowledge
about the workings of the American justice system as well as extensive docu-
mentation about their property holdings. Under the Land Act, Californios land
holdings quickly eroded as Anglo-Americans replaced the Californios economic
base with their own.22
As cattle ranching gave way to wheat farming and, later, orchard produc-
tion, Anglo-Americans reshaped the land to serve their needs. When farmers of
the Santa Clara Valley began irrigating their lands, they added a level of environ-
mental change to a land that had already undergone momentous change at the
hands of humans. The flow of the Valley’s waterscape—the rivers, canals, reser-
voirs, dams, creeks, and streams that comprised this landscape—would emerge as
a hybrid landscape that both aided and hindered humans. The ecological trans-
formations of the Valley swung between destruction and creation. The building
of new dams, reservoirs, and canals interrupted the water’s flow across the land-
scape, which in turn destroyed or drastically altered habitats used by other flora
and fauna.
The water engineers thought little about the destructive aspects of their
projects. Indeed, for many these projects were signs of progress and improvement—
22Tsu, Garden of the World, 18; Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 274–278; Douglas Monroy, Thrown
Among Strangers: Making of Mexican Culture Frontier (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993),
233–251; Pitti, Devil in Silicon Valley, 52–77.
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of human’s ability to bend nature to their will. The drilling of numerous wells
across the Valley allowed farmers to tap into an unused water source beneath
them. In 1854, when San Jose was still the capital of California, the first wells
were sunk into the earth. Diggers struck water at fifty-five feet below the surface
of the earth, continued digging until they reached eighty feet, then drilled through
an impermeable layer of rock into a pressurized artesian well.23 The Spanish and
Ohlone did not know of the artesian reservoir’s existence; the reservoir had col-
lected water for centuries until it was first pierced by a six-inch diameter well.24
Shortly after the first well was bored, two additional wells were drilled nearby.25
Americans became convinced they had discovered an inexhaustible supply of wa-
ter. San Jose booster Frederick Hall could hardly contain his excitement. “As this
year [1854] came rolling in,” he wrote,
the artesian water first came surging up from its hidden depths, to
play and sparkle in the living light of day. What a change! What a
wealth for this beautiful valley! Far beyond in value the discovery of a
dozen gold mines; it appeared to be the work of an enchantment. This
was the only thing that seemed to be wanting. All had felt that the
scarcity of water for irrigation, and good for drinking, were the great
necessaries of this lovely valley.26
The fickleness of the valley’s water supply, however, plagued Americans.
While the early wells tapped into the artesian system provided abundant water—
at times too much, as when G. A. Dabney’s drilling released so much pressurized
water it flooded the streets of San Jose in six feet of water for several weeks—
23Frederic Hall, The History of San Jose´ and Surroundings with Biographical Sketches of Early Settlers
(San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft and Company, 1871), 263.
24Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 329.
25Hall, The History of San Jose´, 263–264.
26Hall, The History of San Jose´, 262–263. Almost a decade later, the City of San Jose credited the
artesian wells for “solving” the area’s water problems, noting the tapping of the San Fernando
Street well that produced so much water that “a stream 4 feet wide by six inches deep [flowed]
for six weeks despite all efforts to cap it.” San Jose Planning Commission, Master Plan of the City
(San Jose: City of San Jose, 1958), 10.
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by the 1860s the availability of water started wavering.27 Severe floods in 1861
overflowed the Coyote and Guadalupe Rivers and killed thousands of cattle, yet
in the three years after the floods a prolonged drought killed thousands more. In
1862 Santa Clara County had around 19,000 cattle on the rangelands; by 1868, that
figure had fallen to 10,000. Outbreaks of big jaw and Texas fever swept through
the Valley in the early 1860s, adding to a shifting preference away from ranch-
ing.28 The instability of cattle raising initiated the conversion of rangelands to
croplands. The cattle culture introduced by the Spanish ninety years earlier fell
away as ranchers sold their lands to farmers. Wheat cultivation especially took
off in the 1860s. While ranching remained dominant in 1860, nearly 26,000 acres
were converted into farms by 1857. By 1863, 165,000 acres were under cultivation,
and by the end of the decade farming dominated the valley.29
The severe droughts in the 1860s led farmers to rely heavily on the ground-
water supplies, which had the effect of lowering the groundwater table. Ameri-
cans understood groundwater recharge and overdraft, and before long compre-
hended the interconnected artesian system belowground. As one well drew wa-
ter supplies, it lowered the availability of all the other wells.30 Some Americans
continued to live by what historian Michael Friedly called the “illusion of inex-
haustibility,” noting one writer in 1876 who gleefully wrote about the Valley’s
“supply [of artesian water] is inexhaustible, and would, with the inauguration of
the proper system, be sufficient to irrigate the entire valley.”31 Yet the droughts
and dwindling artesian supplies led American capitalists to pursue alternative
forms of water supply. In November 1866, businessmen organized the San Jose
Water Company (SJWC) to supply water to its residents. The towns of San Jose
27Hall, The History of San Jose´, 264.
28Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 301–302.
29Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 302, 306–307; Henry Foote, Pen Pictures from the Garden of the World
(Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1888), 23; Hall, The History of San Jose´, 444–445.
30Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 333–335.
31Quoted in Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 338.
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and Santa Clara gave the company a twenty-five-year lease to pursue water re-
source development and provide the towns with reliable water. SJWC first turned
to artesian wells, but as overdraft continued to exhaust the supply they sought out
the flowing waters of the Los Gatos Creek. Flowing from the Santa Cruz Moun-
tains into the Guadalupe River west of San Jose, SJWC built a network of pipes
and a 2.5 million gallon reservoir to funnel the creek’s water to their customers.32
The artesian supply continued to be unreliable. The end of the droughts in the
late 1860s filled the underground reservoirs, but when drought returned in the
1870s the supply again ran dry.33
Figure 1.5: B.S. Fox’s nursery along the Coyote River. Thompson & West Atlas, 1876.
Water engineering projects introduced unanticipated problems. By the 1930s,
agricultural wells had become a problem for the Valley. A 1921 engineering report
warned of the falling water table and its possible threat to farming and cities. Con-
32Hall, The History of San Jose´, 305–307.
33Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 336–337.
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tinual overdrafting of the water supply led to subsidence—the sinking of surface
land as the emptied aquifers compressed under the weight of the earth above
them—which led to ruptured well casings, broken water lines, damage to build-
ing foundations, and made well–pumping more expensive for farmers as wells
were sunk deeper to reach lowered water tables. Even worse, traces of salt from
the San Francisco Bay appeared in the aquifers, another result of sinking land
reshaping the underground water system. Salty water was useless for irrigation
and unable to be used for drinking water.34 Realizing that the underground wa-
ters were unsustainable, politicians looked to the examples of the Hetch Hetchy
and Owens Valley reservoirs in San Francisco and Los Angeles, respectively. Her-
bert C. Jones, an attorney from Stanford and member of the State Senate elected
as a Progressive Republican in 1913, took steps to remedy the valley’s growing
water problem. Spending-wary voters twice rejected bond measures to construct
percolation ponds and dam projects to help trap and funnel waters back into the
underground aquifers. In 1929, Jones introduced a new bill to placate voters by
setting up a water district that lacked the power of provisioning bonds to pay for
water projects. The bill finally met the approval of voters, and the Jones Act helped
establish the Santa Clara Valley Water Conservation District (SCVWCD) in 1930
with the mandate to help solve the reliability of water. By the end of the 1930s,
SCVWCD constructed six new dams.35 The Valley’s cities also contracted with
existing water infrastructure, including private water suppliers and the Hetch
Hetchy, to supply the growing farms and cities with enough resources.36
While engineers worked toward solutions to the water supply, farmers
34Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area, 230; William L. Berry and Herbert A. Howlett, “Supplemental
Water for the San Francisco Area,” American Water Works Association 50:5 (May 1958): 279.
35Glenna Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream: Gender, Class, and Opportunity
in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 103–104.
36As of 1996, 42% of the Valley’s water comes from local reservoirs, 23% comes from the Central
Valley Project, 19% comes from the State Water Project, and 16% is purchased from the Hetch
Hetchy aqueduct. Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream, 104.
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sought ways to adapt their crops to the land and climate. Although the semiarid
Valley provided little rainfall outside the winter months of November through
March, farmers enjoyed a consisted and long growing season. The Valley’s moun-
tains prevented serious frosts, protected the valley from harsh winds, and storms
of any sort were rare. The rich alluval soils provided wheat with plenty of nu-
trients. These combined factors of climate and soil allowed farmers to determine
which crops were best suited to the area. While the Spanish tended to use most
of the Valley for ranching, Americans overturned the Spanish ranching culture by
the 1860s and instead adopted dry wheat farming, oats, barley, and other grains.
By the 1870s wheat farming dominated the Valley as farmers collected nearly 1.2
million bushels of wheat, an 872% increase from twenty years earlier.37
Just as wheat cultivation reached its peak in the 1870s, fruit cultivation
began to take root. Prune cultivation introduced in 1856 by Louis Pellier was fol-
lowed quickly by other fruit varieties well-suited to the climate. By 1888, historian
George Bancroft estimated that California shipped 54 million pounds of fresh
fruit, 39 million pounds of canned fruit, and 20 million pounds of dried fruit to
the East Coast.38 By 1915 the Santa Clara Valley alone produced one-third of the
world’s prune crop as well as significant amounts of walnuts and apricots. Just
before the outbreak of World War II, California supplied over half of the world’s
dried prunes.39
Over time, the emergence of the canning industry would alter the agricul-
tural landscape further. In 1871, Dr. James Dawson started canning his surplus
peaches and pears, starting what would become a massive cannery industry that
37Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 302.
38Bancroft, History of California, VII, 743; Mel Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area: A Metropolis in
Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 71.
39Robert C. Fellmeth, Politics of Land: Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on Land use in California
(Grossman Publishers, 1973), 32–33; Edward N. Torbert, “The Specialized Commercial Agriculture
of the Northern Santa Clara Valley,” Geographical Review 26:2 (April 1936): 248; Richard Rowe,
“Agricultural Land and Open Space in Santa Clara County and Its Preservation” (M.A. thesis,
Stanford University, 1962), 23, 42.
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dominated the Valley’s economy until World War II.40 By 1872 San Jose boasted
two large canneries.41 Along with advancements in transportation methods in-
cluding the completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869 and the intro-
duction of refrigerated rail cars in 1888, fruit and vegetable production became
economically profitable and allowed trade to expand. On the verge of the Great
Depression, thirty-eight canneries operated in Santa Clara County. The Califor-
nia canneries of Del Monte, the California Packing Corporation (Calpak), Hunt’s,
Richmond-Case, Bayside Canning Company, Precita Canning Company, and the
Garden City Canning Company all operated in Santa Clara County by the 1920s.
By the middle of the twentieth century, California produced more canned fruits
and vegetables than any other state.42
New systems of food preparation, shipping, distribution, and financing
aided the transition to fruit production. The completion of a railroad between San
Francisco and San Jose in 1864 allowed farms to ship goods out of the agricultural
towns of the Valley to the ports in San Francisco. The new Oceanic Steamship
Company began importing raw sugar and other products from Hawaii, aiding
further the shift to fruit canning. Claus Spreckle’s huge sugar refinery built along
23rd Street in San Francisco helped refine the Hawaiian sugar into a cannery prod-
uct. Fruit growers also benefited from the invention of an orchard spray pump,
created by John Bean of Los Gatos. The invention allowed fruit growers to com-
bat pests and insects more easily. Bean’s success allowed him to found the Food
Machinery and Chemical Corporation in San Jose in 1883.43
In addition to copious amounts of water and its attendant problems noted
40Rowe, “Agricultural Land and Open Space,” 249.
41Mel Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area: A Metropolis in Perspective (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1959), 68.
42Tsu, Garden of the World, 76–77; Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream, 34–
37; Vicki Ruı´z, Cannery Women, Cannery Lives: Mexican Women, Unionization, and the California Food
Processing Industry, 1930–1950 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987), 21–23.
43Mel Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area: A Metropolis in Perspective (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1959), 73.
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above, the orchards generated tremendous levels of waste. Much of the waste
came in the form of cannery effluence. To aid the canneries in their production,
San Jose especially became a willing partner. Beginning in the 1870s the small
farm town began construction of a storm and sewage system that would funnel
wastes away from the city. Much of the waste found itself simply dumped into
the San Francisco Bay. While the system seemed to effectively deal with the prob-
lem of waste in the city, it had the effect of upsetting the Bay’s ecosystems. The
dumping of the city’s waste into the Bay all but destroyed the clam and shrimp
industries as the contamination of water caused steadily-increasing dieoffs that
made the raising and harvesting of molluscan fisheries unprofitable.44
The orchards also clouded the skies with soot. Orchardists employed the
use of smudgepots—a device comprised of a basin that held kerosene and a
chimney-like pipe emerging roughly five feet high—to warm orchard fields and
prevent frosts from damaging fruits. Usually lit and burned through the duration
of the night, the smudgepots cast smoke and oily soot into the air. Californians re-
called waking up after cool nights to find themselves covered in an oily film from
the kerosene burners, and children were loathe to arrive at school with “smudge
face.”45
Cattle ranching, wheat and grain production, and quicksilver mining flour-
ished in the Valley in the late nineteenth century prior to the Valley becoming
44Stanford Environmental Law Society, San Jose: Sprawling City: A Report on Land Use Policies and
Practices in San Jose, California (Stanford: Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University,
1971), 13; John E. Skinner, An Historical Review of the Fish and Wildlife Resources of the San Francisco
Bay Area, California Department of Fish and Game, (June 1962), 100; Dreisbach, Handbook of the
San Francisco Region, 155; Charles Gilman Hyde and George Leonard Sullivan, Santa Clara County
Sewage Disposal Survey: Report upon the Collection, Treatment and Disposal of Sewage and Industrial
Wastes of Santa Clara County (Ann Arbor: Edward Brothers, 1946), 101–102.
45Jared Farmer, Trees in Paradise: A California History (New York: W. W. Norton & Com-
pany, 2013), 294–296; Robin Chapman, California Apricots: The Lost Orchards of the Silicon Valley
(Charleston, S.C.: American Palate, 2013), 90–91. Smudgepots were more commonly used in other
parts of California, especially in Southern California which experienced two kinds of cold snaps,
either through atmospheric inversion or from Arctic air sweeping down through the Great Basin
across the Mojave Desert and into California. Nevertheless, smudgepots were still occasionally
used in the Valley. See Farmer, Trees in Paradise, 291–292.
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Figure 1.6: Smudging in orchards to prevent frosts from damaging fruits. Reproduced
from Jared Farmer, Trees in Paradise: A California History (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2013).
“one vast orchard.”46 By the end of the nineteenth century, fruit production had
surpassed all other agricultural, mining, and timbering activity. The growth of Sil-
icon Valley occurred upon some of California’s most fertile lands. A survey by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture designated 400 square kilometers—32 percent—of
Santa Clara County as Class 1 land, the highest ranking possible for the cultiva-
tion of fruits and vegetables. Water systems flowing into the valley carved out rich
alluvial fans in the Valley. Santa Clara Valley farms remained relatively small. In
1900, the typical farm was under fifty acres; in 1920, the average farm size was
forty acres and dropped to thirty-two acres by 1950.47 Agricultural activity by the
1940s witnessed around 6,000 farms in the Valley, mostly family–run operations
that totaled around 132,000 acres and some eight million cherry, apricot, and pear
46San Jose Chamber of Commerce, San Jose´, Santa Clara County, California (San Jose: San Jose
Chamber of Commerce, 1910), 4; Tsu, Garden of the World, 17.
47Tsu, Garden of the World, 6.
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trees.48 By the end of the nineteenth century, as the region became a prominent
agricultural producer, Sunset magazine writers labeled it “The Valley of Heart’s
Delight” and “The Delectable Valley” due to its reputation as a major fruit pro-
ducer.49 As late as the 1950s, canneries processed more than thirty percent of the
state’s crop of fruit and vegetables. Although the valley itself only produced a
small portion of the crop, the facilities for canning, drying, and freezing were
located near rail, highway, and water routes in the South Bay.50 The Valley had
become a major agricultural center, and with it came the “garden myths.”
the agrarian culture that had come to dominate the Valley was exalted
not only for its remarkable productivity but also for its aesthetics and promise
of the “good life.” When John Muir passed through the Valley in the spring of
1872, he remarked that the Santa Clara Valley’s climate was “the best we ever
enjoyed.”51 The French writer Amaury Mars agreed. When he visited the Santa
Clara Valley in 1901, he gushed that “no spot in the world has Nature been more
lavish of her gifts. The heat is never oppressive nor the cold severe; there is never
too much moisture, while thunder storms and, above all, cyclones are altogether
unknown here.”52 The valley’s landscape offered a compelling tale: a veritable
garden; indeed, the Garden of the World. The story was uncomplicated, and in its
simplicity it masked historical realities of the landscape.
“What a sight it was to behold all those old oaks and majestic sycamores,”
wrote Amaury Mars during his visit to Santa Clara Valley in 1901.53 The oaks
48Sachs, “Virtual Ecology,” 16.
49G. von Vieregg, “Santa Clara: The Delectable Valley,” Sunset, August 1912; E. Alexander Pow-
ell, “The Valley of Heart’s Delight,” Sunset, August 1912.
50Paul Griffin and Ronald Chatham, “An Industrial Analysis of North Santa Clara County,”
County of Santa Clara Planning Department, 3.
51John Muir, John Muir: His Life and Letters and Other Writings, ed. Terry Gifford (Seattle: Moun-
taineers, 1996), 96.
52Mars, Reminiscences of Santa Clara Valley, 76.
53Mars, Reminiscences of Santa Clara Valley, 58.
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were a source of attraction for the rural lifestyle painted by the region’s boost-
ers. “The valley is a park,” claimed the San Jose Chamber of Commerce in 1910,
“originally dotted with magnificent oaks.” Left unsaid by the twentieth century
was the near-elimination of oaks from the valley floor.54 The shift from ranching
to farming also led to widespread clearcutting of trees. Eager to clear the land for
maximum availability of cultivation, farmers cut down oak woodlands and wil-
low groves, filled vernal pools, and reclaimed salt marshes to expand the amount
of land available for farming. The cutting of trees also formed a core business
for timber interests. Returning Gold Rush seekers often went into the lumber
business rather than farming. By 1857 twelve sawmills were active in Santa Clara
Valley. Groves and woodlands were quickly cleared and transformed into land for
cultivation.55 When aspiring homesteader Bernard Reid moved to Santa Clara in
1851, he noted that most wood for fuel was hauled in from three miles away. No
nearby lumber existed for the town.56 As oak woodlands disappeared from the
Valley floor, timbermen went into the hills for the redwoods. By the 1880s, much
of the accessible forests in the Santa Cruz Mountains were logged.57
Key to Santa Clara Valley resident’s understanding of themselves was the
“nature” they had inherited. Above all, the orchards symbolized the Valley as a
paradise on earth. Journalist Bayard Taylor, arriving in California in 1849, reported
on “the vast and wonderful landscape” of the Santa Clara Valley. He wrote of
the soft cloudless sky—the balmy atmosphere—the mountain ranges
on either hand, stretching far before me until they vanished in a pur-
ple haze—the silica sweep of the plain, with its islands and shores of
54Today, the valley oak (Quercus lobata) is among California’s most threatened oak species,
largely because they grew on lands desired for suburbanization and agricultural development.
See Robin M. Grossinger, Charles J. Striplen, Ruth A. Askevold, Elise Brewster, and Erin E. Beller,
“Historical Landscape Ecology of an Urbanized California Valley: Wetlands and Woodlands in the
Santa Clara Valley” Landscape Ecology 22 (2007): 3.
55Foote, Pen Pictures from the Garden of the World, 21.
56Mary McDougall Gordon, “ ‘This Italy and Garden Spot of All-America’: A Forty-Niner’s
Letters from the Santa Clara Valley in 1851,” Pacific Historian 39:1 (1985): 12.
57Friedly, “‘This Brief Eden’,” 317.
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Figure 1.7: “Largest Prune Orchard in the World in Bloom, Mar. 26 1888,” near Los Gatos
in 1888. Pacific Coast Photo and View Co., Sourisseau Academy for State and Local His-
tory, San Jose State University.
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dark-greek oak, and the picturesque variety of animal life on all sides,
combined to form a landscape which I may have seen equaled but
never surpassed.58
Gold rush seeker Bernard Reid wrote in a letter to his family that the Valley “was
far preferable to any spot I had before seen in California,” describing the Valley
as “this Italy and garden spot of All-America—of singing birds, and the grassy
sward, and balmy air, and the sunny sky.”59 Visitors to the Valley celebrated the
expanse of trees, wild flowers, animals, and rural pastoralism of the Valley.60
Such thinking found its way into promotional material as well. The San
Jose Board of Trade asked rhetorically in 1895, “What will not thrive in the utmost
prodigality? . . . Come let us show you hundreds of acres in constant bearing.”61
The San Jose Chamber of Commerce boasted that the valley had the “largest fruit
canneries in the world; largest fruit packing houses in the world; largest fruit
drying ground in the world.” The Chamber beckoned farmers from the Midwest
and Northeast, where climate and frosts could threaten their crops. Not so in
Santa Clara Valley, where sunshine outnumbered cloudy skies. Chamber adver-
tisements claimed 245 clear days and only a handful of rainy or cloudy days.62
The climate made for perfect farming conditions. “Without any days so cold as
the colder days of an Illinois April, it has no days so warm as the warmer days
of an Illinois June,” the Chamber assured readers in 1910.63 The Valley presented
farmers with a seemingly assured profit and almost no risk thanks to the climate
in which they could grow their produce.
The orchard landscape introduced new myths to the Valley. As historian
58Quoted Gordon, “ ‘This Italy and Garden Spot of All-America’,” 5.
59Quoted in Gordon, “ ‘This Italy and Garden Spot of All-America’,” 9, 13.
60Mars, Reminiscences of Santa Clara Valley, 18, 26.
61San Jose Bord of Trade, “San Jose and Vicinity,” 1897, Santa Clara Valley’s Agricultural Past,
California Room, San Jose Public Library.
62San Jose Chamber of Commerce, San Jose´, Santa Clara County, California (San Jose: San Jose
Chamber of Commerce, 1910), 14.
63San Jose Chamber of Commerce, San Jose´, Santa Clara County, California (San Jose: San Jose
Chamber of Commerce, 1910), 14.
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Figure 1.8: Fruit drying trays, ca. 1920–1930. California Room, San Jose Public Library.
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Cecelia Tsu notes, by the 1880s California boosters promoted “orchard fruit grow-
ing as one of the most idyllic incarnations of the family farm ideal, and the Santa
Clara Valley as the finest location to live out this agrarian dream.”64 The San Jose
Chamber of Commerce boasted in 1910 that the “Santa Clara Valley is literally the
most fruitful valley in the world,” growing “the very best” fruits, and took pride in
“our magnificent roads, the best of country highways, our fine fruits, our possibil-
ities in home making, our universities, schools, churches, transportation facilities,
our ‘best ever’ climate” in transforming the Valley into a successful agricultural
center.65 As acreage devoted to fruit cultivation grew, so did the myths.66
Promotional material also placed the productivity of the land against an
idealized narrative of a Spanish and Mexican past. American promotional lit-
erature avoided distinctions among peoples and cultures, casting the Spanish,
Mexican, and Indian history of the Valley together as a “mission era” where land
went underutilized until Anglo-Americans improved the land. Spanish and Mex-
icans were cast as “content to eat, sleep, ride horseback and roll cigarettes” while
the land went unused, against the hard-working Anglo-American farmers rais-
ing orchards and who improved the land for maximum productivity.67 Orchards
replaced adobe as a defining feature of the Valley. While the Spanish names re-
mained on the Valley’s landscape like the city names “Santa Clara,” “Palo Alto,”
and “San Jose,” Anglo-American promoters had recast the landscape in their
view. Promoters anticipated that newcomers would be unfamiliar with the pro-
nunciation of Spanish names and instructed Anglo-Americans on pronunciation
64Cecilia M. Tsu, Garden of the World: Asian Immigrants and the Making of Agriculture in California’s
Santa Clara Valley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5.
65San Jose Chamber of Commerce, San Jose´, Santa Clara County, California (San Jose: San Jose
Chamber of Commerce, 1910), 16, 28.
66The San Francisco Chronicle estimated that nearly 40,000 acres of the Santa Clara Valley were
devoted to the fruit industry in 1895. “Santa Clara Valley: A Favored Section,” San Francisco Chron-
icle, July 29, 1895.
67Santa Clara County and Its Resources: A Souvenir of the San Jose Mercury (San Jose: San Jose
Mercury Publishing and Printing Company, 1896), 12, quoted in Tsu, Garden of the World, 19.
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to clarify that “San Jose” was pronounced “San Hosay.”68 When botanist William
Brewer passed through the Valley in 1861 he remarked that Americans were al-
ready showing signs of progress. The Valley, he noted, was “all . . . enclosed, in
farms, and under good cultivation. Farmhouses, orchards, etc., give it an Amer-
ican look . . . [The valley] is perhaps twelve or fourteen miles wide at San Jose,
an almost perfect plain, very fertile, a perfect garden, and much of it in higher
cultivation than any other part of California.”69
What historian Mark Fiege concluded for nineteenth-century Idaho—that
Americans crafted a story of “pioneers [who] conquered the howling wilderness
and transformed it into beautiful, productive fields and farms”—could be equally
applied to the Santa Clara Valley.70 The story was a powerful one in American
culture. The land was one of Eden, and the garden myth that emerged in the
nineteenth century would maintain a powerful grip on the human imposition of
ideas onto nature. Americans viewed the valley through the lens of capitalizing
on the “prodigal gifts of nature,” picturing straight plots of reclaimed land held
by private-property owning farmers who toiled to raise the best fruit in the world.
By the end of the nineteenth century, fruit stood at the core of life in the Santa
Clara Valley and in many ways came to define the market towns. The horticulture
economy was not simply an accident of topography but came from culture as well.
Promoters of the Valley crafted a narrative of a land laid fallow under the hands
of Indians and Spanish transformed into a garden by Americans. Emphasizing
conquest, both over people and over nature, the narrative crafted a vision of the
68San Jose Chamber of Commerce, “San Jose (San Hosay): Santa Clara County, California” (San
Jose Chamber of Commerce, 1910); Hall, History of San Jose, 8. See also Tsu, Garden of the World, 21;
Aaron Cavin, “The Borders of Citizenship: The Politics of Race and Metropolitan Space in Silicon
Valley” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2012), 226.
69William Brewer, Up and Down California in 1860–1864: The Journal of William H. Brewer (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1930), 173, quoted in Friedly, “ ‘This Brief Eden’,” 306. Italics in
original.
70Mark Fiege, Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in the American West (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1999.), 171.
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Valley put to better use by the ingenuity and industry of Americans. City and
nature were culturally intertwined.
Over time, city leaders valued the orchards, recognizing their importance
in crafting an image of the Valley that would draw people to the towns. Irrigation,
roads, sewers, railroads, cheap land, and consistently-productive farms became
hallmarks of promotional literature all revolving around the orchard trees. The
orchard trees were admired but also celebrated for the significant income it pro-
vided communities.71 Americans admired their handiwork on the land. In 1894
San Jose held its first agricultural festival at Agricultural Park that featured ap-
pearances by Arizona Charlie’s troupe, Doc Goodwin’s horse riders, fireworks,
and dancing, to celebrate the agricultural bounty of the Valley. By the early 1900s
Saratoga advertised “blossom week” hosted by the Santa Clara County Improve-
ment Club where visitors flocked to the valley to view orchards in full bloom.
Such pilgrimages to nature continued well into the late 1950s, when residents
and visitors could take part of “Blossom Tours” that allowed them to view fruit
trees in full bloom at various times of the year.72
The exceptional growing climate, fertile soil, and plentiful water from arte-
sian wells allowed farmers to transform the landscape into its reputation as a
fruit capital. By the 1920s, Santa Clara Valley led the state in fruit production,
drying, canning, and packing, providing a range of products such as cherries,
prunes, apricots, pears, peaches, plums, and apples. By 1930, Santa Clara County
produced between one-third to one-half of the world’s prune supply.73 The cul-
tivation and processing of apricots, prunes, pears, and cherries became staples
on the horticulture landscape.74 Fruit trees produced a canopy of pink and white
71Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream, 37.
72“San Jose’s Fiesta,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 22, 1894; “Blossom Festival in Santa Clara
Valley,” San Francisco Chroncile, March 22, 1902; “Santa Clara’s Blossom Festival,” San Francisco
Chronicle, April 6, 1903.
73Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream, 18; Tsu, Garden of the World, 17.
74Edward N. Torbert, “The Specialized Commercial Agriculture of the Northern Santa Clara
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Figure 1.9: Blossom tours in Santa Clara Valley were widely popular. Tours took place
several times per year depending on which trees were in bloom. Source: “Blossomtime
Tours: Santa Clara Valley Routes PC, ca. 1953,” Greater San Jose Chamber of Commerce,
Santa Clara History Center Collection, Santa Clara City Library.
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blossoms along with orange California poppies and other native wildflowers that
bloomed on the hillsides. The blooming seasons were popular early in the twen-
tieth century as visitors flocked to the area to behold the orchards in full bloom,
along with farmhouses, berry patches, vegetable gardens, and pastures.75 Little
wonder why Santa Clara Valley boosters advertised the area as “nearest Paradise”
and “the best spot in the whole earth,” a place where “the Eden of vine and tree”
was a “God-favored spot” and “God’s favorite valley.”76
Figure 1.10: Santa Clara Valley Blossom Time, Sourisseau Academy for State and Local
History.
Valley,” Geographical Review 26 (April 1936): 247–263.
75Edith Brockway, San Jose Reflections: An Illustrated History of San Jose, California and Some of
Surrounding Area (Campbell, Calif.: Academy Press, 1977), 132–133.
76Quotes from Tsu, Garden of the World, 3–4; H. S. Foote and C. A. Woolfolk, Picturesque San
Jose and Environments: An Illustrated Statement of the Progress, Prosperity, and Resources of Santa Clara
County, California (San Jose: H. S. Foote and C. A. Woolfolk, 1893), n.p.; The Progressive City Beau-
tiful: Santa Clara (Santa Clara Chamber of Commerce, n.d.); E. Alexander Powell, “The Valley of
Heart’s Delight,” Sunset 29 (August 1912), 120.
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the pre-world war ii spatial practices that configured Santa Clara Valley
were products of the agricultural economy. By the twentieth century, the Santa
Clara Valley landscape became more than just the earth. Collections of laws, insti-
tutions, attitudes, infrastructure, and policies were tied to the natural world of wa-
ter, soil, plants, and animals. City promoters in the nineteenth century crafted an
identity of the Valley around its climate, environmental amenities, and productiv-
ity, in the process embedding cultural values into perceptions of the valley while
farmers simultaneously grew prodigious orchards. But the Valley had become
an overburdened landscape through the demands placed on its environment.
Aquifers ran dry, forests were clear-cut, natural flora crowded out, and lacked
state and national parks until the mid-twentieth century. As industrialization and
urbanization took off in the twentieth century, the county became a groundswell
for environmentalism. The nineteenth century activities had great consequences
on the region’s people and environment, and each landscape greatly overlapped
one another leading to strenuous debates about how each landscape affected the
others.
The Valley distinguished itself in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies as a space for agricultural productivity. The monumental shifts in the Val-
ley economy came with two wars in Europe and Asia, transforming the industrial
activity of Santa Clara Valley towards high technology well before the moniker
Silicon Valley became a household term. The path between agriculture and high
technology may not seem straightforward, but the Valley’s history as an agricul-
tural center helped shape its twentieth century. The choice of water projects and
planning, built originally for the purpose of supporting agriculture, would come
to serve the metropolitan growth after World War II. The road systems, avail-
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ability of land, sewer systems, a major research university all became attractive
features to new industry and federal military investment during and after World
War II.
The orchards themselves would come to shape suburban sprawl. The im-
age of a home in the countryside drew newcomers and oldtimers of Santa Clara
Valley alike further and further away from downtowns in order to participate in
recreation and suburban domesticity. Throughout the San Francisco Peninsula,
families moved into unincorporated land to be near nature. As downtowns de-
clined, the suburbs rapidly expanded as federal tax policies and incentives en-
couraged businesses, malls, and subdivisions to locate new construction outside
city cores. Industrial recruitment likewise used the countryside lifestyle to attract
new industries. “Their scientists liked living there . . . attracted, in part, by the
region’s ‘good life’,” Richard Rowe wrote in his study of open space and agri-
culture in Santa Clara County. But Rowe worried about amenities disappearing
in the twentieth century. “Today’s open space appears headed for tomorrow’s
subdivision. With the loss of these open spaces the county will lose much of its
charm.”77
The orchards found expression on the landscape of the Valley’s infrastruc-
ture. Mid-twentieth century promoters did not forget the agricultural heritage of
the Valley, giving or maintaining street names such as “Blossom Hill,” “Cherry,”
“Apricot,” “Hillsdale,” “Willow Glen,” and “Cherrydale” that expressed a land-
scape culturally tied to agriculture. Homebuilders promoted their subdivisions
as “country-side living” next to orchards. The agricultural past became a tool for
the marketability of homes. Land as a productive source became valued differ-
ently, not as space that was agriculturally productive but as space fit for suburban
homes in the garden. The Garden of the World remained, but became cast as the
77Rowe, “Agricultural Land and Open Space,” 45.
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suburban dream.
While these events would come later in the postwar period, the infras-
tructure and culture of agriculture—roads, sewers, the countryside—supported
and encouraged urbanization. The economic and political demands of the nine-
teenth century allowed these spaces to take shape and contributed profoundly
to the process of Silicon Valley’s postwar urbanization. The Santa Clara County
underwent a definition of a particular kind of place that revolved around its re-
lationship to the environment. The cultural and structural creation of this Eden
by nineteenth century boosters and twentieth century promoters detailed a land-
scape put to the service of agricultural production, but its agricultural identity
was cast as the suburban ideal in the mid-twentieth century. The agricultural past
allowed cities like Santa Clara to boast of “THE GOOD LIFE” owing itself to the
“blooming orchard trees,” “relaxed outdoor living,” and the “heritage and legacy
of the early Franciscan padres.”78 The same culture of orchards-as-nature is what
led Wallace Stegner to conclude that the “original sin came with the Spaniards”
before Americans planted their pear, peach, cherry, prune, and apricot trees, the
“forerunners of the golden age.”79 In the process of redefining the land’s past, the
modern Santa Clara Valley took shape.
78Santa Clara Chamber of Commerce, “Industrial Introduction to the City of Santa Clara,” 1964,
Santa Clara City Library.
79Yvonne Jacobson, Passing Farms, Enduring Values: California’s Santa Clara Valley (Los Altos,
Calif.: W. Kaufmann, 1984.), x.
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Chapter 2
The Nature of Business
Palo Alto is half bedroom suburb, half futuristic 1970s science fiction movies. . . . The
big thing about Palo Alto is that, as a city, it designs tons of incredibly powerful and
scarry shit inside its science parks, which are EVERYWHERE.
—Douglas Coupland, Microserfs
Hammer in hand, the county went noisily about the job of transforming itself from
a rural to a metropolitan community. Bulldozers leveled orchards for thousands of
homesites. The steel webbing of new factories spread over former hay fields. Acres
of asphalt marked the parking areas of new suburban shopping centers. Service
stations sprang up like mushrooms along our major thoroughfares. Fleets of ready–
mix trucks disgorged concrete into the foundation forms of every kind of building—
in every part of the county. —Karl J. Belser, Planning Progress 1956
The West has long dreamed of an indigenous industry of sufficient magnitude to
balance its agricultural resources. The war advanced these hopes and brought to the
West the beginning of a great new era of industrialization. A strong and independent
industry must, however, develop its own intellectual resources of science and tech-
nology, for industrial activity that depends upon imported brains and second-hand
ideas cannot hope to be more than a vassal that pays tribute to its overlords, and is
permanently condemned to an inferior competitive position.
—Frederick Terman
On Labor Day in 1956 a caravan of 300 moving vans trekked into Santa
Clara County carrying the possessions of nearly 600 families and equipment for
Lockheed’s research labs. One month later, Lockheed’s first building on it’s 600-
acre Sunnyvale campus opened to its employees. Many of the families came from
Burbank, California, the home of Lockheed’s southern California corporate head-
quarters, to work in the new missile and space facility established in the northern
California city. The experience of Sunnyvale and Lockheed typified the indus-
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trial and suburban growth of Santa Clara County. Once a small agricultural mar-
ket town of 9,829 in 1950, Sunnyvale’s population expanded rapidly and housed
52,898 people by 1964. Employment in electronics research and manufacturing
expanded just as quickly, rising from less than 3,000 workers in 1940 to 68,000 in
1963.1 Among the advertisements sold to these companies was the Santa Clara
County environment. David Beers, whose father worked in the Sunnyvale facility,
recalled the Chamber of Commerce brochures ensuring an “all-year garden” and
“the most beautiful valleys in the world” that enticed his family’s relocation to
Sunnyvale.2 The convergence of boosterism, climate, environment, and industry
defined the contours of Santa Clara County’s growth liberalism.
The spatial transformation of agricultural space to industrial space in Santa
Clara County resulted from the imaginations of city builders and boosters during
the World War II and postwar eras. Coalitions of city builders, merchants, and
industrialists imagined a modern urban setting of single-family homes, separation
from a dependence on eastern capital, low taxes, the lack of unions, and plenty
of space to accommodate the expansion of cities. Home and work could occur
in what historian Robert Self called the “industrial garden” where workers and
their homes were in relative proximity to each other and nestled into the garden
landscape that erased distinctions between country and city. Through the process
of defining the countryside in the suburbs, boosters relied on California’s climate,
environment, and landscape to pitch their vision of the modern city.
1“Defense Boom: Lockheed Arrived in ’56, Leading to Economic Explosion,” San Jose Mercury
News, December 26, 1999; “Lockheed Aircraft: Midpenninsula’s Largest Employ,” Palo Alto Times,
February 3, 1960; interview with Jack Balletto, Silicon Genesis Project, Stanford University, 1–3.
Lockheed was not alone in its arrival to Santa Clara County in the postwar era, nor was it the first.
Hewlett-Packard, Varian Associates, GTE Sylvania, FMC Corp., and Philco Ford all established
operations for space, electronics, and telecommunications research and manufacturing prior to
1956.
2David Beers, Blue Sky Dream, {PG}.
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Figure 2.1: The Lockheed Missile and Space Division building in Sunnyvale, California,
ca. 1956–1957. Arnold Del Carlo Collection, Sourisseau Academy for State and Local
History, San Jose State University.
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the introduction of the military economy in the Santa Clara Valley trans-
formed the landscape in the Santa Clara Valley. The market towns of Palo Alto,
Sunnyvale, Mountain View, and San Jose had grown up around agricultural com-
modities and supporting their production, processing, and distribution. City offi-
cials encouraged the construction of city infrastructure to support activity in the
hinterlands, including roadways and sewers, and such decisions largely reflected
the desires and interests of farmers.
The transition to defense industries began prior to the attacks at Pearl Har-
bor in 1941. A decade before, the City of Sunnyvale purchased a 1,000 acre parcel
of farmland against the San Francisco Bay and sold the land to the Navy for
running dirigibles. The newly created Naval Air Station Moffett Field remained
relatively dormant until April 1942, when the base was used for staging anti-
submarine campaigns and maritime patrols. During the interwar era, scholars
at Stanford University initiated research agendas around microwave and radio
technology and their military applications.
Historians have warned of granting World War II too much influence in
shaping the West Coast. Roger Lotchin in particular suggests that defense-related
industries in Southern California and elsewhere in the West show that World
War II had less impact than assumed. Rather, World War II was a continuation
of policies underway well before the war and the benefits of federal spending
to cities were largely the result of unintended consequences. With that in mind,
however, the results of federal activism had deep effects in Santa Clara County’s
economy and housing markets.3
3Roger W. Lotchin, Fortress California, 1911–1960: From Warfare to Welfare (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 393–420. For an opposing view, see Gerald D Nash, The American West
Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990); Ger-
64
World War II introduced seismic shifts in Santa Clara County’s cities as
political leaders began accommodating land use towards the defense industry.
Further north in the Bay, the shipyards and manufacturing facilities in San Fran-
cisco and Oakland absorbed the bulk of new workers migrating to California to
work in defense industries. Between 1940 and 1950, western states led the country
in population growth.4 The production of agriculture still remained Santa Clara
County’s dominant contribution to the war effort. Federal spending in defense
further tied the west’s burgeoning educational and high-technology industries to
the desires of the federal government. California, Arizona, Washington, Kansas,
Utah, and Colorado were among the top ten states for high-tech jobs. San Diego
led the way in California, supporting nearly 215,000 people in 1957. The military
became a constant and visible presence in the defense-dependent cities of the
West.5
The Cold War policy of industrial dispersion exerted influence on the de-
sign and location of industrial centers. Fears of a potential “total war” with the
ald D Nash, World War II and the West: Reshaping the Economy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1990); and Gerald D. Nash, The Federal Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth-
Century West (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999). See also Carl Abbott, The New Urban
America: Growth and Politics in Sunbelt Cities (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1987), 17–19.
4Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A New History of the American West
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 507.
5Carl Abbott, Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West (Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 1995), 60–61; Lotchin, “The City and the Sword Through the Ages and the Era
of the Cold War,” in Essays on Sunbelt Cities and Recent Urban America, ed. Robert Fairbanks and
Kathleen Underwood (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 95; James Clayton,
“The Impact of the Cold War on the Economies of California and Utah,” Pacific Historical Review
36, no. 4 (November 1967): 449–473; Abbott, “The Metropolitan Region,” 82-83. See also Gilbert
S. Guinn, “A Different Frontier: Aviation, the Army Air Force, and the Evolution of the Sunshine
Belt,” Aerospace Historian 29 (March 1982): 34-45; James Eastman, “Location and Growth of Tinker
Air Force Base and Oklahoma City Air Material Area,” Chronicles of Oklahoma 50 (Autumn
1972): 326-346; Leonard J. Arrington and Archer L. Durham, “Anchors Aweigh in Utah: The U.S.
Naval Supply Depot at Clearfield, 1942-62,” Utah Historical Quarterly 31 (September 1963): 109-126;
Thomas G. Alexander, “Ogden: A Federal Colony in Utah,” Utah Historical Quarterly 47 (Summer
1979): 291-309; Martin Schiesl, “Airplanes to Aerospace: Defense Spending and Economic Growth
in the Los Angeles Region, 1945-60,” in Lotchin, ed., Martial Metropolis, 135-150; Stephen B. Oates,
“NASA’s Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, Texas,” Southwest Historical Quarterly 67 (January
1964): 350-375.
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Soviet Union prompted officials in Washington to pursue industrial dispersion as
an official policy. The dispersal of industry first appeared in federal legislation in
the National Security Act of 1947, which created the National Security Resources
Board (NSRB) charged with locating the strategic location of industries, services,
governmental, and economic activities deemed essential to national security.6 A
presidential order issued by Harry Truman in August 1951 ordered the move-
ment of government agencies “out of dense urban cores” and specifically noted
the policy’s importance to “the dispersal of new and expanding industries.” The
dispersal policy encouraged the movement of industry to “areas adjacent to in-
dustrial or metropolitan districts in all sections of the country.” Such areas needed
to be ten to twenty miles from a potential nuclear ground zero. The dispersal of
industry to suburban areas meant fulfilling the policy directives while also main-
taining proximity to employees, manufacturing facilities, and the infrastructure
of central cities. According to the policy of dispersal, the suburb was the ideal
industrial area.7
The national policy of dispersal aligned with the desires of business. Through-
out the nation, industrial leaders expressed concern about inner cities and pointed
to dispersion as a potential solution to what they identified as urban problems,
especially entrenched unions, high taxes, and an aging infrastructure. To a speech
before the San Francisco Bay Area Council, San Francisco’s director of city plan-
ning noted that “it is more than a great piece of good fortune for city planners
that policies which best serve the nation’s security are also best for urban de-
velopment. . . . We claim that this is good for our people and economical for
our industry and business.”8 Just as the federal government endorsed non-urban
6Margaret Pugh O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next Silicon
Valley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 29
7“National Dispersal Program Forecast by President Statement,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists (September 1951): 263–279; O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 28–38; Kenneth T Jackson, Crabgrass
Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 249
8Quoted in O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 33
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Figure 2.2: The policy of dispersal. “National Dispersion as a National Policy,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists (September 1951).
cores as ideal locations for defense-related industry, business leaders were al-
ready looking to relocate their facilities beyond major American cities. Industry
no longer developed in central cities as it historically had. Rather, industrial man-
ufacturing sought cheaper and more spacious outlying lands that had adequate
space for parking, loading facilities, and room for plant expansions. Industries
also sought more amenable work environments. City ordinances in the middle
of the twentieth century began pushing industry to less desirable areas of cities,
while simultaneously industrial facilities sought the same amenities as suburban-
ites: a pleasant environment, suburban design, distance from urban problems, and
lower taxes, while remaining in proximity to city services and infrastructure.9
World War II and the location of defense industries along the West Coast
drew thousands of new residents to California in search of jobs after a decade of
economic depression.10 Between 1940 and 1947, the nine counties of the Bay Area
9John M. Findlay, Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture After 1940 (University
of California Press, 1993), 120; Santa Clara County, Calif., Planning Department, “Directory of In-
dustrial Parks and Industrial Districts in Santa Clara County,” InfoCommentary: Industrial Districts
1 (January 1966): 1; Robert E. Boley, “Rx for Successful Industrial Park Development,” Urban Land
26 (June 1967): 3; Victor Roterus, Planned Industrial Parks: A Case Study (Washington, DC, 1960),
3-4.
10On the mid-century migration to California, see James Gregory, American Exodus: The Dust
Bowl Migration and Okie Culture in California (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). On the ef-
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became home for 676,000 more people, 330,000 new jobs, and $2.5 billion more in
annual income.11 The burgeoning Cold War science complex added an additional
influx of people and capital to the region. In 1950, Santa Clara County counted
800 factory workers, which jumped to 264,000 manufacturing workers and more
than 3,000 electronics firms by 1980.12 The county towns grew rapidly during and
after World War II as middle-class families moved to the area to take advantage
of new defense and related industries. Menlo Park, located in the southern end of
San Mateo County, grew from a town of 3,000 to 27,000 between 1940 and 1960,
while Palo Alto grew from under 17,000 to 52,000 in the same period.
In the years after World War II, scientific funding by the federal govern-
ment rose rapidly that helped spur new industrial activity centralized around
defense and military applications. In 1955, federal expenditures on basic research
topped $286 million, a figure that jumped to $693 million by 1960 and, just five
years later, topped $1.6 billion. The total research and development budget of the
federal government had grown from eight percent to twelve percent in ten years.13
Along the Peninsula, cities sought out new ways to attract defense industries to
the area in order to capitalize on defense research contracts. Bay Area governmen-
tal associations, such as the Bay Area Council (BAC), sought to make California
an industrial center not by replicating the industrial Northeast or Midwest but by
promoting new industries.14
Bay Area city leaders chased corporate recruitment and grew their economies
fects of World War II on the American West, see Nash, The Federal Landscape; Abbott, Metropoli-
tan Frontier, chap. 1; Roger W. Lotchin, “World War II and Urban California: City Planning and
the Transformation Hypothesis,” Pacific Historical Review 62, no. 2 (May 1993): 143–171; Lotchin,
Fortress California
11O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 103
12Carl Abbott, How Cities Won the West: Four Centuries of Urban Change in Western North Amer-
ica (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008), 181. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960
Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census,
Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census, Santa Clara
County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov.
13O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 47
14O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 106
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as other cities faced decline. The Rust Belt in particular, once an industrial pow-
erhouse, began its steady decline in the postwar era while western towns once
peripheral to the American industrial economy began to rise. The Sunbelt in par-
ticular succeeded in attracting tremendous levels of population, industry, and
federal funding.
Regional electronics manufacturing in the Bay Area grew quickly. The
Western Electronics Manufacturers Association listed twenty members in the Bay
Area in 1951; by 1953 it counted fifty-three, and by 1974 listed eight-hundred
and employed around 150,000 people. The bulk of new manufacturers created
products for the Department of Defense and NASA. Between 1952 and 1968, elec-
tronics firms made at least half of their annual incomes from sales to the federal
government for military and space programs.15 Desires on the part of NASA and
the Pentagon for compact systems of missile and rocket guidance as well as wars
in Korea and Vietnam and the space race, electronics equipment accounted for
as much as twenty percent of the cost of an aircraft and thirty percent of the
cost for missiles. While southern California built the aircrafts, northern California
provided the electrical components.16
world war ii and the postwar years witnessed an explosion in the population
of northern California. San Francisco, Oakland, and Berkeley, the traditional ur-
ban centers in northern California, had seen their populations rise during the war
years, but in the postwar years populations began moving to the suburbs. Out of
the nine counties of the Bay Area, Santa Clara County ranked first in the size of its
15G. Bylinsky, “California’s Great Breeding Ground for Industry,” Fortune Magazine (June 1974):
133, 128-129, 130; Findlay, Magic Lands, 145
16Blue Sky Metropolis: The Aerospace Century in Southern California, ed. Peter Westwick; Findlay,
Magic Lands, 143–144; Albert Shapero, Richard Howell, and James R. Tombough, An Exploratory
Study of the Structure and Dynamics of the R&D Industry (Menlo Park, Calif., 1964), 23-25; Saxenian,
“The Genesis of Silicon Valley,” 27; Siegel and Markoff, High Cost of High Tech, 8-9.
69
population increase. Throughout the 1940s the population of Santa Clara County
nearly doubled, and by the mid-1950s, nearly 4,000 new people were moving to
the county every month. The county’s 1950 population of 290,547 people exploded
to 642,365 by 1960, surpassing San Francisco as the region’s urban center. The ar-
rival of so many people in a short amount of time led to subdivisions spreading
throughout the Valley.17
Figure 2.3: Population of the Bay Area counties, 1940-2010. U.S. Bureau of the Census.
The rapid rise of the Bay Area followed a wartime and postwar trend
throughout the American West. New opportunities in western cities after a decade
of economic depression led migrants to metropolitan areas to take jobs in wartime
industries in the 1940s. The American West especially felt the impact of this shift,
leading urban historian Carl Abbott to remark that the migration led “the en-
tire West into a half-century of head-long urbanization.”18 Western metropolitan
areas—Dallas, San Francisco, San Jose, Denver, Albuquerque—became centers of
new economies based on high technology, services, tourism, and recreation.19
17Belser, Planning Progress 1956, 2; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 Census, Santa Clara County,
n.d., census.abag.ca.gov; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census, Santa Clara County, n.d.,
census.abag.ca.gov; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., cen-
sus.abag.ca.gov.
18Abbott, Metropolitan Frontier, 4
19On the metropolitan West, see Abbott, How Cities Won the West; Abbott, Metropolitan Fron-
tier. See also Athur R. Gomez, Quest for the Golden Circle: The Four Corners and the Metropolitan
West, 1945-1970 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); Robert M. Fogelson, The Fragmented
Metropolis: Los Angeles, 1850-1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); William Issel and
Robert Cherny, San Francisco, 1865-1932: Politics, Power, and Urban Development (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1986); Peter Wiley and Robert Gottleib, Empires in the Sun: The Rise of the
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The region that Bernard DeVoto once described as a “plundered province” had
become an economic pacesetter in the latter twentieth century, propelled by world
war, new economic pursuits, demographic shifts, and federal funding.20
Encouraging the arrival of a new base of industry and residents were tire-
less city boosters. While city leaders had grown wary of agriculture as a core
economy activity, especially after the Depression plummeted farm incomes to
historic lows, they held onto the imagery of the countryside for their cities. A
booster campaign initiated by Palo Alto in 1930 emphasized the city’s pleasant
climate, proximity to Stanford University, sport and recreation, and good health,
framed by photographs of well-tended landscapes, scenic valley vistas, and tow-
ering coastal redwoods. A campaign run by San Jose around the same time like-
wise pointed to the Bay Area’s blossoms, ideal climate, “sylvan setting[s] for pic-
turesque home[s],” and described the county as “a 60-mile long Garden.”21
Climate alone not only shaped the recreational and domestic life for Santa
Clara County’s boosters. The same amenities mattered for industry. San Jose made
special note of the “great industrial and manufacturing opportunities” of the
Santa Clara Valley, all made possible by the “favorable living conditions, varied
natural resources, ample transportation facilities, cheap potential power, low over-
head costs, and highly intelligent labor supply,” along with San Francisco serving
as a “logical distribution center for the Pacific Coast and foreign markets.” San
Jose also pointed to the advantages of its neighbors, including Sunnyvale as “the
New American West (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1982).
20Bernard DeVoto, “The West: A Plundered Province,” Harper’s Magazine 169 (August 1934),
355–364. On the West and World War II, see Nash, The Federal Landscape. Additional work on
World War II and the postwar West include Abraham Shragge, “‘A New Federal City’: San Diego
During World War II,” Pacific Historical Review 6 (August 1994): 333–361; Clayton, 449–473. See
also Lotchin, Fortress California. and Roger W. Lotchin, The Bad City in the Good War: San Francisco,
Los Angeles, Oakland, and San Diego (Indiana University Press, 2003).
21“Palo Alto, California: Home of Stanford University,” Palo Alto Chamber of Commerce, ca.
1930, Folder 19, Box 41, Arbuckle Research Files, California Reading Room, San Jose Public Li-
brary; “The Valley of Heart’s Delight,” San Jose Chamber of Commerce, ca. 1922, Folder 7, Box 58,
Arbuckle Research Files, California Reading Room, San Jose Public Library.
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shipping center of the west side of the valley,” Saratoga and it’s “world-famous . .
. annual Blossom Festival,” and Mountain View and it’s “steadily growing in pop-
ulation and commercial importance.”22 In a 1948 promotional video distributed
by the San Jose Chamber of Commerce, the city emphasized to industry they
would have little problem finding “desirable sites for space for future expansion
. . . on the widespreading outskirts of San Jose,” while highlighting the presence
of San Jose Steel, General Electric, AMES, and Moffett Airfield. “In this county of
home lovers, gardens really flourish,” the Chamber’s video emphasized, “and job
opportunities flourish, too, attracting citizens to take pride in establishing a finer
type of community life.”23
If Santa Clara County was idealized as a place, it was also a political
project. By the 1950s, cities took advantage of New Deal era personal consump-
tion and local efforts to attract consumers and capital to the county. These themes
contained in promotional material suggested the central message emerging from
the municipal campaigns. Seen through promotional material and the pages of
national magazines, Santa Clara County was a remarkable place for outdoor liv-
ing, individual lifestyle choices, and industrial opportunities. The representation
mattered because place mattered. The reputation as a place of clear skies, cozy
weather, beautiful landscapes, open space, cheap homes, middle-class jobs, and
opportunity attracted “quality of life” residents. Climate and environment shaped
the sell of the Valley, cast as an opportune situation for domestic life, recreation,
and business.
Wartime meant prosperity for the peninsula’s businesses, but postwar re-
conversion shook the confidence of Peninsula businessmen. From the offices of
city halls and businesses throughout the Midpeninsula, businessmen and politi-
22“The Valley of Heart’s Delight,” San Jose Chamber of Commerce, ca. 1922, Folder 7, Box 58,
Arbuckle Research Files, California Reading Room, San Jose Public Library.
23“Valley of Heart’s Delight,” video recording, San Jose Chamber of Commerce (Three Crown
Productions, 1948).
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cal leaders worried about their futures. They wanted to avoid seeing their cities
fall back into agricultural pursuits, with its limited possibilities for expansion
and tax base, while manufacturing located elsewhere. From their perspective, the
small tax base and seasonal agricultural business was no way to build a mod-
ern, western metropolis. The establishment of the Bay Area Post-War Planning
Committee as well as several local postwar planning committees in San Francisco
and Oakland attempted to maintain wartime industries. They envisioned cities as
business friendly, rich with amenities, benefiting from important universities, pro-
viding a bounty of recreational opportunities for homeowners, and key sites for
investment of federal dollars in scientific research, development, and manufactur-
ing.24 Amid national debates about the reduction of reducing wartime spending
the Midpeninsula’s businessmen, promoters, and political leaders looked locally
to maintain their prosperity.25 Starting in the 1940s, they “reformed” municipal
government and reoriented their policies towards attracting new business.26 What
these leaders shared was a vision: local control of municipal government aided by
the injection of massive federal funding aimed at promoting new defense-related
research. Maintaining a “climate for business” to attract public and private sec-
tors to the county became a guiding principal as a means of promoting municipal
expansion.
san jose’s vision of metropolitan expansion began before the end of World
War II. Up until the 1940s, San Jose and nearby towns promoted their agricultural
24Findlay, Magic Lands, 143
25Cohen, Consumer’s Republic, 98–114; Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for
Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 61–95.
26Scholars have various referred to these organized businessmen as “community power struc-
tures,” “civic-commercial elites,” and “growth machines” in places like Phoenix, Arizona’s “Char-
ter Government” and Dallas, Texas’ “Citizens Charter Association.” Needham, Power Lines, ch. 3;
Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine”; Molotch and Logan, Urban Fortunes; Kruse, White
Flight, ch. 1; Lassiter, The Silent Majority; Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism.
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productivity by sponsoring festivals such as the “Blossom Tours.” But in the mid-
1940s, an ambitious group of young merchants, lawyers, industrialists, and prop-
erty owners endorsed the importance of metropolitan expansion in order for the
city to achieve the greatness they felt it deserved. The political machinery of San
Jose was controlled by the taxi service operator and political boss Charlie “Boss”
Bigley and City Manager C. B. Goodwin. Goodwin and Bigley became targets as
their critics charged that the leadership failed to entice new industries to the city
and help stabilize an economy built on the instability of agriculture and seasonal
employment. The 1944 election gave opponents of Bigley and Goodwin an open-
ing. When six of the seven city council seats opened for election, opponents led by
businessmen Harvey Claude Miller and Louis Oneal, formed the “Progress Com-
mittee” and put up a slate of candidates to capture the vacated council seats.27
The Progress Committee candidates accused Bigley, Goodwin, and the city coun-
cil of jeopardizing San Jose’s future. Voters, and the newspaper, agreed. Aided by
the newspaper’s endorsement, six members of the Progress Committee—among
them the key business and political figures Al Ruffo, Ernest Renzel, Ben Carter,
Jim Lively, Roy Rundle, and Fred Watson—secured seats on the city council as
“reform” candidates. Lacking the majority on the council to directly fire the man-
ager, the Progress Committee amended the city’s charter requiring city managers
to stand for biennial approval by the citizens. The Committee further weakened
the power of entrenched officials by reducing the city council member’s terms
from six year to four year terms. By the end of the 1940s, Goodwin would be
out of office, and the Progress Committe also ousted the antireform manager that
replaced Goodwin, John Lynch.28
27Jessica Trounstine argues that “municipal formers organized groups of concerned citizens
into party-like coalitions that slated candidates. These organizations were much less structured
than the hierarchical coalitions in machine cities, but they served a similar purpose.” Trounstine,
Political Monopolies in American Cities, 102.
28“No Decision Made on New City Manager,” San Jose Mercury, May 13, 1946; Philip Trounstine
and Terry Christensen, Movers and Shakers: The Study of Community Power (New York: St. Martin’s
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With the Progress Committee secured in city government, the new city
council’s immediate plans aimed to attract industry to San Jose. With subsidies
from city and county government, the Chamber of Commerce began a $60,000
advertising campaign that lured the industries of Food Machinery and Chemical
Corporation, already a local to the area, International Business Machines, Gen-
eral Electric, Pittsburgh Steel, Owens-Corning, and Kaiser. The city undertook the
construction of its first airport and passed a $1,700,000 bond to construct new sew-
ers. Some of their initiatives fell under criticism when, in 1946, a fellow member
called the committee “reactionaries” and accused them of selling municipal land
to companies well below market value. Others in city government disagreed with
plans for the private ownership of water infrastructure, arguing instead for mu-
nicipal ownership. The Progress Committee, along with the newspaper, silenced
such criticism with accusations of socialism.29
The Progress Committee set to bring their vision for San Jose to life, but had
to overcome a major obstacle: the voters. The Progress Committee sought many
things for San Jose to make the city an attractive place for industry and work-
ers, including construction of an airport, a deep water port in the north of the
city, and improved sewers, streets, and storm drains. The infrastructure projects
required the approval of city voters, who approved or disapproved general obli-
gation bonds that allowed the city to borrow money long-term with low interest
rates. These bonds were often paid for through increases on property taxes, a ma-
neuver most voters opposed, and benefited developers. Bonds were repeatedly
voted down during the interwar years, even as the city attempted to deal with its
unique problem of sewage and cannery effluence. Voters refused to give in even
Press, 1982), 87; Mitchell Mandich, “Growth and Development of San Jose” (PhD Dissertation, San
Jose State University, 1975), 44–47; Clyde Arbuckle, San Jose, 44; Trounstine, Political Monopolies in
American Cities, 103.
29“City Extends West Border, Annexes Tract,” San Jose Mercury News, n.d.; “Food Machinery
Bids $140,000, Retains Site,” San Jose Mercury News, n.d.; Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and
Shakers, 88; Mandich, “Growth and Development,” 47–49.
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as the state of California declared the city in violation of pollution regulations in
1948.30
Table 2.1: Party Affiliations in San Jose, 1948 and 1950. San Jose Mercury News, March 23,
1950.
Party 1950 1948 Gain/Loss
Republican 50,774 41,800 + 8,974
Democratic 59,042 46,220 + 12,822
Progressive 53 41 + 12
Prohibition 106 97 + 9
Socialist 42 48 - 6
Townsend 19 36 - 17
Independent Progressive 266 45 + 221
Communist 2 4 -2
The Progress Committee dissolved shortly after their victory, but their
pro-growth ideology remained entrenched in San Jose politics for the next three
decades. Several of the members of the committee remained in city government
for the next two decades. The combination of the population boom and the
booster ethos of the city council fueled a political culture that was accommodat-
ing to business and favorable towards developers. To fund such growth the city
needed long-term, low-interest bonds that required approval by the city’s voters,
whose property taxes helped pay back the loans. Since the days of the Progress
Committee, San Jose city leaders faced reluctant voters who continually refused
to fund general obligation bonds. But with the city’s rapidly expanding popula-
tion and attendant needs to support the newcomers—mainly, infrastructure that
included roads, utilities, and sewers—the city needed to find someone to convince
30Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 88.
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voters to support the measures they believed necessary for San Jose’s growth. The
city council found that person in Anthony P. “Dutch” Hamann. Hamann epit-
omized San Jose’s postwar pro-growth outlook. The forty-year-old former busi-
nessman, teacher, and oil company representative had a strong attachment to the
city and solid connections throughout the community.31 Hamann had not served
in political office until his appointment by the city council in 1950 in a split 4–to–3
vote. As the city began its drive for urban growth, Hamann hoped to avoid the
fate that had befallen his home of Orange County in Southern California with its
many competing medium-sized cities. Hamann believed that a large city could
better manage urban development and growth than several small towns all look-
ing out for their own interests. He wanted San Jose to dominate the county, and
thus avoid what he saw as petty competition among small towns.32 To grow and
make available the funds to sustain growth, Hamann reasoned, the city needed
to annex land to raise revenue from taxes.33 “You don’t build a city by staying in
a vacuum,” Hamann declared. “You build, you sell. . . . And I was the gun for
hire.”34
And build San Jose did. The city approved over 1,400 annexations between
1945 and 1970 including many narrow strips—“shoestring” annexations—snaking
outward, sometimes only on one half of a street, to capture a desirable subdivi-
sion, commercial center, or street intersection. In some areas, annexations became
a tool of coercion. Annex enough areas around land-owning hold-outs, city offi-
cials reasoned, and pockets of non-annexed land would have little choice but to
succumb.35 Hamann’s drive for land became so aggressive that his staff became
31Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 89; Arbuckle, San Jose, 44-45. Hamann had
graduated from the University of Santa Clara and played on the same football team as Councilman
Al Ruffo.
32“Hamann: San Jose’s Growth Guru,” San Jose Mercury, 1999.
33Glenna Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream: Gender, Class, and Opportunity
in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 96
34Hamann quoted in Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 96.
35“Annexations by Year”, 2011, City of San Jose Planning Division; “City Size by Year”, 2011,
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Figure 2.4: Annexations in San Jose, 1940—1990, shaded from light to dark by decade.
Interactive annexation visualization is at http://dissertation.jasonheppler.org/
visualizations/annexations/.
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known as “Dutch’s Panzer division”—named after the swift motorized armored
tank squadrons of the Third Reich—as annexations sprawled outward from the
city core.36 “They say San Jose is going to become another Los Angeles,” Hamann
rebuked his critics. “Believe me, I’m going to do the best in my power to make that
come true.”37 Under Hamann’s tenure, the San Jose Chamber of Commerce spent
nearly $1 million to attract new industries to the city. The population boomed
and the city sprawled. “It was just growth, growth, growth,” Al Ruffo, San Jose’s
mayor in the 1940s, recalled approvingly. “That was everybody’s song. And Dutch
sang it the loudest.”38
San Jose’s pro-growth contingent received enthusiastic support from the
city’s newspaper, the San Jose Mercury, and its new manager, Joseph Ridder. The
Ridder family newspaper empire owned several large publications in the United
States, including the St. Paul Dispatch, Duluth Herald, Manhattan’s Journal of Com-
merce, and the Seattle Times. When the family of Everis Hayes sold the morning
News and evening Mercury in 1952 after the paper owner’s death, the Ridders pur-
chased the newspaper.39 Joe Ridder was sent to manage the new daily paper and
redefined the paper’s pro-growth mission, saying that he hoped to make the Mer-
cury News “not only among the best newspapers on the Pacific Coast but a vital
and constructive force in the development of San Jose and its territory.”40 When
asked why he was so enthusiastic about San Jose’s growth, Ridder responded:
“Trees don’t read newspapers.”41
The newspaper unabashedly promoted San Jose’s growth. In 1956 it pub-
City of San Jose Planning Division; Belser, Planning Progress 1956, 47; Trounstine, and Christensen,
Movers and Shakers, 93; “Correcting San Jose’s Boomtime Mistake,” Business Week, September 19,
1970, 74; Stanford Law Review, San Jose, 5.
36Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 93.
37Stanford Law Review, San Jose, 17.
38“Hamann: San Jose’s Growth Guru,” San Jose Mercury, 1999.
39“The Ridders Buy Again,” Time, August 4, 1952.
40San Jose Mercury, July 1952, quoted in Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 89;
Abbott, Metropolitan Frontier, 40.
41Quoted in Stanford Law Review, San Jose, 17.
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lished a special series called “Metropolitan San Jose—Progress Town U.S.A.”—
the same year that San Jose christened itself the “City of Progress”—detailing
the various changes in the city that the paper took as signs of progress.42 Res-
idential growth, home ownership, and widespread annexations were among its
favorites. The paper applauded the arrival of “new plants bearing some of the
biggest names in the nation’s business,” the “highly diversified farming” of the
region, the “educational, recreational and cultural benefits” the city offered, and
the growth of retail, outlets, and store chains.43 The Mercury News praised the
industrial diversification of the city and its promise of “year-round employment
and production” instead of the seasonal (and uncertain) employment found in
the agricultural industries. A town less reliant on agriculture meant avoiding eco-
nomic dips, more opportunities for employment and education, and additional
wealth.44 The Mercury News’ emphasis on the shifting economic center of the city
was important as, over time, the paper devoted less and less space to agricul-
tural news. The paper argued for the importance of the “irreplaceable asset” of
farmland and the greenbelts that the land provided urban areas, but continued to
promote urban developers, subdivisions, and industry flowing into the city.45 The
amount of page space devoted to agricultural news steadily declined and, as early
as 1950, columnist Dorothy Thompson could bemoan farm subsidies as a “pro-
gram [that] has produced preposterous inequities” without insulting a majority
of readers.46 By 1960, farm news covered only two pages of the newspaper. While
agriculture still accounted for $200 million to the county’s economy—canning,
packing, drying—the figure was rapidly falling as high tech industry overtook
the central economic activity of the county. By 1976 the farm editor and farm
42“Metropolitan San Jose—Progress Town U.S.A.,” San Jose Mercury, January 15, 1956.
43“Metropolitan San Jose—Progress Town U.S.A.,” San Jose Mercury, January 15, 1956.
44“Diversification Gives Solid Balance to Area,” San Jose Mercury, January 15, 1956.
45“Greenbelts Protect Irreplaceable Asset,” San Jose Mercury, January 15, 1956.
46Dorothy Thompson, “Farm Price Program Real Mess,” San Jose Mercury, April 7, 1950; Alpert,
“Valley of Heart’s Delight,” 37.
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section disappeared from the newspaper entirely.47
The San Jose Chamber of Commerce also helped pave the way for business.
Between 1950 and 1965, the San Jose Chamber of Commerce spent $1,000,000
publicizing the city.48 As the Mercury reported in 1956, the
San Jose Chamber of Commerce, increasingly a dominant force in
Santa Clara County growth because it has long since left behind its
restrictive limitation of serving only the City of San Jose, is not con-
tent to let ‘natural resources’ of land availability, good labor supply,
key transportation services and growth potential ‘pull’ new industries
here. Active contact with potential industrial neighbors is kept up to
date with personal visits, servicing requests for technical information,
location of possible plant sites and a nationwide advertising campaign
that has proven highly effective.49
The industrial campaigns helped pull industry to the city. By the mid-1950s,
San Jose was home to IBM and General Electric, and neighboring cities included
DuPont, Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel, Monsanto Chemical, Levi Strauss, Owens-
Illinois Glass, Owens Corning Fiberglass, Food Machinery Corporation, Lock-
heed, and Ford Motor Company.50 The city attracted the attention of the New
York Times as early as 1947, who declared the Bay Area an industrial center of
the West.51 By the end of the 1950s, hundreds of new factories were built in the
city.52 Between 1944 and 1962, companies invested more than $290 million into
new plants.53
The city’s political coalition of businessmen, newspaper publishers, real es-
tate developers, and the Chamber of Commerce allowed the political machinery
47Alpert, “Valley of Heart’s Delight,” 44–45.
48Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 92.
49“Chamber Vital to Growth in Valley Areas,” San Jose Mercury January 15, 1956.
50“Santa Clara County—Scene of the Big Boom,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 11, 1952; Belser,
Planning Progress 1956, 1.
51“Eastern Industry Going Westward,” New York Times, March 2, 1947.
52Belser, Planning Progress 1956, 1–2.
53Santa Clara Chamber of Commerce, “Industrial Introduction to the City of Santa Clara,” 1964,
Santa Clara City Library.
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Figure 2.5: San Jose’s unplanned annexation policies resulted in complicated city borders
as nearby towns incorporated to resist being brought into the city boundaries.
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to pursue growth. Widespread annexation became an avenue for development,
provided the city with a broad tax base of industrial, residential, and commer-
cial land, gave itself more power over surrounding cities, and allowed San Jose’s
leaders think about the city as a regional powerhouse.
carved out of the southeast corner of stanford university’s vast land hold-
ings on the San Francisco Peninsula, the Stanford Industrial Park became the epi-
center of specialized manufacturing and research activities in the northern end
of the county. By the 1960s Stanford Industrial Park had gained a reputation for
industrial and technological innovation that would be mimicked around the coun-
try.54 Like many other American colleges and universities throughout the nation,
Stanford sought to capitalize on the burgeoning science and technology oppor-
tunities in order to fashion itself as a leader in academic research and become a
powerful influence in the new industrial age in the American West. As the U.S.
Government pursued Cold War scientific research and development programs,
places like Stanford Industrial Park fostered specialized science-based industries.
The process of industrial recruitment at Stanford reflected an alternative form of
land development versus cities like San Jose, but played a key role in shaping the
Valley’s urban form and political responses to it.
The establishment of Stanford Industrial Park emerged from the confluence
of several postwar trends: rapid suburbanization, the Cold War impetus for fed-
eral research and development, and the need for Stanford to diversify its finances.
The Board of Trustees approved a plan to lease land to high technology companies
in 1951 and quickly gained a reputation as a favorable site for burgeoning elec-
tronics companies. Roughly five percent of Santa Clara County’s workforce was
54Michael I. Luger and Harvey A. Goldstein, Technology in the Garden: Research Parks and Re-
gional Economic Development (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 154; Abbott,
Metropolitan Frontier, 61–68.
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employed in high technology or research and development in 1951 (compared to
9.4% in the US as a whole), and by 1986 the workforce reached twenty percent
(compared to 8.5% in the US).55
Stanford actively pursued close ties with business after World War II. As
early as 1945, University President Donald Tressider remarked he “hope[d] that in
the postwar period Stanford will draw very much closer to business and industry
than it has in the past—by means of cooperative undertakings we hope to develop
more and more projects in which both the University and business will have a le-
gitimate stake.”56 In the postwar era, university officials and faculty supported
the expansion of the business/university relationship. Among the most enthu-
siastic supporters of recruiting and supporting the new economy was Frederick
Terman, the university’s first dean of engineering and, later, provost. Terman had
spent the war years in Cambridge, Massachusetts, studying radar projects under
Vannevar Bush. Terman saw first-hand cooperative programs between MIT and
businesses like General Electric, AT&T, and other firms on the front edge of high
technology. When he came to Stanford after the war, he used what he learned to
begin building a new research agenda for the university. The growing availability
of federal research money meant support for the university’s pursuit of academic
reputation in addition to becoming a key player in Cold War research in a pro-
cess Terman referred to as “steeple building.” By 1948, Stanford established a
traveling-wave tube research program, supported Stanford alumni Russell and
Sigurd Varian in founding their microwave tube company, encouraged faculty
consulting with businesses, arranged for university instructors to teach courses
for businesses, and established an honors program to allow employees to earn a
degree from the university while working full-time.57
55Luger, and Goldstein, Technology in the Garden, 130.
56Quoted in O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 106
57O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 106–110; Gillmor, Fred Terman at Stanford; Findlay, Magic Lands,
122–125; Stuart W. Leslie, “”The Biggest ’Angel’ of Them All: The Military and the Making of
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While Frederick Terman worked to cement relationships between the uni-
versity and business, Alf Brandin developed the land. Hired in 1946 to serve as
the university’s business manager, the 33-year-old Stanford alum quickly set to
convincing people about the value of developing Stanford’s lands. Brandin re-
called wondering before World War II “why didn’t we do something with our
land? We could lease it out.” What was missing was metropolitan growth. “The
war changed all that,” he recalled. “After the war we then had an opportunity to
do something.” The University also needed to do something as rising land val-
ues and rising property taxes threatened to eat into Stanford’s income. The open
lands on Stanford were subject to “unrelated business income” taxes, whether
those lands were grazing, farming, or office space. Stanford officials feared a fu-
ture of paying high taxes without a high enough return on rents to cover the costs.
Furthermore, the university felt threatened by urban renewal programs whereby
local governments could claim unused land for public services. Faced with the
potential of condemned land and high taxes, Brandin sought ways to encourage
the university to develop its lands for more income.58
Stanford’s additional motivations for pursing the creation and growth of
the Industrial Park included finances. The university faced financial dilemma by
Silicon Valley,” in Understanding Silicon Valley: The Anatomy of an Entrepreneurial Region, ed. by
Martin Kenney, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 48–67; Rebecca S Lowen, Creating the
Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997),
chap. 4; Stuart W. Leslie and Robert H. Kargon, “Selling Silicon Valley: Frederick Terman’s Model
for Regional Advantage,” The Business History Review 70, no. 4 (December 1996): 437–440. Timothy
Sturgeon warns against giving Frederick Terman too much credit in the creation of Silicon Val-
ley. He argues for extending Silicon Valley’s history backward from Varian and HP’s founding,
suggesting that electronics manufacturing in the Bay Area played a key role in the fields of radio,
television, and military electronics before World War II. Sturgeon, “How Silicon Valley Came to
Be,” in Understanding Silicon Valley 16.
58Stanford Oral History Project, transcript of interview with Alf Brandin, ca. 1980, 30–31, Stan-
ford University Archives. Margaret O’Mara notes that Stanford University was a 501(c)(3) orga-
nization subject to the Unrelated Business Income Taxes (UBIT). Stanford was paying roughly
$700,000 in property taxes in 1968. O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 111 and 265, fn. 46. See also, “A
Look at Stanford Lands Program—Past, Future,” Palo Alto Times, March 4, 1960; “Questions and
Answers About Stanford Land Use,” Campus Report Supplement, January 1971, Folder 16, Box 1,
Page Mill Coordinating Committee Records, Stanford University Archives.
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1950, and hoped that the Industrial Park could become a money-making venture
to support the university. In the years prior, returning veterans of World War II,
aided by the GI Bill, brought a wave of new students to the university. Stanford’s
income peaked in 1946-1947, when income from tuition amounted to sixty percent
of the university’s income. By 1952, despite raising tuition, income from student
tuition fell to 47 percent. Between 1940 and 1950 income from endowment fell
from 29 percent to 16 percent of total income in general for private universities
nationwide, figures that were similar to Stanford’s own.59 The pursuit of land
development projects and federal grants and contracts proved to be a lucrative
business. In the 1950s Stanford’s income rose from less than $2 million in 1951 to
over $8.3 million by 1960, the bulk of which came from Department of Defense
and Atomic Energy Commission grants.60 Stanford lands prior to the land devel-
opment program initiated by Brandin were leased to farmers and ranchers, ideal
tenants for hinterlands so far from urban centers. While the rents from agricul-
tural income were modest, in the postwar era they were not enough for Stanford
to continue its reliance. Facing diminishing class sizes, falling tuition income, and
declining alumni donations, the university needed to pursue alternative sources
of income.
To further cement the relationship with the university and business, Ter-
man helped established two educational programs. Starting with the Honors Co-
operative Program that allowed employees of surrounding electronics companies
to study part-time towards a master’s degree at Stanford, and later with the Indus-
trial Affiliates Program, which allowed companies pre-publication access to sci-
entific and technical military-sponsored research. The two educational programs
sought to benefit both industry and the university and strengthen the ties between
59Lowen, Creating the Cold War University, 150; “Questions and Answers About Stanford Land
Use,” Campus Report Supplement, January 1971, 1, Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating
Committee Records, Stanford University Archives.
60O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 109
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Figure 2.6: Stanford and Lockheed officials discussing the Industrial Park. Courtesy Stan-
ford University Archives.
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the two.61 The cooperative program also proved lucrative to Stanford through
the payment of tuition. As Terman recalled, the honors cooperative brought in
more students that essentially “paid double tuition, because the company made
a matching payment equal to the tuition and this brought extra money,” partic-
ularly to the engineering department. Furthermore, the location of nearby firms
on Stanford lands also resulted in generous gifts to the university. “We’re getting
about as much from the gifts from those technical companies as you’re getting
from the lease income,” Terman told Brandin. “Alf Brandin saw the point very
quickly, and very soon thereafter, if you weren’t a high-technology company, you
had a hell of a time coaxing him to give you a lease.”62
Stanford sought to aid its land development plans by establishing a cam-
pus planning office after the war. In 1947, the university hired Lewis Mumford
to study how the university could best use its land. The university, he suggested,
should use some of its open space for “housing developments to serve the staff
and faculty” and suggested parcels suitable for industrial development. But Mum-
ford argued that the land’s most suitable use went towards academic purposes
or kept as open land, not subdivided along its borders for housing.63 The uni-
versity, however, largely ignored Mumford’s advice to concentrate urban devel-
opment and retain the “rural setting” of the university. The draw of suburban
development was too desirable for Stanford to resist. In 1953, the university com-
missioned the San Francisco architectural firm Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill to
suggest land use plans and the economic potentials for its development. They
developed the 1953 Master Plan that emphasized an “integrated community.”
Thinking of the area as a suburb of San Francisco, the plan emphasized high-
income housing rather than “small, attractive, light industry plants” but noted
61Lowen, Creating the Cold War University, 130–131.
62Terman oral history, 127.
63Mumford quoted in O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 112
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that the high income housing areas in San Mateo and Santa Clara counties “do
not want heavy industries.” These industries were especially attractive to home-
owners if they “relieve their residential tax load,” but the firm also cautioned the
university to think carefully about how it used the land, concluding that Stanford
preserve the “present character of the entire suburb area.”64
While the firm’s study was useful to Stanford planners, the university ul-
timately rejected the suggestions of the firm. The Advisory Committee on Land
and Building Development wrote to University President Wallace Sterling that
the university needed to focus on attracting “a wide variety of national and re-
gional activities which have a direct and immediate value to the University.” Such
activities revolved around industry.65 One source of frustration with Skidmore,
Owings, and Merrill was its view that the Peninsula was a commuter suburb
of San Francisco rather than an economic center. Furthermore, Skidmore, Ow-
ings, and Merrill’s recommendations followed the “growth-is-good” philosophy
of urban planning common in the 1950s. Had the university followed their plans,
most open space on the Stanford lands would have been subdivided into housing
projects. The firm concluded that up to 6,000 of Stanford’s 9,000 acres be devoted
to residential subdivisions, with only 350 acres given to industrial and commer-
cial uses. Such views went against the philosophy of Stanford administrators, who
not only wanted to pursue industrial development but also hoped to maintain the
amenity-rich quality of the university.66
After rejecting the Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill plan, university admin-
istrators decided to pursue high-end housing, a regional shopping center, and
64O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 112–115; Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill, Master Plan for Stanford
Lands 1953: Report to the Board of Trustees, Stanford University (San Francisco, 1953), Land Develop-
ment, General file, Stanford University Archives.
65Stanford University Advisory Committee on Land and Building Development, “Master Plan
for the Stanford Lands: A Review of the Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill Report,” June 1, 1954,
Land Use and Development file, Stanford University Archives, 2-5, 7-9.
66O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 114
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the industrial park. Alf Brandin led the way in pursuing the university’s land
development projects, starting with the shopping center on the north end of the
campus. Observing that shoppers commuted to San Francisco to spend their earn-
ings at the high-end shopping center of Stonestown, Brandin saw an opportunity.
“Why make everybody go to San Francisco to shop?” he wondered. “Why don’t
we bring some San Francisco down here?” Brandin, with the support of the real
estate banker Colter Coldwell, presented plans to the Stanford Board of Trustees
of a regional high-end shopping center that would house the likes of Penney’s,
Macy’s, Emporium, and Roos Brothers. The Board signed off on the project in
1951. As an income-generating idea, the shopping center paid off handsomely.
Between 1951 and 1970, the university earned $1.8 million off rents, sales percent-
ages, and interest.67
67Brandin oral history, 32; O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 115. The shopping center alone covered
Stanford’s property taxes. In 1960–1970, the university paid $835,000 in property taxes to Palo Alto
and Menlo Park. “Questions and Answers About Stanford Land Use,” Campus Report Supplement
(January 1971): 5, Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill Coordinating Committee Papers, Stanford University
Archives.
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Table 2.2: Stanford Net Income from Land Use, 1954–1969. “Stanford University Land
Use Policy/Plan,” Campus Report Supplement March 29, 1971, Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill
Coordinating Committee Papers, Stanford University Archives.
Year Industrial Park Shopping Center Other Incomes Total
1954 $3,000 N/A $4,000 $7,000
1955 30,000 N/A 7,000 37,000
1956 117,000 255,000 8,000 380,000
1957 164,000 489,000 58,000 711,000
1958 156,000 510,000 35,000 701,000
1959 296,000 585,000 88,000 969,000
1960 351,000 639,000 121,000 1,111,000
1961 406,000 607,000 120,000 1,133,000
1962 465,000 654,000 172,000 1,291,000
1963 568,000 694,000 201,000 1,463,000
1964 594,000 712,000 204,000 1,510,000
1965 636,000 736,000 223,000 1,595,000
1966 796,000 797,000 220,000 1,813,000
1967 827,000 713,000 184,000 1,724,000
1968 907,000 778,000 305,000 1,990,000
1969 1,024,000 779,000 377,000 2,180,000
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By the mid-1950s, Stanford lands around the regional shopping center were
opened to residential developers. Sterling, Terman, and other Stanford adminis-
trators espoused a vision for the Stanford lands that sought to build a community
where “work, home, recreation, and cultural life are brought together with some
degree of balance and integration,” outlining a planned vision for the univer-
sity and surrounding communities.68 Stanford began its residential development
plans by opening up lands in Menlo Park for single-family homes on the north
side of campus marketed to Stanford faculty and alumni. In 1957, the university
initiated the “Stanford Hills” development, where upscale homes cost between
$33,000 and $75,000 and lots ranged from one-quarter-acre to five acres in size.
“Enjoy Peninsula Living at its Best,” read an advertisement for the Stanford Hills
subdivision in 1959. “All homes INDIVIDUALLY PLANNED for the most dis-
criminating buyers. . . . You, too, can now join our ‘Who’s Who’.”69 In 1959,
Stanford continued its role as real estate developer with the expansion of residen-
tial suburbs into the Willow Creek Apartments, which developer Howard White
described as “luxury apartments” responding to “innumerable requests on the
Peninsula for true apartment living in a country setting.”70
Two years after the university broke ground for the shopping center, the
first tenants of the Stanford Industrial Park began moving into the original 100
acres set aside for industrial development. Varian Associates, who had outgrown
their original space in San Carlos in San Mateo County, provided the opportunity
for the Industrial Park’s establishment. Russell Varian had developed the Klystron
tube at Stanford and worked under Terman at Harvard during World War II.
He maintained those close ties to Stanford. Returning to the Bay Area with his
brother, Sigurd, after the war, they founded Varian Associates in 1948 to continue
68Quoted in O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 115
69Quoted in O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 118
70Quoted in O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 118
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their work in applied physics. When they began looking for new space for their
expanding facilities, Russell Varian went to Alf Brandin first. Varian was followed
shortly by Eastman Kodak and Hewlett-Packard, the company founded by former
Terman students William Hewlett and David Packard.71
Stanford’s reputation helped attract potential tenants, but so did its inno-
vations in industrial park design. Stanford administrators drew up strict design
guidelines that tenants had to follow. These designs often reflected Stanford’s
own architectural aesthetics of red-tile roofs and adobe-style exteriors. “Every-
one thought of smokestacks,” Brandin recalled. “These new people who came
out from the east and settled here thought, ‘Don’t change it. We just left all the
smoke and all that junk. Don’t change this.’ ” Stanford planners attempted to
make the park-like belief into a reality, regulating that parking lots be located be-
hind buildings and landscaped in a way to screen off anything that might appear
unsightly. Any architectural modifications had to be approved by the University,
while firms also had to maintain the cleanliness of their grounds. The appearance
of greenery was of paramount importance. As Brandin later plainly stated, “this
was going to be a park.”72 Setbacks from the road allowed firms to maintain lawns
and landscaping to provide a green atmosphere. New tenants were required to
submit plans detailing off-street parking, green space, roads, setbacks, location,
and the type of industry. Open spaces had to cover at least 60% more than the
space occupied by buildings, and no buildings could rise higher than two stories.
The university forbade smokestacks and prohibited noise, odor, and emissions
that might disturb the area’s neighbors. The open, lush, low-rise and architec-
turally appealing design of the industrial Park also helped provide support from
the surrounding suburban communities, ensuring that none of the manufacturing
71“Varian: Pioneer from A (accelerators) to V (vacuum pumps),” Palo Alto Times, March 2, 1960;
Terman oral history, 127; Findlay, Magic Lands, 129—141.
72Brandin oral history, n.p. [58].
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facilities would interfere with the neighboring affluent suburbs.73
Stanford never ran short of potential tenants attracted to the suburban de-
sign of the park and its proximity to university researchers. The university privi-
leged those companies working in high technology and medicine—and thus con-
tributed to Stanford’s educational and research programs—and welcomed several
companies to the park, including Eastman Kodak, Varian Associates, Hewlett-
Packard, Syntex Pharmaceutical, and Lockheed Missiles. The park expanded quickly
as its reputation grew. In 1955, only seven tenants occupied fifty-three acres of the
Industrial Park. By 1962 the number had jumped to forty-two tenants occupy-
ing 360 acres (around half of the available space) and employed 11,000 people.
By 1970, the number of tenants had reached fifty, occupied 500 acres, and em-
ployed 17,000 people. The rents generated tremendous profits for the university,
by 1978 reaching an annual profit of $4.3 million, while also generating another
$13.5 million in tax revenue and utility payments for the city of Palo Alto.74 The
“electronics-nuclear space-age . . . is accelerating the transformation of the Palo
Alto area into one of the country’s most important national defense facilities,”
wrote The Tall Tree, the publication of the Palo Alto Chamber of Commerce, in
1958. “The Palo Alto-Stanford research community has grown to become an inte-
gral part of the science community of the nation.”75
Applying the pastoral isolation of the university and a design tradition
meant to suburbanize office space allowed the university to pursue industrial
growth that seemed qualitatively different from other industries in the country. So
successful had Stanford been in its designs that a newspaper editorial remarked
in 1960 that “the research centers of the Midpeninsula, with their architectural
73Palo Alto Planning Commission, Report on the Interim General Plan (Palo Alto, April, 1955),
42–43; Findlay, Magic Lands, 131; O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 119–120
74City of Palo Alto, Calif., Palo Alto Comprehensive Plan, 1977-1990 (Palo Alto, 1976), 15; Findlay,
Magic Lands, 140.
75“The First Fifty Years of Electronics Research,” The Tall Tree 1:9 (May 1958), 3, FF Palo Alto
History, SC 486, 90-052, Stanford University Archives.
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buildings and landscaped lawns, look more like college structures than factories.
In fact, I’ve seen many college buildings, and attended classes in a few, that re-
sembled those factories of old more than do the industrial plants of today.”76
The Saturday Evening Post even referred to Stanford’s land program as “a model
city” and the Los Angeles Times described the Industrial Park as “fast taking on
the appearance of a fully integrated city.”77 By the end of the 1960s, the Stan-
ford Industrial Park had become a worldwide model of economic development,
exemplified by the tours given to Charles de Gaulle, the Japanese Diet, Nikita
Khrushchev, and it’s featuring at the World’s Fair in Brussels in 1958. Stanford
and the surrounding communities represented something new, innovative, and
worth replicating—a modern vision of cities for the space age.
san jose and stanford typified the emergence of the modern West: a region
less reliant on what economist Thomas Michael Power called “folk economics”
and more reliant on postindustrial economies of tourism, service, and technol-
ogy.78 The economic shift meant a cultural shift as well. As farmland, pastures,
and ranches became subdivisions, technology companies, research firms, and ser-
vice industries, the new economic activity began to reshape how people thought
about the Valley. Namely, the expansion of industry carried with it a contentious
debate about the effects of industrialization on the Valley’s landscape and over
how it would be shaped.79 Appeals to nature, environment, and climate formed a
core selling point for boosters on the Midpeninsula, and the expectation of indus-
try as clean made the sell easier for suburbanites. Manufacturing in the Stanford
76Quoted in O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 118
77O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 127
78Power, Lost Landscapes and Failed Economies, 19-21.
79On postwar suburban growth, see Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier; Robert Fishman, Bourgeois
Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 155–181; Abbott, Metropoli-
tan Frontier.
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Industrial Park had “to be clean, no smoke, no heavy manufacturing,” Brandin
later said. “Light manufacturing that is clean and electronic. . . . We wanted to
put [high-tech companies] in a park-like atmosphere.” The perception of high
technology’s “greenness” formed a core component of the booster’s assurance to
the new white-collar middle-class that the industrial and manufacturing activity
of the Valley would be distinct and different from the Rust Belt’s smokestacks
and pollution. Building the reputation of “clean” meant aesthetics, however, not
necessarily the cleanliness of industry. But the appearance of suburban offices led
to a regional political consensus that valued and encouraged industrial growth,
hailed as a sign of progress and modern. Yet by the early 1960s a widening range
of growth critics began questioning the environmental, economic, political, and
racial consequences to growth.
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2.0.1 Tables
Table 2.3: Sunbelt Population and Territorial Growth, 1940
City 1940 Land Area (sq mi) 1940 Population
Albuquerque 11 35,449
Austin 25.1 87,930
Dallas 40.6 294,734
Denver 57.9 332,412
Fort Worth 49.8 177,662
Houston 72.8 384,514
Los Angeles 448.3 1,504,277
Phoenix 9.7 65,414
San Diego 95.3 203,341
San Jose 14.8 68,457
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Table 2.4: Sunbelt Population and Territorial Growth, 1950
City 1950 Land Area (sq mi) 1950 Population
Albuquerque 47.9 96,815
Austin 32.1 132,459
Dallas 112 434,462
Denver 66.8 415,786
Fort Worth 93.7 278,778
Houston 160 596,163
Los Angeles 450.9 1,970,358
Phoenix 17.1 106,818
San Diego 99.4 334,387
San Jose 17 95,280
98
Table 2.5: Sunbelt Population and Territorial Growth, 1960
City 1960 Land Area (sq mi) 1960 Population
Albuquerque 58 201,189
Austin 45 186,545
Dallas 254 679,684
Denver 68 493,887
Fort Worth 138 356,268
Houston 321 938,219
Los Angeles 455 2,479,015
Phoenix 187 439,170
San Diego 195 573,287
San Jose 56 204,196
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Table 2.6: Sunbelt Population and Territorial Growth, 1970
City 1970 Land Area (sq mi) 1970 Population
Albuquerque 82.2 243,751
Austin 72.1 255,869
Dallas 265.6 844,303
Denver 95.2 514,678
Fort Worth 205 844,303
Houston 433.9 1,253,479
Los Angeles 463.7 2,811,801
Phoenix 247.9 589,016
San Diego 316.9 697,027
San Jose 136.2 461,212
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Table 2.7: Sunbelt Population and Territorial Growth, 1980
City 1980 Land Area (sq mi) 1980 Population
Albuquerque 95.3 332,920
Austin 116 345,544
Dallas 333 904,074
Denver 110.6 492,686
Fort Worth 240 904,074
Houston 556 1,595,167
Los Angeles 464.7 2,968,528
Phoenix 324 789,704
San Diego 320 875,538
San Jose 158 629,400
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Chapter 3
A Home in the Countryside
Do you know the way to San Jose? It’s simple: annex more, plan less density and
develop, develop, develop. —Seattle Times
We’d hate to think of the communities of the Midpeninsula as just little pieces of San
Jose. —Dutch Hamann
Across the street—the freeway,
blind worm, wrapping the valley up
from Los Altos to Sal Si Puedes.
I watched it from my porch
unwinding. Every day at dusk
as Grandma watered geraniums
the shadow of the freeway lengthened.
—”Beneath the Shadow of the Freeway,” Lorna Dee Cervantes
Cold War defense policies not only bolstered the position of Santa Clara
Valley’s industrial leaders. The legacy of New Deal housing policies and post-
war homeownership incentives also allowed housing markets to secure anchors
into the Valley landscape. The industrial expansion of the Valley intersected with
the growth-based strategies of city leaders to attract new white-collar middle-
class residents to the area. As newcomers arrived in the Valley, however, their
expectations for the landscape shaped growth politics. As early as the mid-1950s,
critics launched attacks against growth and its promoters. Their critiques were
wide-ranging: racial inequality, environmental concerns, suburban sprawl, van-
ishing farmland. The emergence of so many critiques from various avenues of
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concern illustrated a growing need to redirect development in Santa Clara Valley.
When the much-anticipated Rockefeller Brothers Fund published its book-length
report from its bipartisan Task Force on Land Use and Growth in 1973, they con-
cluded there existed “a new mood in America” as citizens questioned “what ur-
ban growth will add to the quality of their lives.” The questioning of “growth is
good, that growth is inevitable” that the Rockefeller report identified in the 1970s
existed nearly two decades earlier in the Santa Clara Valley.
the santa clara valley of the 1940s was a relatively small place, especially in
comparison to the urban cores of San Francisco and Oakland. Santa Clara County
housed 145,118 people, the bulk of which lived in San Jose—around 68,457 people
on roughly 14 square miles. By 1960, San Jose’s population ballooned to 204,196
and covered 56 square miles. Between 1940 and 2000, the city’s land cover ex-
panded 968% and its population rose by 819%. As farmland converted to resi-
dential and industrial suburbs, the Midpeninsula cities embarked on aggressive
annexation campaigns to maintain control over territory and enjoy new tax dol-
lars.
While the greatest financial benefits for cities came from taxing industry,
municipalities of the Midpeninsula encouraged suburban growth. In the wake of
the “monetary and credit revolution,” in the words of historian David Freund,
that “made it easier—in many cases risk free—for the private sector to lend and
borrow,” thousands of new homeowners flooded housing markets.1 Aided by the
Federal Housing Authority (FHA), created under the National Housing Act of
1934, guaranteed mortgage loans up to eighty percent of the value of a home
encouraged widespread purchasing of homes. The federal subsidy into housing,
1David Freund, “Marketing the Free Market: State Intervention and the Politics of Prosperity
in Metropolitan America,” in Sugrue and Kruse, The New Suburban History, 15, 26.
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Kenneth Jackson noted, meant there was “very little risk to the banker if a loan
turned sour.”2 The new lending terms under the FHA of low down payments,
larger loans in proportion to a home’s value, low interest rates, and longer loan
repayments ushered in a dramatic rise in demand. Nationally, single-family hous-
ing sales and starts doubled between 1936 and 1941, and rose almost fifteen-fold
between 1944 and 1950.3 The federal tax code also allowed home ownership to
blossom by allowing homeowners to take deductions from their mortgage interest
and property taxes. Renters, however, received no similar federal subsidy. Thus,
federal policies encouraged building in suburbs rather than city cores. Federal
tax policies also allowed developers to write off construction costs on commercial
buildings, tipping incentives towards new construction instead of renovation.4
San Jose lay at the center of northern California’s suburban population
boom. A rural farming community of 68,457 in 1940, San Jose would be among
the top ten largest metropolitan areas in the nation by the century’s end. By the
1960s the town’s population numbered 204,196, and doubled by 1970 to 445,779.5
San Jose became the largest city in northern California and largely served as the
suburban home for the Bay Area’s technology commuters working in Sunnyvale,
Mountain View, and Palo Alto.6 The city limits rapidly expanded from 17 square
miles in 1950 to 137 square miles in 1970, sprawling awkwardly across the Valley
floor and foothills.7 The city grew so rapidly that street map makers could not
2Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 203–205.
3Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, chapter 11.
4Marion Clawson, Suburban Land Conversion in the United States: An Economic and Governmental
Process (Baltimore: Resources for the Future, Inc. / The John Hopkins Press, 1971), 41–44; Dreier
et al., Place Matters, 110–111.
5U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov; U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov.
6U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1950 Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov; U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1960 Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov; U.S. Bureau of
the Census, 1970 Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov; U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1980 Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov.
7Stanford Environmental Law Review, San Jose: Sprawling City: A Report on Land use Policies and
Practices in San Jose, California, March 1971, 2.
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keep up with the changes, finding their maps outdated just five months after
printing. The city began selling monthly packets of stickers with corrections that
people placed upon their maps to maintain their accuracy.8
Figure 3.1: Population of San Jose, 1940-2010. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1950
Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960
Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970
Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov; U.S. Bureau of the Census,1980
Census, Santa Clara County, n.d., census.abag.ca.gov.
Although much of San Jose’s drive aimed at attracting industry to the city,
San Jose instead witnessed the most growth in housing and residential develop-
ment. San Jose gained 25,000 new residents in 1953, and another 31,400 a year
later. Residential construction totaled $84 million in 1954, much of which was in
unincorporated county territory. Residential construction employed 35,000 people
and built 8,300 homes, while industrial and commercial construction topped $48
million. Banks in the county lent out more than $202 million through FHA, Cal-
Vet, and other programs meant to entice the construction of homes.9 Throughout
the entire county, housing subdivisions continued to increase. In 1950 Santa Clara
8“County Grows Too Fast for Mapmakers,” Palo Alto Times, September 12, 1952; “Notes for a
Gazetteer,” The New Yorker, May 4, 1963, 148.
9“1954—A Year of Amazing Growth in County,” San Jose Mercury, January 3, 1955.
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County witnessed 144 subdivisions and homes on 6,833 lots. A year later the fig-
ures dropped slightly with only ninety-eight subdivisions and 4,616 homes. But
in 1952 construction jumped again, reaching 144 subdivisions and 6,437 homes.
By 1955, the county saw 177 subdivisions and the construction of 10,157 homes
for families moving to the area.10 The county estimated that as much as 75% of
the population owned their homes.11
Along with suburban growth came new municipal projects. The city coun-
cil finally convinced voters to approve bond measures beginning in 1955 when
San Jose voters approved bonds supporting the construction of a new City Hall,
new hospital facilities, new jail and court buildings, and a new YMCA facility.
The Progress Committee ran up against resistance from voters in the 1940s as
they rejected general obligation bond votes. But by the late 1950s residents started
reversing course and approved over $134 million in general obligation bonds in
elections held in 1957, 1961, 1966, and 1969.[12]
Like other cities in the nation, New Deal housing policies made homeown-
ership nearly nonexistent by nonwhites. The FHA determined at its inception that
integration introduced risk to property values and instituted policies preventing
the agency from supporting neighborhoods that housed a majority of nonwhite
populations. Simultaneously, the FHA rejected nonwhite applications for homes
in the country’s new subdivisions. “That the entry of Non-Caucasian[s] into dis-
tricts where distinctly Caucasian residents live tends to depress real estate val-
ues,” wrote realtor Stanley McMichael in the industry textbook Real Estate Subdi-
visons, “is agreed to by practically all real estate subdividers and students of city
10“Population Growth Created Demand for Housing; Subdivisions on Grand Scale Provided
the Homes,” San Jose Mercury, January 15, 1956; “198 Tracts Provide 11,631 Home Sites,” San Jose
Mercury, January 15, 1960.
11“Estimate of Homeowners: 75%,” San Jose Mercury, January 15, 1956.
12Philip Trounstine and Terry Christensen, Movers and Shakers: The Study of Community Power
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 95–96.
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life and growth.”13 These ideas followed through in Santa Clara County. While
minority populations in the South Bay were much smaller than the North and
East Bay’s urban cores of San Francisco, Richmond, and Oakland, where job op-
portunities and access to government-subsidized housing was more accessible,
minority populations still faced the brunt of discriminatory housing policies in
the South Bay. When black realtor Mary Anne Smith took a black family to a
home in the San Jose neighborhood of Willow Glen, she received a terse phone
call from a white agent from a different brokerage who told her “in no uncertain
terms that there were areas where black people are not welcome, and that Willow
Glen was one of them.”14 One study concluded that the suburbs of Santa Clara
County “are almost totally white.”15
Restrictive covenants also shaped the urban space. Restrictive covenants
and redlining initially forced African Americans into Northside properties. By the
1950s, roughly 40% of the South Bay’s 1,718 black population lived in Northside.
Similarly, the county’s Mexican Americans occupied the enclave of East San Jose,
known as Eastside, while Japanese Americans were restricted to downtown and
Northside. Southern and western neighborhoods of San Jose were essentially off
limits to nonwhites.16
Yet while racial discrimination continued to lock minorities out of partic-
ular neighborhoods, other homebuilders confronted racial restrictions head-on.
13McMichael quoted in Needham, Power Lines, 84. See also Federal Housing Administration,
Underwriting Manual: Underwriting and Valuation Procedure Under Title II of the National Housing
Act With Revisions to February, 1938 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), Part II,
Section 9, Rating of Location.
14Smith, “Unsung Hero—In Her Quiet Way, Mary Anne Smith Has Introduced San Jose to
Color, Diversity, Acceptance,” San Jose Mercury News, October 29, 1995, quoted in Ruffin, Uninvited
Neighbors, 100.
15“Proposal for a Metropolitan Bay Area Housing Development Corporation,” n.d., Folder 32,
Box 73, Don Edwards Congressional Papers, MSS-1995-01, San Jose State University Library Spe-
cial Collections and Archives.
16Ruffin, Uninvited Neighbors, 74-75. In 1967, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission chastised the Bay
Area FHA for “dragging its heels” on President Kennedy’s open housing policy. See United States
Commission on Civil Rights, Hearing Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights: Hearing
Held in San Francisco, May 1–3, 1967, and Oakland, California, May 4–6, 1967, 143.
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Among the most prominent was Eichler Homes, founded by Joseph Eichler in
1947. Eichler Homes built homes for the professional middle-class: single-family,
modern, and suburban. Yet they also gained a reputation as racially progressive.
By the end of the 1960s, Eichler Homes were responsible for 6,000 houses built in
the Bay Area, largely located in San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties.17 After the
FHA and Veteran’s Administration ended racial restrictions after 1950, Eichler
sold their first homes to people of color. Asian Americans and African Ameri-
cans were Eichler’s first minority customers, purchasing new homes in Palo Alto
in the early 1950s.18 By the end of the 1950s, Eichler Homes adopted an “open
occupancy policy” that they would sell homes regardless of race. Realtors and
competitors questioned the policy and attempted to use the policy against the
Eichlers. Yet the company continued to build and sell homes, in part due to ed-
ucated, white professionals who seemed more agreeable to open occupancy.19
When residents complained of an Asian American family purchasing a home in
their neighborhood in Palo Alto, Eichler parner Jim San Jule told the residents
that “we don’t even want people like you in our subdivisions.”20
The county’s largest minority population were Latinos, comprising roughly
eighteen percent of the county’s population in 1970.21 In East San Jose—known
simply as East Side—a small group of Latino laborers banded together in the early
1950s to confront the problems of urban sprawl and urban policy discrimination.
The Mayfair District was a key site of Latino activism focused on halting racial
discrimination, calling for greater participation in electoral politics, labor rights,
and a critique of San Jose’s growth policies. Chicano activism and environmental
regulations became entwined with debates over citizenship and discrimination,
17Cavin, “Borders of Citizenship,” 366.
18Edward P. Eichler, Race and Housing: An Interview with Edward P. Eichler, President, Eichler Homes,
Inc. (Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1964).
19Starr, Golden Dreams, 46–49.
20Adamson, Arbunich, and Braun, Eichler: Modernism Rebuilds the American Dream, 199.
21Testimony of Jack Ybarra, May 15, 1972, Folder 3, Box 56, Don Edwards Papers, SJSU.
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prompting activists to call for environmental equality alongside their challenges
to racial inequality, citizenship, and segregation. Even economic issues that ap-
peared neutral, such as zoning, sewer hookups, and street paving became a core
tenant of Chicano politics. In the drive for progress, city leaders in San Jose cre-
ated spaces that were disconnected from urban services and lacking good roads,
adequate sewers, and city utilities.
Perhaps no place better represented frustrations in Mayfair than Sal Si
Puedes. Originally a neighborhood populated predominantly by Puerto Rican
farm laborers, Latinos living in Sal Si Puedes moved to the neighborhood in
greater numbers the 1940s to work in the orchards, packing houses, and on con-
struction crews building San Jose’s suburban future.22 In the early 1950s, agricul-
ture remained a steadily profitable industry. By the mid-1950s, the county boasted
the highest levels of agricultural profits before agricultural industries began their
steady decline towards the end of the decade. “Agriculture and industry are syn-
onymous words in the Santa Clara Valley,” the San Jose Mercury could boast in
1955. Food processing employed a third of the county’s manufacturing work-
force.23 The presence of San Jose’s agricultural industry attracted many migrants
seeking job opportunities.
East Side reflected the spatial influences of industrialization in the Bay
Area. High tech industries tended to cluster west and south in San Jose, staying
close to the highways that channeled traffic and freight north and south. Zoning
decisions by city and county government likewise determined the spatial layout
of industrialization. Few of the Bay Area’s new high-tech industries located them-
selves in the eastern parts of San Jose. East Side tended to be the site of homes
rather than industry, a feature made more prominent through the city’s decision
22Clark, Health in the Mexican American Community, 49–51, 79; The Spanish-American Community
of the San Francisco Bay Area (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, April 28, 1967), 3.
23“Agriculture,” San Jose Mercury, January 15, 1956.
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to zone for low-density residential and federally-subsidized housing that clus-
tered heavily in East Side. The density of housing caused severe traffic congestion
on roads inadequate to carry the thousands of commuters traveling to their north
county jobs.24 The pattern and policies of the Bay Area’s postwar development
introduced uneven environmental effects to barrio neighborhoods. Space, race,
class, and environmental politics became tangled in East Side, expressed through
Latino activists in the South Bay.
Cesar Chavez was among those Latinos coming to East Side in the 1950s
seeking out ways to make a living and support his family. Chavez, his wife, and
four children moved to San Jose in 1952, where he found irregular work in can-
neries, orchards, and lumberyards. A native of Yuma, Arizona, Chavez’s family
moved to Los Angeles when he was ten years old and later to San Jose, where
his family worked in fruit packing houses. After a stint in the Navy during World
War II, Chavez married and moved to foothills of San Jose where he sharecropped
for a few years. Unable to scrape together much of a living, he moved his family
into the city where Chavez worked in fields and lumberyards.25
Chavez lived in the neighborhood known as Sal Si Puedes (“Get out if you
can”), a suburban barrio in East San Jose that served as home for many of the
area’s seasonal workers. Sal Si Puedes became an epicenter of environmental jus-
tice for the city’s Mexican American residents. By the early 1950s, Fred Ross, a
community organizer from Los Angeles who helped Chavez establish the Com-
munity Service Organization (CSO) in 1952, wrote of the neighborhood’s lack of
sewers, the presence of cesspools that led to amoebic dysentery outbreaks, and
flooding, muddy streets that occasionally left children unable to attend school.26
24“East Siders form alliance to increase political clout,” San Jose Mercury, March 22, 1978; Cavin,
“Borders of Citizenship,” 293–294.
25Richard Griswold del Castillo and Richard A. Garcia, Ce´sar Cha´vez: A Triumph of Spirit (Nor-
man: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 24; Stephen J. Pitti, The Devil in Silicon Valley: Northern
California, Race, and Mexican Americans (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 150–154
26Fred Ross, “The Saga of Sal Si Puedes,” 3–6.
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Figure 3.2: Mayfair neighborhood and its subdivisions.
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Environmental hazards formed a critique of the city’s public policies that over-
looked it’s minority communities. Even the very name of the community became a
rallying point for activists. Puerto Rican families jokingly coined “Sal Si Puedes”
due to its muddy streets that became filled with potholes in the winter rains.
Residents continued to use the name because of its housing and socioeconomic
problems, not so much as a joke but as an aspiration.27
Figure 3.3: Children playing near a culvert at South 33rd Street in the Mayfair District, ca.
1950s. Fred Ross Papers, Stanford University.
Ross, Chavez, Herman Gallagos, who served as the CSO’s first president,
organized the community to act, turning to electoral politics to get the city’s at-
tention. While the CSO predominantly focused on anti-poverty programs, ending
27Margaret Clark, Health in the Mexican-American Culture: A Community Study (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1959), 35. Herman E. Gallegos, who became the first president of the
San Jose CSO in 1952, recalled three stories as to how Sal Si Puedes got its name. See Gallegos,
“Equity and Diversity: Hispanics in the Nonprofit World,” interview by Gabrielle Morris, 1988,
16, Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, University of California,Berkeley.
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racial discrimination, and embraced the postwar welfare state, their platform was
framed, in part, around the uneven environmental hazards their neighborhoods
experienced. Ross told members of San Jose’s first CSO meeting that election
drives he helped organize in Los Angeles brought streetlights, paved roads, and
medical care to the barrio. East San Jose, Ross promised, could achieve the same.28
Armed with Ross’s know-how for organizing, an eighty-five-day voter drive reg-
istered 6,000 new Mexican American voters. The move caught the attention of
city officials. Fearing that the wave of Latino voters might sway city politics, city
officials approved new urban services to Sal Si Puedes within months after the
election drive. New public works systems to fix chronic flooding, clearing out
cesspools, and paved roads were brought to the barrio. Fruit packinghouses and
canneries were forced to cease dumping effluence into creeks.29
Yet despite the city’s move to connect the barrios to urban services, such
places were still considered expendable. Encouraged under the 1949 federal hous-
ing act that granted Title I money to demolish substandard housing, local officials
looked to secure funds to partake in urban renewal programs. Nationwide, Title I
money was used for the demolition of neighborhoods considered “blight,” which
were then redeveloped often as housing, commercial, or civic projects. San Jose
leaders and planners saw barrios as signs of decay. “Each segment of the city,”
the city’s 1958 master plan noted, “has a natural cycle of growth—obsolescence
and decay—and then renewal.”30 The planning commission’s map of blighted ar-
eas closely followed the city’s barrios, identifying blight primarily in East Side.
The city, the commission warned, needed to pursue urban renewal programs to
prevent blight from spreading so “that the vast private investment in our city will
28Ross, “The Saga of Sal si Puedes,” 8.
29Ross, “The Saga of Sal si Puedes,” 16, 22–23; Clark, Health in the Mexican-American Culture, 28;
Levy, Cesar Chavez, 104.
30San Jose City Planning Commission, Master Plan of the City of San Jose, 89.
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Figure 3.4: Installing curbs and sidewalks in East Side. Fred Ross Papers, Stanford Uni-
versity.
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remain sound an continue to expand.”31 Renewal needed to “clear and rebuild
areas that economically are not worth saving.”32 The suggestions for renewal also
aligned with federal transportation programs. Beginning in the mid-1940s, fed-
eral loans to states for road building increased rapidly. After the 1956 Interstate
and Defense Highway Act, a larger pool of federal money for transportation be-
came available to states. Over the next decade, 41,000 miles of new highway were
authorized nationwide.33
In Santa Clara County, city officials turned to the newly available pool of
transportation money to aid their demolition of blighted areas as well as provide
a short-term stimulus of subsidized construction. Plans for three interstate high-
ways and an expressway through East Side emerged in the late-1950s: Highways
280 and 680 would shuffle traffic between northern and southern Santa Clara
County, while Capitol Expressway skirted the eastern edge of San Jose to allow
traffic to flow east and west. The federal funds also went into the construction of
Bayshore Freeway (Highway 101) and Highway 280 running north and south up
the Peninsula. In the process of constructing the new highway system, many of
the East Side barrios were demolished.34
The social and environmental considerations were rarely taken into ac-
count under such development policies. The quickly-crowding Peninsula meant
that new road construction projects would almost guarantee the displacement
of people and business. But such concerns ran low for highway engineers and
31Planning Commission, Master Plan of the City of San Jose, 94–95.
32Planning Commission, Master Plan of the City of San Jose, 89.
33Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939–1989 (Knoxville: University of Ten-
nessee Press, 1990); Raymond A. Mohl, “Race and Space in the Modern City: Interstate-95 and the
Black Community in Miami,” in Arnold R. Hirsch and Raymond A. Mohl, eds., Urban Policy in
Twentieth-Century America (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1993), 108; Edward Weiner,
Urban Transportation Planning in the United States: An Historical Overview (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Transportation, 1988), chapter 3. See also Teaford, Rough Road to Renaissance, 93–97;
Rose, Interstate, chapter 5; Annmarie Hauck Walsh, The Public’s Business: The Politics and Practices
of Government Corporations (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978.)
34“Housing for Freeway Displace-ees,”, newspaper clipping, n.d., Box 5, Folder 19, Fred Ross
Papers, Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, California.
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Figure 3.5: Areas identified as “blight” in San Jose. San Jose Planning Commission, Master
Plan of the City of San Jose (1958).
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civic leaders.35 The bulk of San Jose’s lower-income Mexican Americans displaced
under new road projects relocated to a centralized barrio in East Side and re-
mained physically and symbolically separated from white communities by the
freeways. The eastern edge of the city also became home to many of the city’s
federally-financed public housing projects administered through San Jose’s Hous-
ing Authority, established in 1966.36 Urban renewal plans sealed the fate of Sal Si
Puedes. What had once housed a community of 422 people became the site for
highways. San Jose’s policies of transportation, urban renewal, and annexations
overwhelmed the CSO activists. “What use to be a very small neighborhood is
now . . . hundreds of hastily-built tract homes that have become quite blighted,”
Gallegos noted. San Jose’s growth “happened so rapidly,” he continued, “[that]
it was just incredible.” The problems of Sal Si Puedes “were exacerbated by the
sudden growth.”37
By framing community problems around environmental issues, Mexican
Americans in East Side shaped a conversation about their lack of access to the
suburban lifestyle enjoyed by the majority of white residents in the city, but also
demanded that the city ensure an environment that promoted health and quality-
of-life. The conditions of their neighborhoods went hand-in-hand with the envi-
ronment, a point that residents of Sal Si Puedes understood well. In shaping their
political organizing around the community, activists argued for a suburban vi-
sion that included them while promoting an environmental critique of San Jose’s
35Nationally, between 1957 and 1968 nearly 330,000 homes were destroyed to make way for
highways. In the 1960s, new interstate highways in urban areas displaced roughly 32,400 families
annually. Mohl, “Race and Space in the Modern City,” 100–101, 134–136.
36“Housing for Freeway Displace-ees,” Fred Ross Papers.
37Gallegos oral history, 17–18.
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sprawl.38
san jose’s rapid growth came with a price. Nearby towns attempted to protect
themselves from becoming part of the city. In the 1950s, suburban governments
proliferated in the Bay Area. For various reasons, towns were not willing partners
in San Jose’s growth and instead sought strict economic regulations within their
boundaries in order to control the development and character of their munici-
palities. Some cities used incorporation as one method for protecting themselves
from San Jose’s sprawling annexations. Campbell became a city in 1952, followed
by Milpitas in 1954, Cupertino in 1955, and Saratoga in 1956.39 County-wide,
between 1952 and 1957 seven cities incorporated, doubling the number of munic-
ipalities in the county.40
In other cases, cities found themselves resisting attempts at municipal con-
solidation.41 Alviso, located to the north of San Jose at the southern tip of the
San Francisco Bay, was an incorporated city long desired by civic leaders in San
Jose. City leaders valued Alviso for two particular reasons. First, San Jose desired
access to the San Francisco Bay for the location of a deep water port, a dream
the city had held on to since the late 1800s.42 Second, the city wanted to locate a
sewage treatment plant on the fringe rather than inside the city. For pro-growth
Alvisans, incorporation with San Jose would provide the city with a larger tax
38Pitti, Devil in Silcion Valley, 157.
39“Hamann: San Jose’s Growth Guru,” San Jose Mercury, 1999.
40Cavin, “Borders of Citizenship,” 491.
41Consolidation and annexation are very different issues. Consolidation means the joining of
two independent municipalities; annexation means the expansion of municipal boundaries to
control unincorporated land.
42Land-locked San Jose began looking to Alviso’s port as early as 1895. In the 1930s, the city
was so certain it would control the port that it prematurely released a pamphlet boasting of the
“San Jose´ Deep Water Port.” In 1958, the city’s Master Plan still mentioned their goal of a deep
water port located in Alviso. See Cavin, “Borders of Citizenship,” 323; “Trip on Alviso Channel,”
San Francisco Call, August 30, 1895; San Jose City Planning Commission, Master Plan of the City of
San Jose, 50.
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Figure 3.6: The South Bay cities of San Jose, Santa Clara, Campbell, Saratoga, Cupertino,
Sunnyvale, Milpitas, and Alviso. Map courtesy Mapbox.
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base to fund capital improvements in the town. Alvisans, one pro-consolidation
advertisement wrote, are “tired of wallowing in the mud, are tired of having our
children play in the streets . . . are tired of seeing all of our neighboring areas
make great strides forward while we just stand still. SUPPORT PROGRESS.”43
A campaign began to approve the city’s annexation to San Jose. While debates
continued in Alviso, San Jose annexed a narrow one-hundred-foot strip of land to
the border of Alviso, and there built a sewage treatment plant. That plant would
become the basis for more annexations as it allowed the city to extend municipal
services cheaply to surrounding areas.44 The sewer system of San Jose became a
key tool in the city’s growth: by offering cities a chance to connect to San Jose’s
sewer system, which whisked treated sewage away to outfalls dumping into the
San Francisco Bay in a sewer system originally designed to handle the massive
amounts of cannery effluence. Neighboring cities had a highly desirable incentive
to join the city. Joining the sewer system was the price for annexation.45 “We’re
in this fight to the finish,” Dutch Hamann argued, “and if we have to use sewage
disposal to bring Santa Clara [County municipalities] to some point of reasoning,
we’ll do it.”46
The very choices of annexation, zoning, and construction introduced en-
vironmental problems municipal leaders failed to anticipate. When San Jose lo-
cated a sewage treatment plant near Alviso, they were attempting to push such
services away from the city’s downtown in order to maintain a pristine image
43“Covenant and Betrayal,” San Jose Mercury, March 28, 1993.
44While San Jose prided itself on industrial and commercial development, the city made most
of its revenue through residential property taxes. These taxes, however, were unbalanced. The city
desired more industrial land to expand its tax base, and locating industrial facilities northward
allowed it to tap into the growing industries of Silicon Valley. San Jose City Planning Commission,
Master Plan of the City of San Jose, 50.
45Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 97; Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New
Frontier (New York: Anchor Books, 1992), 224-227.
46David N. Pellow and Lisa Sun-Hee Park, The Silicon Valley of Dreams: Environmental Injustice,
Immigrant Workers, and the High-Tech Global Economy (New York: New York University Press, 2002),
70.
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Figure 3.7: The expansion of San Jose sewers.
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and high property values. The sewage treatment plant, however, required mas-
sive amounts of chlorine, which was shipped to the plant by rail across Alviso’s
borders. Alvisans not only dealt with the daily stench of the plant but were also
exposed to potential chemical spills and sewage leaks. For San Jose, controlling
Alviso’s space was a method for offloading the environmental consequences of
pollution to neighboring cities.
Complaints and campaigns were not enough to stop San Jose’s drive. In
January 1968, voters approved consolidation by the thin margin of nine votes.47
However, many of the developments pro-consolidation Alvisans anticipated were
never realized. No deep water port could be constructed because the dredging
necessary to accommodate large ships ran up against new state environmental
laws passed in the early 1970s. The port had also become less important to San
Jose since new industries relied less on water for shipping and more on the in-
terstate system. Yet while commercial developments ran aground, the city contin-
ued to expand its sanitation facilities. Large land owners sold their land to the
city. Tony Santos, a landlord and former Alvisan police chief, city council mem-
ber, and mayor, sold his land to San Jose that became the site of the city’s huge
landfill. The site became so polluted that the Environmental Protection Agency
declared it a Superfund site in 1986.48 William Zanker, chair of Alviso’s planning
commission, sold his property to the city for $1.5 million and moved to nearby
Sunnyvale. Zanker’s land became the site of an expanded sewage plant that en-
compassed 1,764 acres and quadrupled its capacity. The new sewage plant became
San Jose’s key to growth, allowing the plant to handle the municipal waste of the
whole region, including the industrial effluence from high technology industries.
The plant eventually grew to service twenty-four cities.49
47“Covenant and Betrayal,” San Jose Mercury, March 28, 1993.
48Cavin, “Borders of Citizenship,” 333.
49“Covenant and Betrayal,” San Jose Mercury; Cavin, “Borders of Citizenship,” 333.
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The city’s political coalition of businessmen, newspaper publishers, real es-
tate developers, and the Chamber of Commerce allowed the political machinery
to pursue growth. Widespread annexation became an avenue for development,
provided the city with a broad tax base of industrial, residential, and commer-
cial land, gave itself more power over surrounding cities, and allowed San Jose’s
leaders think about the city as a regional powerhouse. The combination of envi-
ronmental politics and the limits of the environment itself shaped contests over
metropolitan space, environmental degradation, and municipal government.
Similar patterns of offloading environmental problems to outside commu-
nities occurred elsewhere on the Midpeninsula. In the North Bay next to Palo
Alto lay East Palo Alto, a predominantly African American community along the
San Francisco Bay. East Palo Alto incorporated for the same reasons other small
communities did during the postwar era: they feared the loss of independence.
After the City of Menlo Park acquired the Belle Haven subdivision—one-quarter
of East Palo Alto’s population and property—in 1949, the city made overtures
towards incorporation. The city itself had grown dramatically in the postwar era,
from 1,500 residents in 1947 to 12,000 by 1953.50 But incorporation efforts were
upended by the Kavanaugh family, the largest property owners in East Palo Alto
who worried that incorporation would mean higher taxes.51
The widening of Bayshore Freeway (Highway 101), under the same fed-
eral funding that allowed San Jose to drive freeways through its neighborhoods,
marked a physical boundary between Palo Alto and East Palo Alto that the
NAACP’s The Crisis referred to as the “concrete curtain.”52 When the California
State Planning Commission went ahead with plans to widen the freeway in the
50U.S. Census, 1952.
51Bayinnah R. Jones, “The Tinsley Case Decision,” Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina-
Chapel Hill, 17—18.
52Rachelle Marshall, “Concrete Curtain—the East Palo Alto Story,” The Crisis (November 1957):
543–548.
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late 1950s as a major corridor for traffic between San Francisco and the growing
tech industries of Santa Clara Valley, little effort was made to preserve East Palo
Alto businesses which mostly lined the freeway. The freeway project appeared
willing to curve around other commercial districts, but the fifty-three East Palo
Alto businesses lining the old four-lane freeway were displaced. The widening of
the freeway also caused greater flooding problems in the city and lowered land
values, causing residential and business developers to look elsewhere.53
Figure 3.8: The former site of the Romic waste facility.
Exacerbating the environmental problems in East Palo Alto was the loca-
tion of the Romic waste management facility. Opened in 1956, the facility first
run by the Hird Chemical Corporation before it was sold to Carad Chemical Cor-
poration in 1959 followed by the purchase of the facility by P.D. Electronics in
1964 before its eventual sale to Romic in 1979. The facility largely existed for the
processing of solvent wastes and wastewaters from industrial activity, including
53Bayinnah R. Jones, “The Tinsley Case Decision,” Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina-
Chapel Hill, 18; Palo Alto Times, January 11, 1956.
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the manufacturing waste from aerospace and electronics. Like the Alviso sewage
treatment plant in San Jose that located the facility outside the city, Romic lay
outside of Greater Palo Alto but close enough to East Palo Alto that the com-
munity would be left dealing with potential problems. A major environmental
problem occurred in the winter of 1972 when tidal flooding breeched wastewater
receiving pond levees, causing 20,000 gallons of waste liquids to dump into ad-
jacent tidal sloughs along the San Francisco Bay. The California Regional Quality
Control Board issued a Cleanup and Abatement Order in March 1973 command-
ing Romic to rebuild levees, improve surface drainage, and connect the facility
to sanitary sewers.54 East Palo Alto Vice Mayor A. Peter Evans, who had once
worked at the Romic facility in the late-1950s, regretted the facility’s presence in
the city. East Palo Alto, he recalled, had become “the dumping ground for San
Mateo County.”55
The emergence of urban black and Latino politics in the 1950s did not blos-
som completely from environmental concerns. Throughout the 1950s growth pro-
grams throughout the Midpeninsula faced little resistance. Indeed, political orga-
nizing focused more specifically on ending segregation, housing discrimination,
and political participation. Yet opposition and critique of urban growth policies
promised to unleash new political energies focused on the health of neighbor-
hoods and communities, a alternate expression of environmentalism than that
54The Environmental Protection Agency initiated investigations into the Romic contamina-
tion sites in April 1985 and found various volatile organic compounds in the soil including
dry cleaning chemicals, carburetor cleaning liquids, paint thinners, and various industrial sol-
vents. See “Statement of Basis for Proposed Soil and Ground Water Remedy,” Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, September 14, 2007 http://www.epa.gov/Region9/waste/romic-eastpaloalto/
pdf/romic-sob.pdf. On June 5, 2006, a chemical release of roughly 4,000 gallons of a chemi-
cal mixture caused East Palo Alto police to issue a shelter-in-place order. The EPA fined Romic
$20,000 for failing to immediately notify the agency of the problem. See “U.S. EPA finds Romic
$20,000 for failing to notify authorities after chemical release,” EPA News Release, August
20, 2007 http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/6427a6b7538955c585257359003f0230/
2c861bd40017ca988525735600604ee3!OpenDocument&Start=3.2&Count=5&Expand=3.4.
55“Romic waste facility fuels toxic debates,” Inside Bay Area, July 14, 2006 http://www.
insidebayarea.com/argus/localnews/ci_4050135.
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emerging among lifestyle liberals who valued countryside homes, open spaces,
and recreation.
as city leaders defined the details of San Jose’s suburban and industrial fu-
ture, a sizable contingent of city residents began questioning whether the link
between growth and prosperity was guaranteed. In the mid-1950s, debates over
the landscape’s identity as an agricultural powerhouse rose to fruition, resulting
in legal challenges to San Jose’s unrestricted growth and initiated a campaign to
conserve farmland. The extension of subdivisions into farmland, however, was
not a clean story of transition from agricultural to suburban space. Yet given the
physical space restrictions in the Santa Clara Valley, farms rarely stayed in the
Valley when they were bought up. Many farmers took their new-found capital
and moved their operations to other parts of the state, most commonly to the
Central Valley straight east of the Santa Clara Valley.
The expansion of the city into agricultural land was part of a large cycle
of capital flowing into the county. Federal money, the nation’s political and finan-
cial centers, and investment dollars became fixed in space in neighborhoods like
Willow Glen, Los Altos Hills, and Cupertino, subdivisions built on the periphery
of the urban cores of San Jose, Palo Alto, and Sunnyvale. Growth liberalism pro-
vided the structure for capital and incentive, allowing banks to aggressively bet
on mortgages with the mitigation of risk through the FHA. New Deal housing
policies allowed banks in the Valley to become anchors by which capital entered
the Valley, establishing homebuilders and city leaders as central figures in the
Valley’s postwar growth and steady erosion of agricultural land.56
Despite the dramatic rise of subdivisions and neighborhoods, Santa Clara
Valley maintained its reputation as a major producer of fruit, food preserva-
56Needham, Power Lines, 72.
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tion, and food processing in the immediate postwar era, even after farm incomes
peaked in 1955.57 The orchards of the Valley remained abundant enough in 1953
that the Chamber of Commerce published a postcard advertising the blossom
tours in the “land of sunshine, fruit and flowers.” The blossoming trees lured
tourists to the city, giving visitors a chance to see the abundant flowering of
cherry, almonds, apricots, prunes, and pears in “famous Santa Clara County, Cal-
ifornia.”58 In 1960 the county contained eighty-five canneries, twenty-three dried
fruit plants, twenty-five frozen food operations, and eighty-five fresh fruit and
vegetable packing facilities.59
The county’s suburbanization attracted its critics, most prominently from
the suburban critic William H. Whyte. In 1958 in the pages of the New York Times
Whyte described Santa Clara County cities as a “vast, smog-filled deserts that
are neither city, suburb, nor country.” Like other observers of suburban America,
Whyte considered suburbanization as a symbol of progress, but he questioned
its application to the Santa Clara Valley. “You can’t stop progress, they say,” he
wrote, “yet much more of this kind of progress and we shall have the paradox of
prosperity lowering our real standard of living.” Whyte’s greatest concern for the
Valley was the farmlands. “In a maze of signs and neon lights,” Whyte bemoaned,
“the unspoiled country had almost disappeared.”60
Beginning in the early 1950s the children and grandchildren of farmers
and ranchers began selling their land to developers. Many times smaller farms
could not hold out against the pressures of urbanization, while larger land own-
ers waited for a high enough offer. The experience of Carl Wesley Haman’s land
57County of Santa Clara Planning Department, “Land Use Issues in Santa Clara County,” (San
Jose: County of Santa Clara Planning Department, 1963), 8.
58Greater San Jose Chamber of Commerce, “Blossomtime Tours: Santa Clara Valley Blossom
Routes”, ca. 1953, Santa Clara City Library.
59“Agriculture,” San Jose Mercury, January 15, 1956; Megan Lynn Alpert, “Valley of Heart’s
Delight: Orchards to Hard Drives in the San Mercury News” (MA Thesis, San Jose State University,
2010), 16; Cavin, “Borders of Citizenship,” 224.
60Whyte, “Urban Sprawl,” 124. See also Rome, Bulldozer in the Countryside, 119–152.
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Figure 3.9: Greater San Jose Chamber of Commerce, “Blossomtime Tours: Santa Clara
Valley Blossom Routes,” ca. 1953, Santa Clara History Center Collection, Santa Clara City
Library.
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was typical. When the Santa Clara fruit grower died in 1955, a Palo Alto devel-
oper purchased his 41.44-acre lot for $287,000—seventeen times more than what
Haman paid originally. Farmland desired by developers had the opportunity to
fetch upwards of $7,000 an acre by the mid-1950s.61 Smaller farmers had simi-
lar experiences. Joe Ruscigno spent his lifetime working the land on his San Jose
farm. Son of first-generation Italian immigrants, Ruscigno and his family had run
the farm since the 1940s.62 But in 1952 he gave up tending land for tearing up
land. “Guess I’ve pulled out 150 acres of trees since the first of the year,” he told
a San Francisco Chronicle reporter. Ruscigno lamented the uprooting of the fruit
trees to the bulldozer he now controlled, but “what can you do? . . . The subdi-
visions were coming in all around us and when they made a good offer I sold
out.”63 By the 1970s, pockets of agricultural land were being sold for $18,000 an
acre, and one land owner refused an offer of $2,300,000.64 San Jose, T. H. Bowden
was already noting in 1937, “might literally be said to have been carved from a
forest of fruit trees, as most of the residential sections were orchards prior to be-
ing subdivided, and many of the original trees still ornament the gardens of the
invading residences.”65 The land’s use for agriculture was under threat despite
its persistence. Local historian Yvonne Jacobson estimated that 77,000 acres left
production in a span of thirty years. By 1982, 20,000 acres of agricultural land
remained in the Valley, which fell to just 4,500 by 2001, mostly located near the
South Bay cities of Morgan Hill and Gilroy.66 “As the people came,” the San Jose
61“41.44 Acres Bring Price of $287,000,” San Jose Mercury, September 17, 1955; Cavin, “Borders
of Citizenship,” 212.
62U.S. Census, 1940. http://www.archives.com/1940-census/joe-ruscigno-ca-34378841.
63“Santa Clara County–Scene of the Big Boom,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 11, 1952.
64Stanford Law Review, San Jose, 8.
65T. H. Bowden, Report of a Survey in San Jose, California, (Washington, D.C.: Division of Research
and Statistics, Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, September 18, 1937), 2, quoted in Cavin, “Borders
of Citizenship,” 208.
66Jacobson, Passing Farms, Enduring Values, 231–236; Paul F. Griffin and Ronald L. Chatham, “Ur-
ban Impact on Agriculture in Santa Clara County, California,” Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 48 (September 1958): 203; “From Fertile Fields, a High-Tech Harvest,” San Jose Mercury
News, June 20, 2001; Roy Hitchock, “Taking the Pulse of the Prune,” California Farmer, September
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Mercury noted in 1956, “the orchards went.”67
Figure 3.10: Clearing out orchards. Reproduced from Karl Belser, Planning Progress, 1956.
City leaders had no problem annexing land for what they saw as the appro-
priate and correct use for land: new industry and new suburban homes. But this
vision of the landscape came into conflict with farmers, whose own ideas about
4, 1957; “The Indispensable Man at Harvest Time,” San Jose Mercury, August 28, 1955.
67“Population Growth Created Demand for Housing; Subdivisions on Grand Scale Provided
the Homes,” San Jose Mercury, January 15, 1956.
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land use also meant protecting their livelihoods. Right as suburbs were expand-
ing across the valley floor, their farming neighbors began organizing an effort at
agricultural land preservation. Farmers worked with the County Planning Com-
mission to create new zoning ordinances that would maintain greenbelts between
cities and leave pockets of land to the exclusive use of agriculture.
The combined efforts of Santa Clara County Planning Director Karl Belser
and County Planning Commissioner Will Weston drove the county’s early efforts
at farmland conservation. On April 8, 1953, the county proposed an amendment
to the zoning ordinance establishing exclusive agricultural zoning after fifteen
pear growers near the community of Agnew in the City of Santa Clara appealed to
the county for help. The amendment passed in April 1954 with little opposition—
perhaps due to its broad definition of agricultural land that included nurseries,
botanical conservancies, riding academies, stables, and other land uses pursued
by hobby farmers—and established the county’s first greenbelt of 744 acres for
pear orchards in Agnew controlled by fifteen owners.68
Belser and the county planning commission continued to advocate for the
importance of agricultural zoning. County planners contributed to a 1954 report
to the state legislature identifying areas where the state could improve its role in
helping shape chaotic urban growth around the state. The report pointed specif-
ically to agricultural land in Santa Clara County, arguing that unplanned urban
growth posed a “direct threat” to the “agricultural base of Santa Clara County,
and the hastening of the day that it ceases to contribute to the economy of Santa
Clara County and the state as a whole.”69 Four years later the county published
“Green Gold,” a county publication that argued for “permanent agricultural re-
68Rebecca Conard, “Green Gold: 1950s Greenbelt Planning in Santa Clara County, California,”
Environmental Review: ER 9, no. 1 (April 1985): 6–8.
69Assembly Interim Committee on Conservation, Planning and Public Works, Planning for Growth:
A Report on the Status of City and County Planning in California (Sacramento: Assembly of the State
of California, January 1955), 43.
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serves” for protecting the “priceless reserve” of farmland threatened to succumb
to an “endless, monotonous megalopolis.”70 Farms, they argued, required growth
control if they hoped to survive urban development.
Pressure by farmers and the county, with the support of the Santa Clara
County Farm Bureau and California Farm Bureau Federation, led the state legis-
lature to pass the Green Belt Exclusion Law in 1955 and the Agricultural Assess-
ment Law in 1957, both efforts thought to help farmers hold on to their land.71
The Green Belt Exclusion Law created zones where no subdivisions, industry, or
commerce could establish itself. The land would remain the exclusive use of agri-
cultural production. This was aided by the Agricultural Assessment Law, which
sought to help farmers maintain low tax assessments on their land. By allow-
ing green belts to be preserved, assessments of land would remain low since no
non-farming activity would be located on neighboring land. The exclusive zon-
ing expanded the county’s zoned agricultural land by almost sixty percent, from
40,000 acres in 1958 to 70,000 acres in 1960.72
Many of those supporting the zoning of agricultural preserves did not
think of themselves as environmentalists, but, as Adam Rome has observed, they
were “grassroots activists and government officials [that] saw the difficulty of ac-
quiring open space as part of a larger problem—uncontrolled growth.”73 Most
70Santa Clara County Planning Department, “Green Gold: A Proposal for a Pilot Experiment in
the Conservation of Agricultural Open Space,” (San Jose, 1958), n.p., quoted in Conard, “Green
Gold,” 12.
71Although the county and state level farm bureaus supported the local plan, Rebecca Conard
argues that the planner-farmer coalition at the local level collapsed once land use issues reached
the state level. Conard, “Green Gold,” 14.
72Robert C. Fellmeth, Politics of Land: Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on Land Use in California
(Grossman Publishers, 1973), 32–34.
73Adam Rome, Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environ-
mentalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 135. Rome suggests that open space
regulations became a phenomenon in the 1970s, but Santa Clara County was ahead of the trend
by applying land-use controls to agricultural land in the 1950s. The same is true for other parts of
California. See, for example, Kathleen A. Brosnan, “Crabgrass or Grapes: Urban Sprawl, Agricul-
tural Persistence, and the Fight for the Napa Valley,” in Cities and Nature in the American West, ed.
by Char Miller, (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2010), 34–56.
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Figure 3.11: Simplified outline of farmland zoning (light gray) separating urban areas
(dark gray). Reproduced from Green Gold (Santa Clara County Planning Department,
November 1958).
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farmers aimed to protect their way of life, seeing sprawl as a threat to their lands
and living. Yet others also saw themselves as protectors of the land, notably Belser
and others in county government. The coalition worked to protect agricultural
land and hoped to maintain alternating patches of agricultural land and urban
areas, but their efforts were overwhelmed by the growing cities.
The San Jose Chamber of Commerce noted those in the community who
feared the encroachment of industrial development. In an industrial survey, the
Chamber noted that
there were some sincere and intelligent people who looked askance at
this industrial development. They had genuine fears that smokestacks
would “encircle the city”; that “blighted areas” would spring up in
industrial sections; that orchards would be torn up “by the hundreds”;
and that by past standards, this accelerated trend in the establishment
of new industry might result in an unbalanced, top-heavy economy
destined to collapse at some undetermined time in the future.74
Such fears seemed confirmed by the mid-1960s as the exclusive agricultural zon-
ing would begin to fall under the gerrymandered annexations of the county’s
municipalities. Although farmers had felt themselves under pressure in the early
1950s to preserve their lands, many, like Haman and Ruscigno, began to real-
ize the value they could extract from the sale of their lands.75 The patterns of
leapfrogged annexations angered growers as well, which encouraged other farm-
ers to sell their land to urban developers well before the land was needed for the
city.76
Yet if county government saw the value in protecting farmlands and de-
velopers found value in marketing those lands to suburbanites desiring coun-
tryside homes, the experience of living among the orchards was another matter
74Quoted in Scott, Bay Area, 273.
75Fellmeth, Politics of Land, 35.
76Conard, “Green Gold,” 5–18, 6.
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entirely. Living near the accouterments of the farm economy upended suburban-
ites’ views of the countryside. Homeowners complained about farm labor camps
for largely Latino farmhands and their mingling with suburban property. When
farmer Walter Seagraves announced plans to build a labor camp near Saratoga
in 1955, homeowners argued that such development would lower property val-
ues in the residential area. Hundreds of residents protested at a County Board
of Supervisors meeting about Seagraves’ plans, and residents eventually hired
a lawyer to make their case, arguing that Seagraves’ property should be sub-
divided rather than developed for the camp. The County Board of Supervisors
and Seagraves bowed to public pressure.77 Nor were suburban residents pleased
about the byproducts of agriculture. While orchards and gardens mingled with
suburban properties and were desirable for their amenities, canneries and pack-
inghouses were pocks on the suburban landscape. Odors from a meatpacking and
tallow facility near the new Berryessa housing development upset the air quality
of the suburb. At a meeting of the Board of Supervisors, one resident complained
about the odors. “We want real action taken immediately and this cleaned up,”
he threatened the Board, “otherwise we will do our best to do some cleaning up
in the next election.”78
Such sentiment reveals the shifting political patterns in Santa Clara County.
Growers and their issues dominated Valley politics until the 1950s as suburban
voters displaced farmers. The concerns of the San Jose Mercury Herald indicate the
importance of agriculture to the Valley until the 1950s. The column “Let’s Grow
It!” about home gardens and fruit trees appeared regularly for several years, and
in the immediate postwar era the newspaper ran a Sunday insert called “Ranch,
77“Saratoga Residents Win Labor Camp Ban Fight,” San Jose Mercury, August 9, 1955; “Sarato-
gans to Protest Farm Labor Camp,” San Jose Mercury, July 27, 1955; Cavin, “Borders of Citizen-
ship,” 213–214.
78“Still Smells, Berryessa Road Dweller Tells Supervisors,” San Jose Mercury, 1950, quoted in
Alpers, “Valley of Heart’s Delight,” 36.
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Home, Garden” that provided agricultural news and technology.79 Yet by 1960,
the farm news section of the Mercury fell to one or two pages on Sundays and
Frank Freeman, the paper’s columnist for local news, implored readers to re-
member that “this county is among the 25 most important counties in agricultural
production in the United States.”80 After 1976, the farm section and farm editor
were gone from the Mercury.81
The contest over the agricultural landscape revealed not only an effort by
farmers to protect their livelihoods, but a broader debate about land use and
the environmental costs exacted on the land for its various uses. The hope for
orderly planning separated by “nature”—the greenbelts of orchards—sought to
impose the environment into urban space. The agricultural landscape not only
dealt with the livelihoods and economics of food production, but was valued
for what appeared to be an inherent ability to control urban growth. Farmlands
needed acreages to produce crops, the argument went, necessarily causing pock-
ets of land to separate urban areas. But the rural landscape would be valued for
another reason: its suburban aesthetics.
land developers in san jose were operating at a time when planning and
zoning regulations of undeveloped areas was virtually nonexistent. The City of
San Jose rarely hesitated in granting land uses to industry and residential sub-
divisions with no regard to planning guidelines. The city’s original master plan
created in 1934 was routinely ignored and was not revised until 1958, when state
regulations required the city to update its general plan. The city continued to
paid little heed to the goals outlined in the document. The city also routinely ig-
79Alpers, “Valley of Heart’s Delight,” 32.
80Frank Freeman, “Agriculture’s Still S.C. County’s Biggest Industry,” San Jose Mercury News,
April 4, 1965.
81Alpers, “Valley of Heart’s Delight,” 44–45.
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nored the recommendations of the Santa Clara County Planning Commission. In
some cases, land originally deemed unfit for development by the county was nev-
ertheless developed once the city acquired the land through annexations. Many
times, the decisions of city leaders, developers, and industrialists failed to take
into account the best interests of residents as the city permitted construction in
flood plains, hillsides, and along fault lines. The lack of such considerations led
to problems homeowners would have to manage in the future.
Historian Hal Rothman has noted that Americans could develop land while
still considering themselves conservationists because “progress and the ethic of
conservation were entirely compatible. Space was either sacred or profane, ei-
ther reserved because of its special value or open to development.”82 The desire
for scenic nature and the eagerness to develop the land accompanied, ironically,
the devaluation of agricultural land. The suburban characteristics of the South
Bay were marketed to residents seeking natural amenities. Promotional material
and advertisements from realtors, the Chamber of Commerce, and developers fre-
quently promoted the Bay Area’s pleasant climate and natural setting. Beginning
in the 1950s, land developers began buying up farmland and marketing these
places as scenic, suburban areas located away from urban cores. This reflected
a shift in thinking about the land—no longer was land thought of for extractive
industries. Instead, the land would be tended in order to preserve the Valley’s
views. Farms were no longer valued for the production of food, but instead cul-
turally and spatially valued for their aesthetics.
The development of county lands followed a pattern identified by histo-
rian Jon Teaford, writing about a different region but whose findings equally ap-
ply to Santa Clara Valley. Developers, Teaford argued, took advantage of county
land’s lax zoning laws and low property taxes in order to develop suburban areas
82Rothamn, Saving the Planet, 95.
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away from urban centers. Only after the initial phase of development did locali-
ties attempt to pass and enforce more strict zoning and planning regulations. In
San Jose, county lands followed Teaford’s pattern of little governance and rapid
growth.83 Much of the housing developments anchored themselves into unincor-
porated county land at the outskirts of the city. Such growth made Santa Clara
County the fastest growing county in the Bay Area. These unincorporated lands
had been owned or leased to orchardists, wheat and nut farmers, and horse and
cattle ranchers. Productive farmland became a draw for suburbanites lured to the
region’s growing high-tech economy.
Advertisements for homes noted the bloom-time beauty of the orchards,
the rolling foothills, the pleasant climate, and the countryside character of the
South Bay, offering suburbanites the natural beauty they expected with their new
homes. Yet often these “countryside” landscapes quickly gave way to more subur-
ban housing developments. It was not uncommon for a new homeowner, enticed
by the idea of a countryside home, to suddenly be in the midst of sprawling
subdivisions in only a few years.84
Suburban homeowners came to expect that the places they moved to not
only had low property taxes, provided property ownership as an avenue for up-
ward mobility, and segregated neighborhoods, but a pleasant environment as
well.85 Such views put residents at odds with the concerns of developers and
boosters, who tended to privilege the sale of land for profit, taxes, and jobs—the
very core of “growth.” But home-owning suburbanites approached property dif-
ferently, expecting that the place they inhabited had access to public parks, open
83Jon Teaford, Post-Suburbia: Government and Politics in Edge Cities (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1997), 7.
84Stanford Law Review, San Jose, 23-24.
85On the issues of social mobility, racialized suburban space, and taxes, see Robert O. Self,
American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003), 96–100; Ronald Tobey, Charles Wetherell, and Jay Bringham, “Moving Out and Settling
In: Residential Mobility, Home Owning, and the Public Enframing of Citizenship, 1921-1950,”
American Historical Review 95 (December 1990); Nicolaides, My Blue Heaven, 185-237.
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Figure 3.12: An advertisement for homes in San Jose that features a subdivision “nes-
tled in a beautiful walnut and cherry orchard” that the builder is “leaving . . . for your
enjoyment.” San Jose Mercury, January 18, 1956.
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Figure 3.13: An advertisement for homes in San Jose boasting of the “calm of the country.”
San Jose Mercury, January 18, 1956.
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space, well-kept lawns, and access to recreation. Property, then, was more than
just the accumulation (and production) of capital. Property’s proximity to nature
mattered a great deal to suburbanites, manifesting itself in a sort of “aesthetic
capital” that could not be measured by dollar amounts. Suburbs were not just ef-
forts towards organizing space; their very proximity to natural surroundings led
suburbanites to define their space in aesthetic terms and take measures to protect
their idea of “nature.”
Figure 3.14: Subdivisions among the orchards. Planning for Growth: A Report on the Status
of City and County Planning in California (Sacramento: Assembly of the State of California,
1955), 42.
The very location of annexations and subdivisions ignored potential envi-
ronmental issues, or introduced new problems the city failed to anticipate. The
City of San Jose eagerly approved subdivisions in floodplains, hillsides, fault lines,
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and wetlands. Such flexible land use gave San Jose city leaders what they wanted,
drawing developers to the city rather than its neighbors whose land use policies
were more restrictive.86 Sometimes housing developments occurred on land orig-
inally blocked by the county as improper for development, only to be annexed by
a city and opened to development.87 No type of land, it seemed, would be off the
table for San Jose civic leaders.
San Jose had to confront more than the politics surrounding land use. They
confronted the land itself, which had its own ways of dictating the limits of urban
growth. The approval of development in areas prone to flooding provides one
example of the environmental limits of growth. The city’s poor planning exacer-
bated flooding problems. As more and more soil was paved over and built upon,
the less area remained to absorb excess water.88 Urban development changed the
Valley’s drainage system, upsetting centuries of drainage patterns that had cre-
ated hundreds of small streams and areas for groundwater absorption. Storm
runoff and flooding became problems in ways it had previously not been.89 Fur-
thermore, building in low areas frequently flooded in winter and spring rains,
places often sold to lower-income families.90
In addition to runoff and drainage issues, communities faced an issue with
the earth sinking beneath them, a phenomenon known as subsidence. Subsidence
occurred as groundwater stores were depleted and the soil and clay above the
aquifer compressed from the weight above. The area had been facing problems
of subsidence since the early twentieth century as groundwater levels dropped
86Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 95.
87“Proper Storm Drainage Possible, Says Planner,” San Jose Mercury, January 5, 1956.
88Leonard Downie Jr., “A Misplanned Suburb,” Washington Post, December 30, 1973.
89Bill Zanker to Don Edwards, February 11, 1966, Box 72, Folder 3, Don Edwards Congressional
Papers, MSS-1995-001, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
90Downie, “A Misplanned Suburb,” Washington Post, December 30, 1973. According to Downie,
such sales were made primarily to lower-income families and allowed developers “profit risk-
free.” The homes were guaranteed by FHA loans, which were often leased to black and Hispanic
homebuyers.
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as much as ninety-five feet from heavy pumping from the county’s more than
2,000 wells.91 Alviso sank six feet in the postwar years through a combination of
agricultural groundwater pumping and, later, increased water draws to supply
residential subdivisions. By comparison, San Jose’s downtown sank fourteen feet
before groundwater replenishment efforts finally ended the subsidence in the late
1960s. The combined issues of subsidence and altered drainage patterns dramat-
ically collided in a Christmas 1955 deluge that flooded nearby Sunnyvale and
Alviso, requiring the Santa Clara County Flood Control and Water District and
the Army Corps of Engineers to begin building a system of levies and dikes to
protect the communities.92 Changes to the drainage channels altered the rivers
and creeks of the area as well. The Guadalupe River and Coyote Creek, which
whisk water from the southern rim of the Diablo Mountains to the San Francisco
Bay, experienced a change in their grade from the subsidence. The sinking land
caused the rivers to adjust their angle more sharply downward, causing them to
transport more and larger river material than they had previously.93
Subsidence unwittingly caused infrastructure problems as well. As aquifer
levels fell, farmers had to run their wells deeper and, in turn, use more electrical
power and larger pump equipment to bring the water to the surface. Furthermore,
the sinking of the ground caused damage to well casings, sewers, water mains,
and other underground infrastructure. At the very moment that the city needed
its infrastructure the most, the rapid urbanization it was promoting was putting
stress on existing facilities.94
91Scott, San Francisco Bay Area, 229-230.
92Andrew Trice, Review of Economic Aspects of the Corps of Engineers’ Draft Report on Coyote Creek,
March 22, 1971, Box 84, Folder 140, Don Edwards Congressional Papers, MSS-1995-01, San Jose
State University Library Special Collections and Archives; “Proper Storm Drainage Possible, Says
Planner,” San Jose Mercury, January 5, 1956; “Orchardist Orders Dike Builders Off His Land,” San
Jose Mercury, January 5, 1956; “A ‘Walled’ City of Alviso May Be Answer to Problem,” San Jose
Mercury, January 6, 1956, p. 4.
93J. Robert Roll, “Effect of Subsidence on Well Fields,” American Water Works Association 59
(January 1967): 80–88.
94Scott, San Francisco Bay Area, 230.
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Figure 3.15: Illustrating subsidence and recharge, courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey.
Reproduced from S. E. Ingebritsen and David R. Jones, Santa Clara Valley, California: A
Case of Arrested Subsidence (U.S. Geological Survey, n.d.), 16.
Rapid urbanization also resulted in the disappearance of open spaces and
undeveloped land, despite the goals of the agricultural zoning laws. When county
planning director Karl Belser issued the county’s planning goals in 1956, he urged
the “preservation of scenic beauty” and the maintenance of undeveloped land for
the purpose of “relief” from the city. The county sought scenic roads projects
to limit the “unsightly development” on the land and provide “visual amenity”
for the area.95 Yet by the early 1970s journalist Leonard Downie concluded that
all that remained of scenic open space was the “carefully tended and regularly
watered greenery along the shoulders of the county’s many freeways.”96 Ironi-
cally, the countryside amenities that had attracted new people to the region were
rapidly giving way to roads, commercial districts, industrial parks, and residential
subdivisions.
The dwindling amount of agricultural land, the growth of industrial and
95Belser, Planning Progress 1956, 12. See also Belser’s remarks in Beauty for America: Proceedings of
the White House Conference on Natural Beauty (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965),
190-295.
96Downie, “A Misplanned Suburb,” Washington Post, December 30, 1973.
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residential areas, and the expansion of energy, water and city infrastructure al-
lowed San Jose to exert authority over space beyond its borders. Through this
process, a new region took shape largely defined by San Jose’s desires to become
the Los Angeles of the North. Although the conservation politics of the 1950s
attempted to slow San Jose’s expansionist drive, the city had already come to
dominate and define a new region in the South Bay. But the drive to dominate
was not simply a matter of greed, as observers at the time identified. Rather, San
Jose’s sprawl resulted from a desire to take advantage of nature as an aesthetic
experience for new suburban subdivisions.
Anchored by the growing high technology industry, the construction of
new homes, interstate highways, and city infrastructure led to unprecedented
growth in the Bay Area, transforming the once agriculturally-dominated region
of rural communities into a sprawling metropolis that quickly filled the flatlands
of the valley. San Jose became the model of urban development. Widespread an-
nexation combined with real estate development, retail services, and high tech
industries became drivers of population growth. Simultaneously, the concerns of
conservationists and environmentalists over urban growth and the loss of open
space was the first salvo in future struggles over the environment. City compe-
tition over land use and control would only increase over the next two decades,
leading to a growing intensity of environmental critique and more strident de-
mands for open space and growth limits.
in california, rapid growth brought prosperity to the state, but by the
1960s Californians were questioning these benefits. Many communities of the
Midpeninsula attempted to participate in suburban growth, and those who de-
sired to sustain their suburban lifestyles generated an environmental politics. But
those politics failed to live up to alternative forms of growth patterns pursued by
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critics. The varieties of suburban development and efforts to participate in that
experience defined responses to environmental health and hazards. Often times
that experience was rooted in an ideal of the orchard for many middle class fami-
lies, but more often than not it also predicated itself on the health of communities,
especially among Latinos and African Americans whose communities were often
separated physically and culturally from the core of city services. Urban growth
took various forms in urban and suburban settings, and oftentimes growth ig-
nored communities on the margin of society.
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Chapter 4
A Place for Nature
We stand today poised on a pinnacle of wealth and power, yet we live in a land of
vanishing beauty, of increasing ugliness, of shrinking open space and of an overall
environment that is diminished daily by pollution and noise and blight. This, in
brief, is the quiet conservation crisis. —Stewart Udall, 1965
From the work bays of the light-industry sheds that the speculators were beginning
to build in the valley, you could look out and see the raggedy little apricot trees they
had never bothered to bulldoze after they bought the land from the farmers.
—Tom Wolfe, 1983
The breakfast garbage you throw in the Bay, they drink as lunch in San Jose.
—”Pollution,” Tom Lehrer, 1960
Journalist Leonard Downie could scarcely find nature in Santa Clara County.
Visiting San Jose in the early 1970s, he concluded that the only remaining open
space existed along the “carefully tended and regularly watered greenery along
the shoulders of the county’s many freeways.” The Santa Clara Valley had become
defined by the clusters of poorly-built and quickly constructed homes, traffic that
had given the air a “mustard-colored haze,” and urban space so compact that
there existed no “open spaces, parks or even sidewalks.” Downie blamed poor
planning and greed for the Valley’s urban problems, citing a study that found res-
idential density could be maintained near 1973 levels in just thirty square miles
instead of 134, saving miles of open space and orchards. Santa Clara County,
Downie concluded, had become a “jigsaw puzzle of intertwined suburbs” and the
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land “systematically ravaged” by “speculators, developers, other entrepreneurs
and homebuyers.”1 Downie was not alone in questioning the value of urban
growth at the expense of disappearing open space. After a decade-long boom
that saw Bay Area cities sprawl across the landscape, activists, journalists, home-
owners, and critics promoted the protection of open space for recreation, aesthet-
ics, and ecological health. Environmental advocates argued for new restrictions
on city growth and the protection of greenbelts, public parks, and wilderness
areas. “Already we have filled the San Francisco basin with housing, industry,
airfields, and highways, from the tops of the hills to the edge of the water,” wrote
Raymond Dasmann, a Berkeley-trained biologist and conservationist. If the pro-
cess proceeded, Dasmann feared a “gigantic, disorganized metropolis” “engulfing
farm and forest, marsh and pasture with no end in sight.”2
Anxieties over suburban growth and issues of clean air and water, open
space, sprawl, discrimination, and pollution defined environmental politics in
the Bay Area. Postwar American environmentalism largely became issues over
quality-of-life as new worries about chemicals used in products, pollution of wa-
ter resources, pesticides, and overrun national parks became key political issues.
The publication of bestselling books, including Stewart Udall’s The Quiet Crisis,
Rachel Carson’s The Silent Spring, and Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, made
the case for greater regulation of urban growth and pollution. The passage of new
legislation embodied attempts to protect land, air, and water, such as the Wilder-
ness Act of 1964, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970, the creation of
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Clean Air Act of 1972, and Endangered
Species Act of 1973.3
1Leonard Downie, Jr., “A Misplanned Suburb,” Washington Post, December 30, 1973.
2Raymond F. Dasmann, The Destruction of California (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 19.
3On the emergence of wilderness protection, see James Morton Turner, The Promise of Wilder-
ness: American Environmental Politics Since 1964 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012);
Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Mark
Harvey, Wilderness Forever: Howard Zahniser and the Path to the Wilderness Act (Seattle: University of
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Against this backdrop, rapid growth in western cities encouraged new con-
cerns about their environmental impact, which had the effect of shaping local and
regional politics. World War II defense industries, Cold War military and indus-
trial buildup, and tourism and recreation encouraged the growth of western cities,
and, while growth brought new prosperity and wealth, it also unsettled western-
ers who watched rural landscapes vanish under four-lane highways, parking lots,
office buildings, and residential developments. By the 1960s, some westerners
began pushing back against the tide of change and fueled new antigrowth and
environmental politics throughout the region. Comprised mostly of middle-class
professionals, suburban liberals and conservatives found common ground over
environmental damage, uncontrolled growth, poor planning and development,
trampled wilderness, and disappearing open space.
The economic and infrastructural changes wrought by World War II, the
militarization of western industry, and the growing recreational and tourism econ-
omy led to breakneck metropolitan growth throughout the region between 1940
and 1960. Westerners witnessed what they perceived as environmental damage,
giving rise to a cultural and political backlash throughout the region that mani-
fested itself in antigrowth activism and quality-of-life politics. Largely comprised
of middle-class professionals, metropolitan growth and environmental and social
problems identified by growth and quality-of-life activists lay at the center of their
Washington Press, 2005); Paul S. Sutter, Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the
Modern Wilderness Movement (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002); Liza et al. Nicholas,
ed., Imagining the Big Open: Nature, Identity, and Play in the New West (Salt Lake City: The Uni-
versity of Utah Press, 2003). The historiography of the environmental movement is vast. See, for
example, Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States,
1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Adam Rome, Bulldozer in the Country-
side: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2001); Hal Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to the Environment in the Twen-
tieth Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000); Thomas Wellock, Preserving the Nation: The Conservation
and Environmental Movements, 1870–2000 (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 2007); Philip Shabecoff,
Earth Rising: American Environmentalism in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000);
Victor B. Scheffer, The Shaping of Environmentalism in America (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 1991); Robert Gottleib, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental
Movement (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005).
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motivations. The millions of Americans coming to western states like Colorado,
Oregon, and California since World War II came to take advantage of these state’s
air quality, federal public lands, recreation, and economic opportunities. By the
1960s, however, newcomers and old-timers alike believed too many people were
moving in and threatening their quality of life.4
This chapter traces the chronological contours of urban sprawl debates in
Silicon Valley. Debates over open space in Santa Clara Valley roughly followed
three branches. One branch emerged among expert urban planners and residen-
tial activists, who relied on professionals to form a critique of poor urban plan-
ning and the loss of natural landscapes. As Adam Rome has demonstrated, home-
owner’s sense of environmentalism emerged from professionals and experts.5 In
the process, they pressured politicians to craft new zoning restrictions that re-
quired environmental impact studies and strict zoning requirements. A second
branch came from anti-growth and no-growth advocates who urged tightened re-
strictions on the places that cities were allowed to expand. Simultaneously, elite
suburbanites were challenged by communities on the margins of the suburbs—
Chicanos, African Americans, Asian Americans—who formed a critique of sprawl
based not on aesthetics but out of concerns for human health and safety. To-
gether, these activists shared a common language—using terms such as “beauty,”
“wilderness,” “ecology”, “health”, “sprawl”—but used that vocabulary to defend
4On quality-of-life politics, see Carl Abbott, How Cities Won the West: Four Centuries of Urban
Change in Western North America (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2008), 205; Eliza-
beth Carney, “Suburbanizing Nature and Naturalizing Suburbanites: Outdoor-Living Culture and
Landscapes of Growth,” Western Historical Quarterly 38, no. 4 (winter 2007): 477–500, 480-481; Amy
Scott, “Remaking Urban in the American West: Urban Environmentalism, Lifestyle Politics, and
Hip Capitalism in Boulder, Colorado,” in The Political Culture of the New West, ed. by Jeff Roche,
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 253–255, 253-255; Michael W. Childers, Colorado Pow-
der Keg: Ski Resorts and the Environmental Movement (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012),
71-73.
5See Rome,, Bulldozer in the Countryside. Christopher Sellers argues that Rome overlooks a gen-
uine environmentalism emerging from the suburbs. Christopher C. Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Sub-
urban Nature and the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2012).
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and define different goals. Environmental advocates revealed a clash between
competing political ideas and urban priorities, placing ecology and its relation-
ship to cities at the center of the conflict. Environmental activists influenced urban
planning, arguing that prevailing trends in land use, density, and urban design
harmed sustainability and the economic viability of their communities.
in 1960, a short but intense fight over the proposed industrial development
of the Stanford foothills to the southeast of the main campus marked the be-
ginning of a cultural and political shift in the Bay Area. Stanford announced in
January plans to expand foothills development southward from the existing In-
dustrial Park. In particular, Stanford received interest from the Ampex Corpora-
tion, a manufacturer of high-end sound recording and broadcasting electronics,
to build a new research facility in the foothills. Surrounding neighborhoods, how-
ever, fiercely opposed the development on Stanford’s property eventually leading
to a referendum campaign. Stanford President Wallace Sterling referred to the
year-long contest as “the Battle of the Hills.”6
Figure 4.1: Comparing the urban development of the area near the Ampex foothills pro-
posal.
6Letter from Wallace Sterling to John Francis Neylan, April 11, 1960, Folder 8, Box A29, SC 216,
Stanford University Archives. Margaret O’Mara provides an excellent overview of the Battle of
the Hills in Cities of Knowledge, 132-139.
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Roughly six-hundred acres of undeveloped university land lay between Ju-
nipero Serra, West Fremont, Arastradero, and Page Mill roads. Originally zoned
for residential development, Stanford administrators submitted an annexation
proposal to the City of Palo Alto, who would then have the authority to rezone the
land for light industry. Electronics manufacturers had already sought out the area
as prime real estate for establishing research facilities, taking advantage of nearby
residential neighborhoods for employees to live, proximity to researchers at Stan-
ford and the Industrial Park, city infrastructure, and a favorable tax climate. In
January 1960, Ampex and General Telephone and Electronics Laboratories Cor-
poration (GT&E) announced plans to build and expand their operations in the
Stanford foothills both north and south along Page Mill Road, in part to take ad-
vantage of the proposed route of the new Junipero Serra Freeway.7 Additional
development plans were laid out for a new shopping center and luxury homes in
the Palo Alto–Los Altos Hills foothills.8 In May 1960, the Palo Alto City Council
approved the rezoning in a 9 to 4 vote.9
Residents had few objections for the proposed residential and shopping
center developments in the foothills. Industrialization, however, was unaccept-
able. Ampex’s proposed eighty-acre development location ran up against resis-
tance from neighboring communities, fueling quality-of-life and environmental
politics in surrounding neighborhoods. The proposed site ran along the Los Altos
Hills city line and raised concerns among property owners and Los Altos Hills
city officials who feared the loss of scenic beauty and the residential ambiance
of the area.10 Furthermore, residents were growing suspicious of Stanford’s role
7“Ampex plant just first in Stanford plan,” Palo Alto Times, January 14, 1960, 2; “Electronics
research plant planned for foothills area,” Palo Alto Times, January 28, 1960, 1; letter from Wallace
Sterling to Gordon Johnson, March 16, 1960, FF8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford University Archives.
8“103-acre foothill plan told,” Palo Alto Times, January 29, 1960, 1-2.
9Letter from Thomas Hunt to Alumni, May 9, 1960, 2, Folder 8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford
University Archives.
10“Decision now will determine future,” Palo Alto Times, February 11, 1960, 16.
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as a land developer and apparent disregard for planning. One resident summed
up the issue saying, “there has been growing concern over Stanford’s policy of
presenting pre-packaged zoning requests. . . . They resemble closely the tactics of
many a Land Developer asking for variances from planned uses.”11 Another resi-
dent wrote the Stanford Board of Trustees urging the foothills to remain closed to
industrial development: “The Peninsula is already too crowded – therefore, new
industry should not locate here.”12 Palo Alto resident Richard Bell in a letter to
Stanford President Wallace Sterling lamented the “program of land exploitation
pursued by the school during the past ten years” which has “succeeded . . . in
eliminating much of the natural beauty and attraction . . . [that] contributed so
much toward making Stanford the top school in the west.”13 The goals of Stan-
ford’s development plans were unclear to residents which, from their perspective,
seemed to indicate the university was planning to overrun the natural beauty of
the area.14
Complaints of potential industrialization of the foothills reflected not only
arguments about the area’s beauty, but also noise and air pollution that accom-
panied development. The sounds of hammers driving nails into two-by-fours
were only part of a chorus of common sounds experienced by suburbanites.
The whirring and grinding of manufacturing equipment, the clattering of dump
trucks, the drone of automobile traffic, the belching of bulldozers—these became
common sounds of the growing city. Concerned that such realities would become
even more common in Palo Alto, critics spoke up in newspaper editorials and
letters. In a letter to the Palo Alto Times, Morgan Stedman, a member of the Santa
11Morgan Stedman, text of prepared meeting with Sterling, March 14, 1960, FF11, Box A29, SC
216, Stanford University Archives. Quoted in ???’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 136.
12Letter from Mrs. H. Wilson to Stanford Trustees, March 4, 1960, FF8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford
University Archives.
13Letter from Richard Bell to Wallace Sterling, August 2, 1960, FF8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford
University Archives.
14Letter from Thomas Hunt to Wallace Sterling, May 14, 1960, Folder 8, Box A29, SC 216, Stan-
ford University Archives.
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Clara County Planning Commission, argued that new foothills industrialization
would increase traffic flow through neighborhoods, thus increasing smog, noise,
and danger, large-scale cutting and filling of land would be required to support
new buildings, parking lots, and roads, the loss of rainwater through runoff, and
“irreparable damage to natural beauty.”15
The spatial arrangements of cities and zoning shaped how residents re-
sponded to the proposed industrialization. The foothills area was originally zoned
for residential or agricultural use and excluded the establishment of industrial
and commercial developments. Furthermore, the community of Los Altos Hills
incorporated as a residential-only city. But encroachments of industry into these
areas raised concerns about the potential environmental damage that industrial-
ization would bring to surrounding communities. Stanford claimed that the in-
dustrialization would result in clean and well-kept facilities, reassuring residents
that the smoke pollution of the Midwest and East would never be present in Santa
Clara Valley.16 However, a greater concern for local residents revolved around the
issue of smog and traffic. In a letter to Wallace Sterling, one resident summed up
the attitude of many of the area’s environmental critics:
We now have smog, congestion, and acres of asphalt where we once
had fresh air and freedom of movement in a beautiful countryside – in
one of the finest climates on earth! The responsibility for developing
such a unique area should be in the hands of the most intelligent and
PERCEPTIVE people available! There seems to be little concern about
total environment. . . . The area sorely needs parks, golf courses, and
low density housing. We need cultural and recreational centers for
all age levels. A University such as Stanford could well promote an
interest in fields that enrich life. Industrial and commercial interests
are far from being neglected but the humanities certainly are!17
15Newspaper clipping, “Area planning seen as needed,” Palo Alto Times, March 12, 1960, from
FF8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford University Archives.
16Transcript of interview with Alf Brandin by Bob DeRoos, Regional Oral History Office, The
Bancroft Library, University of California-Berkeley, n.d., 42.
17Letter from Gordon Johnson to Wallace Sterling, March 6, 1960, FF8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford
University Archives.
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Heavy commuter traffic, smog, concerns about the loss of the foothills pas-
toral beauty, and Stanford’s seemingly smug handling of community relations
resulted in new political energy that would spread through the community and
alumni networks.18 In the wake of such concerns and criticisms, ad hoc commu-
nity and environmental coalitions formed, led by the Citizens Committee on Re-
gional Planning (CCRP). The organization, under the initial leadership of Robert
Mahan, an insurance executive from Palo Alto, organized a letter writing cam-
paign to voice their opposition to the foothills proposal. A few weeks before the
group officially named itself, some of the founding members ran an insert in the
Palo Alto Times that urged readers to clip from the paper and mail to the Stanford
Board of Trustees to illustrate grassroots opposition to industrialization.19 Within
two days of publishing the letter, the Stanford Board of Trustees had received 250
letters voicing opposition to the plan, many of which were clipped from CCRP’s
Palo Alto Times insert.20
Resistance from residents targeted the city council as well. The Palo Alto
Residents Association (PARA) called for “a vigorous campaign” against the Palo
Alto City Council’s plans to allow industrial development in the foothills.21 Peter
Hughes, an officer of PARA, charged that developing the foothills would destroy
the landscape. Calculating that the Ampex site would cover thirty acres of parking
lot and another twelve acres for buildings, Hughes challenged that “if anyone can
lay down that amount of building without changing the contour of the land he is
18???’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 135; letter from Jerrold and Sara Hunt to Wallace Sterling, May
14, 1960, 1, Folder 8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford University Archives.
19“Anti-foothill industry drive launched here,” Palo Alto Times, March 8, 1960, 2; “Industry
opponents organize, name head,” Palo Alto Times, March 11, 1960, 1.
20“Industry opponents organize,” Palo Alto Times, March 11, 1960, 1; “13 residents protest
foothill zoning change,” Palo Alto Times, March 4, 1960, 17.
21“Residents oppose industry,” Palo Alto Times, March 10, 1960, 1. Residents also pointed to a
potential conflict of interest relationship between Palo Alto Mayor Noel Porter and David Packard.
Porter was serving as vice president of Hewlett-Packard at the time. See “Industry opponents
organize, name head,” Palo Alto Times, March 11, 1960.
155
an engineer the like of which I have never seen.”22 Other residents charged that
industrialization of the foothills would inevitably result in the ruin of a pastoral
landscape, no matter how much planning went in to the design of industrial
areas.23 Los Altos Hills resident Thomas Hunt put it more bluntly: “The foothills
can be kept green and will be kept green, IF WE ARE DETERMINED TO KEEP
THEM SO!”24
The neighboring community of Los Altos Hills also expressed their dis-
approval of the plans. Residents, irate that their residential-only incorporation
would be blemished by industrialized foothills, expressed their displeasure through
letters and newspaper editorials. Mayor John Fowle and the city council rebuffed
Stanford in a letter to Alf Brandin, accusing Stanford of “jeopardizing existing
zoning and land development” and charged that the university’s plans were
never “subject to public scrutiny.” Furthermore, contrary to Stanford’s claims that
it was working with surrounding communities, Los Altos Hills claimed it was
caught unaware of the university’s plans.25 Sterling responded to one such letter
claiming that “Stanford has made a conscientious effort to keep the communi-
ties surrounding the campus informed of our plans, an effort which could eas-
ily be documented.”26 Letters continued to pour into Stanford and the Palo Alto
Times. President Sterling received around 400 letters in opposition to the plan and
around fifty in support over the course of four months.27 The editorial pages of
the Palo Alto Times also became a key outlet for residents to voice their frustrations
22“Residents oppose industry,” Palo Alto Times, March 10, 1960, 1.
23Letter from Gordon Johnson to Wallace Sterling, March 6, 1960, 1-2, Folder 8, Box A29, SC
216, Stanford University Archives; letter from Jerrold and Sara Hunt to Wallace Sterling, May 14,
1960, 1-2, Folder 8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford University Archives.
24Letter from Thomas Hunt to Alumni, May 9, 1960, 2, Folder 8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford
University Archives.
25“Stanford foothills plans hit by Hills,” Palo Alto Times, February 10, 1960.
26“Sterling Answers Alumni,” Palo Alto Times, February 24, 1960, Folder 11, Box A29, SC 216,
Stanford University Archives.
27Margaret Pugh O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next Silicon
Valley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) , 134.
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and concerns.
Figure 4.2: Criticizing Stanford’s plans for the foothills. Depicted on the Mount Rushmore
illustration, from left to right, are David Packard, Wallace Sterling, Herbert Hoover, and
Dolores Weaver. Folder 11, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford University Archives
For its part, Stanford pushed back by arguing that it needed to develop the
lands in order to generate income for the University. Thomas Ford, staff council
for the university, claimed that he desired to see the land remain undeveloped but
“the university’s need for funds makes that impossible.”28 Stanford had good rea-
son to pursue this line of argument. The university had indeed fallen on financial
hard times, and its endowment was far below its peer institutions.29
Stanford also continued their refrain that the development of the foothills
28“Foothills industry can be beautiful,” Palo Alto Times, March 2, 1960.
29Rebecca S Lowen, Creating the Cold War University: The Transformation of Stanford (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1997), 130.
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would not become industrial blight, but rather, in the words of Thomas Ford,
would “be a thing of beauty” due to the University’s enforcement of strict design
regulations.30 Furthermore, Stanford positioned itself as a reluctant land devel-
oper only in the business of supporting education and research. Alf Brandin took
to the pages of the Palo Alto Times to argue that the university was not “in the land
development business per se” but that the university was “doing everything we
possibly can to produce income [to support education].”31 “People should feel
thankful Stanford owns the land and not someone else,” Brandin chided. “We
try to look at the problems politically, sociologically, aesthetically, and economi-
cally.”32 Stanford urged residents to realize the role the university had played in
preserving open space, the role residents played in causing traffic congestion, and
Stanford’s road construction efforts. Without Stanford, the university seemed to
argue, none of these improvements would exist.33
When letter and editorial campaigns failed to initiate the planning that crit-
ics wanted to see, they turned to the next available civic tool: the referendum. In
June a petition campaign initiated by opponents of foothills industrialization cir-
culated through Palo Alto. The petition called on the city council to either rescind
its decision to rezone the land for light industry or to allow residents a vote on the
issue. Four days before the rezoning ordinance was to become official, the referen-
dum petition was filed to the City of Palo Alto having collected over two thousand
signatures above the necessary 1,000 that was needed. The Stanford lands were
now in the hands of the voters. Placed on the ballot for the November elections,
a “yes” vote would allow for Stanford to carry forward with its expansion of the
30“Foothill industry can be beautiful,” Palo Alto Times, March 2, 1960.
31“Undeveloped acres prime resource,” Palo Alto Times, March 4, 1960.
32“Stanford wouldn’t do anything detrimental,” Palo Alto Times, March 4, 1960.
33“Foothills industry can be beautiful,” Palo Alto Times, March 2, 1960; “Stanford wouldn’t do
anything detrimental,” Palo Alto Times, March 4, 1960; Letter from Gordon Johnson to Wallace
Sterling, March 6, 1960, FF8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford University Archives.
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Industrial Park and pave the way for Ampex’s research facility.34
As referendum supporters spent the month of June collecting signatures,
additional pressure to alter land development policies came from Stanford alumni.
In June, a group calling themselves the Bay Area Stanford Alumni printed an in-
sert in the Stanford Review, the alumni news organ of the University, accusing
Stanford of ignoring land development policies implemented by the Board of
Trustees in 1958. The petition called on Stanford to find alternatives for earning
money other than “defacing the beauty of the green and summertimes golden
hills” and called on the university to consult with the master plans of surround-
ing communities before making plans to rezone nearby areas.35
The Review was quick to distance itself from the Bay Area Stanford Alumni.
In the issue in which the insert ran, Kemper Freeman, president of the Stanford
Alumni Association, noted that the official alumni organization “emphatically
disagrees with the views and impressions” of the insert. The Review ran the in-
sert, Freeman argued, because the periodical “stands for freedom of expression,”
but “reject[ed] their assumptions, criticisms, and conclusions.”36 Freeman placed
distance between the alumni association and the Bay Area group, noting that
the group’s members accounted for “less than half of one per cent of the total”
number of Stanford alumni living in the Bay Area. Kemper’s letter responded to
the insert’s criticism point by point, arguing that the Stanford lands were “never
intended to be a wilderness” and concluded that the development of lands not
34Details about the petition’s criticisms and intent can be found in a letter from Morgan Stedman
to Wallace Sterling, June 20, 1960, FF 8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford University Archives. In an
explanatory sheet given to solicitors and signers of the petition, the referendum called for better
planning of residential, industrial, and commercial areas and specifically criticized the sudden
zoning change to light manufacturing, housing and traffic pressures that new industrialization
would add to the area, the leveling of hills to accommodate new construction, and pointed to
undeveloped lots already zoned for industry as alternatives to foothills development. Letter from
Stedman to Sterling, June 20, 1960, FF 8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford University Archives.
35“A Message from Bay Area Stanford Alumni to President Sterling and the Board of Trustees,”
1960, FF 8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford University Archives, p 2-3.
36Kemper Freeman to Stanford Alumnus, Stanford Review, June-July 1960, Folder 8, Box A29,
SC 216, Wallace Sterling Papers, Stanford University Archives, 1.
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Figure 4.3: A section of the Bay Area Stanford Alumni insert in the Stanford Review, 1960.
Source: Folder 8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford University Archives.
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“needed for academic purposes is overdue.” Furthermore, the insert gave “no
hint” that Stanford was “preserving 4,800 of its 8,800 acres for academic purposes
or that this reserve includes the greater part of the ‘rolling hills.’ Nor does it reveal
that for every two acres of its land which Stanford has leased in the past decade,
one acre has been condemned for use by some governmental unit or agency.” The
claims of the Bay Area Alumni, Freeman concluded, were misleading and without
merit.
As the referendum campaign dragged on through the summer, editorials
to the Palo Alto Times attempted to flip complaints about the loss of the foothills
upside-down, using the critic’s nostalgia of the environment as an argument in
Stanford’s favor.37 One such editorial in the Palo Alto Times expressed “gratitude”
to Stanford for “so generously permitting thousands of people to freely enjoy the
rolling, tree-studded hills, the lakes, and views of the campus.”38 The Times itself
continued its enthusiasm for Stanford’s land development plans, writing that the
community owed Stanford a debt for keeping the area’s lands free of intrusive
industry. The Times argued that Stanford’s large landholdings “constituted a free
park” for Palo Alto and surrounding communities. Had these lands fallen into
the hands of private owners, they “long ago would have been converted to the
houses, business places and industries where so many of us live and work.”39
One editorial writer to the Times admonished the former “solid supporters of free
enterprise” who were now staging “violent public quarrels about what they’re go-
ing to do with someone else’s property” that “the land isn’t theirs” and Stanford
should do what it needed to do.40 Stanford itself was quick to remind critics of
the efforts the university had put towards city development. As Sterling reminded
37???’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 137.
38Esther B. Clark, M.D., Letter to the Editor, Palo Alto Times, March 28, 1960, FF 11, Box A29, SC
216, Stanford University Archives.
39Editorial, Palo Alto Times, November 1960, Stanford Lands Scrapbook V, 1960-61, Subject File
1300/9, Stanford University Archives.
40Editorial by Daniel S. Endsley, Palo Alto Times, November 1, 1960.
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one critic, overseeing the vast domain of land on the Peninsula meant “the hills
are not likely to be overrun by any commercial developments in your lifetime
or mine.”41 In other cases, university officials were willing to dismiss them en-
tirely. Donald Carlson referred to critics as “malcontents in the community” and
complained in another letter that industrialization would only affect “one little
foothill,” dismissing their concerns as something trivial.42
In November, the referendum was defeated in a close vote. The University’s
arguments and own grassroots campaign helped to turn the referendum in their
favor and allowed for the expansion of the Industrial Park. On the one hand, the
campaign against the Ampex development could be considered a victory. The
company, after the year-long, drawn-out political process, decided to build its
research facility elsewhere. However, the new zoning of the foothills opened a
new area for new light industry to join the Stanford Industrial Park.43
Stanford administrators never understood why residents were upset about
Stanford’s development plans. Alf Brandin recalled that Stanford had an issue
with semantics, arguing that “we tried to say it has got to be clean, no smoke, no
heavy manufacturing. Light manufacturing that is clean and electronic.”44 Stan-
ford took this to heart, renaming the Industrial Park to Stanford Research Park
shortly after the Battle of the Hills in order to avoid industrialization’s association
41“Letter from Wallace Sterling to Gordon Johnson,” March 6, 1960, FF8, Box A29, SC 216,
Stanford University Archives. Editorials to the Palo Alto Times made the same claims. See, for
example, the editorial by Louise Brisebat, Palo Alto Times, November 4, 1960.
42Letter from Donald Carlson to Ben Allen, May 12, 1960, FF 8, Box A29, SC 216, Stanford
University Archives; “Groups Clash over Use of Stanford Land,” San Francisco Examiner, March
18, 1960.
43Stanford learned lessons about community engagement through the “Battle of the Hills.” An
example of this came a year later when a proposal for the expansion of Oregon Expressway,
which cut through a highly desirable residential community, met resistance of area residents.
But a community organization calling itself the Traffic Action Committee emerged to support
the expansion. The pro-expressway movement arose from grassroots, but appears to have also
been supported (if not encouraged) by Stanford administrators. See ???’Mara, Cities of Knowledge,
137-138; letter from Donald Carlson to Frederic Glover, September 20, 1961, Box A22, Stanford
University Archives.
44Brandin interview, 42.
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with the area. But Stanford’s belief that the issue revolved around semantics—
that the word “industry” in Stanford Industrial Park was confusing residents—
reveals that Stanford had no understanding of citizen’s real concerns. Citizens
rightfully argued that industrialization—light manufacturing or otherwise—was
going to have an enormous impact on the environment. Stanford’s frequent claims
of “clean” industry often turned out to be false. Stanford could control complaints
about light and noise pollution to a degree, but other pollutants—radiation, smog,
and toxic solvents—would remain harder to regulate, sometimes invisible, and
have great repercussions. One resident noted in the heat of the Battle of the Hills
debate that a Lockheed plant near his home resulted in a “federal agency [that]
has been checking the shrubs in our back yard for radioactivity.”45 No amount
of planning, architectural prowess, and superb landscaping could get around the
visible and invisible pollution resulting from high technology manufacturing and
urban sprawl.
the grassroots activists spent the 1960s building networks in order to sup-
port a growing citizens’ movement to protect the foothills. The controversies over
Stanford Industrial Park and Stanford’s economic development plans spurred the
emergence of grassroots environmental activism. In the wake of Stanford’s vic-
tory, residents of the area, increasingly concerned that Stanford might overrun
the foothills and irritated by the university’s seemingly dismissive attitude to-
wards citizen’s concerns and favoritism towards industry, continued to pressure
the university. Among the most prominent and long-lasting groups to emerge
was the Committee for Green Foothills. Formed in the living room of Ruth Span-
genberg in 1962, the Committee included Stanford alumni and area professionals,
including the well-known writer and Stanford creative writing professor Wallace
45“Pros and Cons of Foothill Industry Zone Debated,” Palo Alto Times, April 21, 1960, 13.
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Stegner and former Santa Clara County planner Morgan Stedman.46 The Com-
mittee was founded, Wallace Stegner explained, because “of things that seemed
to be happening in the hills that we didn’t like to see happen” and motivated by
a “fear of what Stanford might do in the hills.”47 The impulse to protect land that
emerged in the Battle of the Hills continued throughout the rest of the decade as
Stanford pursued land development initiatives on the Peninsula.
Figure 4.4: Board Members, Committee for Green Foothills. Front row, from left: Pat Bar-
rentine, George Norton, Ruth Spangenberg, Lois Crozier-Hogle, Kent Dedrick, and Tom
Jordan; back row: Kirke Comstock, Claire Dedrick, Larry Dawson, Marry Moffat, Mary
Gordon, Paul Smith, Eleanor Boushey, Norman KcKee, Kathryn Stedman, and Morgan
Stedman. Photo by Lowell Johnson. From Walker, Country in the City.
The organization was not anti-growth per se, and thus distinct from the
no-growth activists that would come in the 1970s. Rather, the organization and
46Stegner oral history, Bancroft, 8; Richard Walker, The Country in the City: The Greening of the
San Francisco Bay Area (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 101.
47Stegner oral history, Bancroft, p 7-8.
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its members feared that city leaders and the university were not giving enough
attention to the potential problems of industrial growth. Members of the Com-
mittee would still argue that Stanford played an important and positive role in
their communities. But they also recognized the immense influence the university
would have on the landscape around them. The Battle of the Hills and the ris-
ing criticism of urban growth would be only the first conflict for the burgeoning
environmental coalitions in the Bay Area.
Some of the original members of the Committee for Green Foothills had
earned reputations as conservationists before CGF’s establishment. Wallace Steg-
ner had risen to prominence as a conservationist in the late 1950s. His famous
“Wilderness Letter” published in 1960 established Stegner as a bona fide de-
fender of the environment.48 Several additional members of the Committee for
Green Foothills had either been long-time conservationists or would get their first
exposure to environmental activism with the Committee. Morgan Stedman, an
architect who had served on the Palo Alto Planning Commission and the Santa
Clara County Planning Commission, became a vocal critic of poor urban plan-
ning throughout Santa Clara County. Many other members later devoted them-
selves to various conservation and environmental protection campaigns through-
out the Bay Area. Barbara Eastman, for example, served as a key organizer of
the Save Our Seashore organization, founded in 1969 to expand the protection
of Point Reyes from logging and freeway construction along the western edge of
Marin County.49 Lois Hogle, Ruth Spangenberg, Morgan and Katy Stedman, and
Gary Girard would go on to lead several environmental campaigns throughout
the Peninsula, and in some cases find themselves in civic leadership positions
48Wallace Stegner, “Wilderness Idea,” in The Sound of Mountain Water (1969); originally written to
the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission in 1960 to support legislation that would
designate wilderness areas in the United States.
49Walker,, The Country in the City, 91.
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in their communities.50 The Committee counted among their powerful allies Bill
and Mel Lane, owners of Sunset Magazine; Dorothy Varian, wife of Varian Asso-
ciates founder Russell Varian and member of the Conservation Associates; and
Tom Ford, a real estate developer in the Bay Area.51
The Committee’s first major test came in 1965 when plans were announced
to straighten and widen Page Mill Road, a historic roadway running northeast-to-
southwest from downtown Palo Alto into the Santa Cruz foothills. Page Mill had
become a major thoroughfare for commuter traffic going into and coming out of
Stanford Industrial Park. But by the mid-1960s, city planners and the university
determined that the winding and narrow road was inadequate for the increased
traffic flow. The City of Palo Alto announced plans to widen and straighten
the road in late 1964. In response, the Committee for Green Foothills formed
a subcommittee called the Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee (PMRCC).
The proposed changes to Page Mill, the Committee for Green Foothills argued,
would mean deep cuts into the hillsides, the pouring of a cement canal to replace
Matadero Creek that ran along the road, the removal of nearly a thousand trees,
and potentially threatened Frenchman’s Tower, a local historic landmark at the
base of the hills.52
50Transcript of interview of Wallace Stegner by Ann Lage. Regional Oral History Office, The
Bancroft Library, University of California-Berkeley, 1982, 10.
51Walker,, The Country in the City, 101-103.
52Stegner interview, 9; letter from the Committee for Green Foothills to Friends of the Foothills,
May 20, 1964, Folder 1, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee Records, M0970, Stanford
University Archives, 1; letter from Wallace Stegner to Martin Spangler, July 28, 1964, Folder 1,
Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives, 1.
Page Mill Road dates to the late nineteenth century and was used by William Page, who operated
a lumber mill along Mill Creek. “Page’s Mill Road” was a main avenue for horse teams to haul
lumber into Palo Alto for shipping and construction. Peter Coutts, a French land developer who
purchased land along the road in 1876, constructed Frenchman’s Tower for the storage of water.
Leland Stanford bought Frenchman’s Tower and the surrounding land in 1882. See Ralph Hansen
to Alf Brandin and Lois Hogle, August 11, 1964, Folder 9, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating
Committee Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives, 1-3. See also “Historical Notes of In-
terest Surrounding Page Mill Road and Environs,” Ralph Hansen, Palo Alto City Historian, n.d.,
Folder 9, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee Records, M0970, Stanford University
Archives.
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Figure 4.5: Alternative Routes for Page Mill Road. “A Study of Page Mill Road,” Page Mill
Road Coordinating Committee, Folder 12, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee
Records, Stanford University Archives, 7.
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Unlike the Battle of the Hills where aesthetics and conservation defined the
political response, the convergence of recreation and conservation formed the crux
of criticism charged at the proposed changes to Page Mill Road. The protection of
the environment around Page Mill became their central concern, largely revolv-
ing around recreational access. In addition to cutting into hills and threatening
the creek and numerous trees, changes to the road had the potential to aggravate
flooding hazards. A straight four-lane road cutting through the foothills meant
the potential for “such a paved canyon” to increase water runoff that could over-
flow Matadero Creek.53 The road, Stegner argued, “offers the easiest access to
the hills for citizens of Palo Alto and surrounding towns” by serving as a “nat-
ural route to Palo Alto’s Foothills Park” and is “used by children on bicycles
and horses, and by families on picnics.” Changes to Page Mill Road would mean
destroying “these amenities, more valuable with every passing year.”54 Further-
more, changes to the road meant mixing vehicular and non-vehicular traffic that
posed potential dangers to equestrianism—“an important part of life of the rural
foothills”—pedestrians, and cyclists who used the winding roadway for recre-
ation.55 A census conducted by the Los Altos Hills Junior Horsemen’s Associated
counted 945 horses in the area—residing at the large horse stables at Stanford Uni-
versity, Crook’s Ranch, and Fox Tail Farm—as well as eighty-nine children, eighty-
two bicyclists, and forty-three hikers.56 Mixing vehicular and non-vehicular traffic,
53Letter from Wallace Stegner to Martin Spangler, July 28, 1964, Folder 1, Box 1, Page Mill
Road Coordinating Committee Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives, 1. In a letter to the
County Board of Supervisors, several sponsoring organizations expressed their view that runoff
hazards would increase. “Saving Old Page Mill Road,” September 10, 1964, Folder 1, Box 1, Page
Mill Road Coordinating Committee Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives, 1.
54Letter from Wallace Stegner to Martin Spangler, July 28, 1964, Folder 1, Box 1, Page Mill Road
Coordinating Committee Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives, 2.
55“Report on Page Mill Road - Serra Freeway Interchange,” from Page Mill Co-ordinating Com-
mittee to Alan Hart, August 3, 1965, Box 1, Folder 10, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee
Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives, 3.
56“Report on Page Mill Road - Serra Freeway Interchange,” from Page Mill Co-ordinating Com-
mittee to Alan Hart, August 3, 1965, Box 1, Folder 10, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee
Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives, 3.
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the Committee argued, would “create a dangerous situation” and “curtail the tra-
ditional uses of Page Mill Road as a main access route to and from the foothills.”57
In 1965 the Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee began studying the
potential environmental impact of widening and straightening Page Mill in or-
der to offer suggestions for alternate routes. The Committee released its study
in December 1965 with suggestions for a parallel road that ran near Page Mill
Road but left the original road alone. Page Mill’s status as a “scenic resource,”
the study concluded, needed to be protected by both rerouting the new road
and the establishing a new system of parks and trails near Page Mill.58 The Page
Mill Committee commenced with a petition campaign as well, gathering the sig-
natures of nearby residents to urge the designation Page Mill a recreation road
with “possible scenic easements and ‘protection from progress’.”59 The Page Mill
Committee enjoyed wide support from other conservation and recreation organi-
zations, including the Page Mill-Arastradero Association, the Loma Prieta Chap-
ter of the Sierra Club, the California Roadside Council, and the National Campers
and Hikers Association.
In the end, the Page Mill Coordinating Committee succeeded in convincing
Stanford University, the City of Palo Alto, and the County Board of Supervisors
to look into alternative routes. The majority of Page Mill Road was left alone and
no major alterations for a second route were made save for the Junipero Serra
Freeway and Page Mill interchange, where a four-lane alternative route running
parallel to the now named Old Page Mill Road was established to the east of the
57“Report on Page Mill Road - Serra Freeway Interchange,” from Page Mill Co-ordinating Com-
mittee to Alan Hart, August 3, 1965, Box 1, Folder 10, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee
Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives, 5. See also letter from Leonard Ginzton to Mary
Gordon, July 18, 1965, Folder 10, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee Records, M970,
Stanford University Archives, 1-2.
58“A Study of Page Mill Road,” December 1965, Folder 12, Box 1, Page Mill Coordinating Com-
mittee Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives, 2.
59Page Mill Road mailer, March 23, 1965, Folder 2, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating Com-
mittee Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives.
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scenic route.
The resolve of environmentalists in halting industrialization projects would
be tested again by the end of the decade. In the fall of 1967 Stanford announced
a request for the rezoning of the land between Hillview Avenue and Arastradero
Avenue encompassing Coyote Hill, primarily for the new zoning of residential
estates and single-family residences. The Coyote Hill development would also
house a medical research center operated jointly by Stanford and the pharmaceu-
tical company Syntex and a grazing area on top of Coyote Hill to house animals
used in research. Additional real estate and land development programs spear-
headed by Stanford included a financial center called Dillingham along Sand Hill
Road that included plans for office towers, a hotel convention center, and parking.
On a newspaper clipping announcing public hearings on the proposed zoning
changes, an activist circled the included map and scrawled “here we go again.”60
By the late 1960s conservation and environmental organizations were no
longer willing to compromise with Stanford. In November 1969, the Committee
for Green Foothills filed suit against the University and the City of Palo Alto cit-
ing irregularities in the rezoning process and a conflict of interest with two City
Council members in the development of Coyote Hill.61 On-campus organizers
also expressed their disapproval of Stanford’s land development plans. Among
these groups was GRASS ROOTS, a coalition that issued sharp criticisms toward
60Newspaper clipping, September 16, 1967, Palo Alto Times, Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill Co-
ordinating Committee Records, Stanford University Archives. The writer included their initials,
“PMB,” which is likely Patricia M. Brown, who had been part of the original 1960 Battle of the
Hills fight. Brown was a signatory on the insert “What is the future of the Stanford lands” that
ran in the Palo Alto Times in 1960 (see “What is the future of the Stanford lands?” newspaper clip-
ping, Palo Alto Times, n.d., Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill Coordinating Committee Records, Stanford
University Archives.) A “Pat B.” is also noted in some handwritten notes from a Palo Alto city
council meeting in Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee Records, Stanford
University Archives.
61“Questions and Answers about Stanford Land Use,” Campus Report Supplement, January 1971,
Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee Records, Stanford University Archives,
11; Walker,, The Country in the City, 101.
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Stanford and specifically targeted the Dillingham plans.62 Although Stanford won
the lawsuit against the Committee for Green Foothills, the activists did succeed
in placing restrictions on further expansion beyond Junipero Serra Way into the
foothills. Despite the Coyote Hill and Sand Hill developments moving forward,
the criticisms of Stanford were effective enough that by 1970 Stanford’s own re-
ports on land use began addressing the potential environmental impact explicitly
than the University had previously.63
Figure 4.6: GRASS ROOTS political cartoon, n.d., Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill Coordinating
Committee Records, Stanford University Archives.
By the end of the 1960s, nascent conservation and environmental coali-
tions pushed back against suburban growth and the encroachment of corporate
suburbs near their communities. Stanford attempted to engage with a pastoral
vision of suburban nature through campus planning that, outwardly, integrated
neatly into surrounding communities. But the spatial arrangement of suburbs
and industry led to conflicts with communities at a moment when environmental
issues were becoming politically significant. Many of the very critics had been
62GRASS ROOTS, for example, charged that Stanford pursued “destructive trends in land use”
and led to “smog, overcrowding, the destruction of the foothills, and a housing shortage.” The
privileging of offices and factories over housing was “escalating the environmental crisis.” See
GRASS ROOTS flyer, Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee Records, M0970,
Stanford University Archives. See also “House People, Not Profits: A Grass Roots Commentary
on the planned Dillingham ‘Palo Alto Square’,” Grass Roots, Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill Road
Coordinating Committee Records, M0970, Stanford University Archives.
63“Questions and Answers About Stanford Land Use,” Campus Report Supplement, January
1971, Folder 16, Box 1, Page Mill Road Coordinating Committee Records, M0970, Stanford Uni-
versity Archives, 2.
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newcomers attracted to the region’s new jobs, climate, and affordable housing.
By decade’s end, these amenities appeared threatened as machinery cut, filled,
paved, released smog, whined, and radiated. Stanford claims to the contrary, res-
idents no longer considered high technology industry “clean.” Urban sprawl and
industrial expansion met a challenge in the next decade: the rise of no-growth
activism and promoters of open space.
the battle over zoning, race, and environment would emerge further north
in Silicon Valley in the town of Los Altos Hills, to the southeast of Mountain
View. The town incorporated in 1956 as an exclusively residential town and im-
plemented some of the strictest zoning requirements in the Bay Area. Los Altos
Hills residential zoning required a minimum of one acre lot sizes, among the
largest lot sizes in northern California.64 The community zoned itself to be ru-
ral and exclusive, a place defined by horse stables, tennis courts, and swimming
pools insulated from the pressures of urbanization and the land-hungry munic-
ipalities of Palo Alto and Los Altos. Fearing that newcomers would overwhelm
the community’s sense of open space, city leaders sought to preserve the rural
characteristics of the town by minimizing public services and taxes.65 Los Altos
Hills also couched its regulations in the language of conservation, arguing that
steep slopes, unstable soils, the preservation of open space, and protection of
wilderness were of paramount concern.66
While residents argued that such strict zoning requirements served envi-
ronmental aims, others saw restrictive zoning that only served as an exclusionary
64Social Planning Council of Santa Clara County, Inc. and Santa Clara County Planning Depart-
ment, “Profile ’70: A Socio-Economic Data Book for Santa Clara County”, (County of Santa Clara
Planning Department, 1973).
65Susan Mensinger, “Los Altos Hills: The Statutory Scheme,” Stanford Environmental Law Annual
4 (1981): 93–99, 21-22.
66Mensinger,, Los Altos Hills, 23.
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tactic. Los Altos Hills’ zoning policies drove up housing prices and its 7,000 resi-
dents lived in one of the wealthiest communities in Santa Clara County.67 To Jack
Ybarra, president of La Confederacion de la Raza Unida (CRU), Los Altos Hills
typified suburbia’s exclusionary affluence.68 Like many of Santa Clara County’s
suburban Chicano activists, Ybarra’s politics emerged out of farmwork and hous-
ing shortages. He started working for the National Farmworkers Association in
1966 and the Tropicana-Hillview Organization United. Ybarra identified sprawl
as a key problem for Latinos in Santa Clara County.69 The rapid urbanization of
the Valley, he argued, had destroyed agriculture and in the process “displaced
the Mexican-American not only from his employment, but from his home.” The
county’s growth came at the expense “of thousands of its poorest and most de-
fenseless citizens.”70
Figure 4.7: The location of Los Altos Hills.
Following a successful 1970 lawsuit against Saratoga, a wealthy suburb in
the Santa Cruz foothills, that charged the city violated a new state law requiring
67Social Planning Council of Santa Clara County, Inc. and Santa Clara County Planning Depart-
ment, “Profile ’70: A Socio-Economic Data Book for Santa Clara County”.
68“Scatter Low-Cost Housing,” San Jose Mercury News, September 10, 1970.
69“Mexican Americans Sound Call for Unity,” San Jose Mercury, September 17, 1969; “Thou Tells
Ybarra: Get Thee Out,” San Jose Mercury News, August 9, 1968; “Mexican Americans Split from
THOU Group,” San Jose Mercury News, August 12, 1968; “The ‘U’ Is Dropped Off THOU,” San
Jose Mercury News, August 13, 1968; Aaron Cavin, “The Borders of Citizenship: The Politics of
Race and Metropolitan Space in Silicon Valley” (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2012),
515–517.)
70San Jose Mercury, March 11, 1972.
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housing for all economic segments, CRU filed another suit against Los Altos Hills.
The organization had applied for a low-income housing permit in 1971 on land
near the edge of town to become a 200-unit apartment that could accommodate
800 persons. The town refused, and Ybarra filed suit charging that the city vio-
lated California law. During the three-day trial, representatives for CRU argued
that the city’s zoning requirements were exclusionary and served only to maintain
an enclave of white, upper-class families. The city responded that their zoning re-
quirements sought to maintain the “rural” character of the town. Furthermore,
they claimed, such additions to the town posed an environmental threat. Nor
could the city fully provide the urban services that would be needed.71 To Ybarra,
such claims were empty, telling the San Jose Mercury that “if they’re interested
in preserving the foothills for a certain class of people then the conservationists
are our enemies, too.”72 In November, Judge Stanely Wiegel rejected Los Altos
Hills’ argument that infrastructure and environmentalism supported the town’s
restrictive zoning, but Wiegel upheld the zoning law. When CRU appealed, the
Ninth Circuit upheld the district ruling on the basis that low-income housing was
available elsewhere in the county.73
Landscape aesthetics and appeals to environmentalism formed the core
justification for suburban exclusivity in Los Altos Hills. Special zoning allowed
affluent suburbs to maintain their “rural” environments, maintaining a sense of
countryside living that had drawn them to the foothills in the first place. Yet zon-
ing for environmental reasons, whether intentional or not, introduced exclusive
spaces. What environmentalists and homeowners neglected was that the protec-
tion of environments not only served to redefine what could or could not happen
71San Jose Mercury, November 24, 1972; San Jose Mercury, November 22, 1972; San Jose Mercury,
December 4, 1972; San Jose Mercury, November 21, 1972; “One-Acre Zoning Draws Criticism,” San
Jose Mercury, December 16, 1970; Cavin,, “Borders of Citizenship.”, 527–528.
72San Jose Mercury, December 21, 1970; Cavin,, “Borders of Citizenship.”, 489–490.
73“Hills City Zoning Upheld by Court,” San Jose Mercury, September 12, 1974; Ybarra v. Los Altos
Hills.
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in space, but also those protections came with a social cost.
the problems of urban growth and environmental consequences in the
South Bay caught the attention of expert planners, intellectuals, scholars, jour-
nalists, and students. Emanating most forcefully from Berkeley, a new wave of
environmental thought began to shape the conversation about the entirety of the
Bay Area’s environment. These emerging conservation groups formed a vision at
once utopian and regional. Rather than leaving planning at the whims of local
governments, these environmentalists called for thinking about a regional envi-
ronment where local governments could improve its coordination, cooperation,
and urban planning. These critics were what geographer Richard Walker labeled
“midcentury Modernists” who believed in “the enlightened application of fore-
sight, science, and good government” to the Bay Area’s problems.74 The expert
critics made their case through book publications, conferences, educational work-
shops, teach-ins, and editorials and, in so doing, helped reshape the conversation
about urban growth and environmental degradation.
Students and scholars at the University of California-Berkeley led the way.
In 1939, students formed an organization called Telesis, a Greek word meaning
“planned progress,” that included T. J. (Jack) Kent, Mel Scott, and Francis Violich,
who would not only become future Berkeley professors but also formed an im-
portant intellectual core of the Bay Area’s midcentury critics. Inspired by the New
Deal, housing reformer Catherine Bauer, and civic planner Lewis Mumford, the
students outlined a vision for the Bay Area focused on planning, architecture, and
greenbelts.75 The university’s Bureau of Public Administration, under the leader-
ship of Samuel May, attempted to establish a state planning commission in 1940
74Walker,, The Country in the City, 133.
75Walker,, The Country in the City, 133.
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under Governor Culbert Olson’s tenure. The bureau, renamed the Institute for
Governmental Studies (IGS) in the 1950s, continued to advocate for region-wide
governance throughout the postwar era.76
Ideas of regionalism pervaded the thinking of the Bay Area’s midcentury
environmental critics. In 1959 IGS helped publish Mel Scott’s study of the Bay
Area, the first study of the region’s urban history and a plea for regional gover-
nance.77 Bay Area cities, Scott argued, all faced the same problems of “air pollu-
tion, vanishing open space, bay pollution, inadequate transit, [and] uncoordinated
planning.” These challenges were “so pervasive,” Scott concluded, that “the one-
ness of the area cannot be denied.”78 The lack of coordinated planning—or any
planning at all—had become most apparent in Santa Clara County, Scott urged.
He pointed to the “lack of zoning, inappropriate zoning, or changes in zoning or-
dinances made under pressure from developers and landowners” that “accounted
for these ill-advised and detrimental uses of the land.”79 The “oneness” of the
Peninsula environment could not be ignored. Smog and water pollution recog-
nized no municipal boundaries. The only sensible way forward, according to Scott
and others, was a new form of coordinated regional government.
As intellectuals pushed the agenda of metropolitan-wide planning, the Cal-
ifornia state legislature took legal action. The Bay Area had grown remarkably
beyond the old urban cores of San Francisco and Oakland, encompassing the
nine counties that touched the Bay, one-hundred cities, 108 special districts over-
seeing parks, sewage, and water, and twenty-four transit districts.80 Metropolitan
fragmentation had led to a chaotic, complicated, and confusing mixture of spe-
76Walker,, The Country in the City, 132—133; John A. Vieg, “Two Men and Two Institutions: The
Lengthening Shadows of Samuel c. May and Emery E. Olson,” Public Administration Review 15, no.
4 (October 1955): 244–246, 244—246.
77Walker,, The Country in the City, 133.
78Mel Scott, The San Francisco Bay Area: A Metropolis in Perspective (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1959), 2.
79Scott,, The San Francisco Bay Area, 274.
80Walker,, The Country in the City, 136.
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cial interests and local governments. In the late 1950s the California Legislature
attempted to intervene, creating the state’s Office of Planning in 1959 and ap-
pointing a Governor’s Council on Metropolitan Area Problems to study what the
state could do to confront challenges to urban growth. The council recommended
the establishment of regional districts to oversee transportation, recreation, and
planning, but resistance by local governments forced the commission to revise
their proposal to a metropolitan-level commission.81
Some metropolitan areas like San Jose resisted the call for regionalism and
sought to maintain their local autonomy, going so far as to reject being included
with the San Francisco-Oakland Statistical Metropolitan Area in favor of its own
census designation and rejecting a connection to the Peninsula-wide Bay Area
Rapid Transit (BART) system. By the late 1950s and early 1960s planning profes-
sionals and state legislatures were formalizing plans to correct what they viewed
as a fragmented regionalism that did a disservice to urban planning and intro-
duced environmental degradation.
Despite resistance to any state intervention into local land-use planning
by the League of California Cities and the County Supervisors Association, the
Coordinating Council continued to argue for a regulatory body in the belief that
problems of growth stemmed from jurisdictional boundaries. The State Legisla-
ture’s passage of the Knox-Nisbet Act in 1963 resulted in their intervention into
urban planning. Under the Act, every county in the state was required to create a
Local Area Formation Commission (LAFCO) whose mandate primarily revolved
around the approval of annexations and incorporations. LAFCO’s authority at-
tempted to discourage urban sprawl and maintained the ability to regulate many
special districts, including sewers and sanitation, police, irrigation, county ser-
vices, water districts, reclamation, and parks and recreation. LAFCOs also estab-
81Stephanie Pincetl, Transforming California: A Political History of Land Use and Development (Bal-
timore: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 140–141.
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Figure 4.8: Open Space in Santa Clara County by administration.
lished “sphere of influence” boundaries for cities in an attempt to prevent one
city from annexing into the area of interest of another city, as well as requiring
all counties and cities to draw up general plans. An extension of the Act under
the 1965 Quimby Act required developers to dedicate space to parks and open
space.82
Although LAFCO attempted to intervene in local political issues, the re-
gionalist thinking of the Bay Area environmentalists remained, perhaps because
the LAFCO ideal simply threw power back to local governining elites. A new
coalition of planners and citizen activists formed under the aegis Citizens for Re-
gional Recreation and Parks (CRRP), emerging after a June 1958 conference in
San Francisco called “The Peril To Our Public Lands–A Discussion of Regional
82“Guidelines, Santa Clara County Local Agency Formation Commission,” September 1974,
Folder 7, Carton 53, California Tomorrow Records, MS 3641, California Historical Society; Walker,,
The Country in the City, 137; Pincetl,, Transforming California, 141–143.
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Recreation.” The organization’s core concern was the lack of accessible spaces
for recreation in California’s metropolitan areas and the rapid disappearance of
such spaces under urban expansion. Leading the charge were Dorothy Erskine
and Jack Kent, who immediately set themselves to creating an inventory of public
lands, sponsored conferences on open space and conservation, and fostered part-
nerships with regional conservationists and national organizations like the Sierra
Club.83
Kent and Erskine were natural activists. Kent earned a degree in archi-
tecture at Berkeley in 1938 and spent a year in Europe studying under Lewis
Mumford before returning to Berkeley to help found Telesis. Kent quickly jumped
into various planning roles, first working as a junior planning assistant with the
Marin County Planning Commission and a planning technician with the Pacific
Southwest Regional Office of the National Resources Planning Board. He earned
a Masters degree in 1943 in City Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and became the Associate City Planner for the San Francisco City
Planning Commission in 1943, but his tenure was cut short when he was drafted
into the Army during World War II. Kent served in Washington, D.C., during
the war, and was stationed in Berlin between 1945 and 1946 before returning to
San Francisco and beginning work as the Director of City Planning under Mayor
Roger Lapham. He was recruited to teach at Berkeley and, along with other plan-
ning professors, founded the Department of City and Regional Planning in 1948.
Along with serving as a Berkeley professor, he maintained an active role in the
Berkeley City Planning Commission and, in 1957, was elected to the Berkeley City
Council.84
Like his mentor Mumford, Kent maintained a firm belief in careful plan-
83T. J. Kent, Open Space for the San Francisco Bay Area: Organizing to Guide Metropolitan Growth
(Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1970), 69.
84Louise Dyble, Paying the Toll: Local Power, Regional Politics, and the Golden Gate Bridge (Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 175–176.
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ning to manage urban growth and prevent suburban sprawl. He was wary of local
governments and their penchant for bucking regional efforts at controlling land
use. He supported the formation of the Association of Bay Area Governments
(ABAG), a voluntary association of Bay Area municipalities, helping draft its first
constitution and bylaws in 1958 and serving on its executive committee. Regional
planning was essential, Kent believed, in protecting open space and environmen-
tal quality. As he explained in 1963:
Without a regional plan, the so-called “natural” forces of economic
development will overwhelm the best efforts of local governments to
control them. . . . Speculative land development forces now operate
on a metropolitanwide basis. They are commanded by men of great
enterprise and ability. These men—the builders and does of today—
will wipe out the vineyards of the upper Napa Valley and fill it with
suburban tracts; they will overrun the Livermore Valley; they will mop
up Stinson Beach, Bolinas, and the Olema Valley. They will spread to
the northeast, beyond Vallejo and Fairfield toward Sacramento; to the
south, below San Jose to Hollister; and to the west, beyond Santa Rosa
to Sebastopol and the Pacific Ocean. . . . Freeways will precede the
initial wave of surging growth, and more freeways will follow. Pre-
dictably inadequate bridges for trucks and automobiles will be con-
structed [and] tidelands will be filled. The central districts of San Fran-
cisco, Oakland, and San Jose will become inaccessible, and will decay.85
Like Kent, Erskine’s political education was rooted in progressive politics
stemming from her immersion with socialism and labor activism. Erskine estab-
lished herself as a dedicated conservationist and social activist for various Bay
Area causes. Erskine helped found the Marin Conservation League in the early
1930s. In 1938, she traveled to the Soviet Union to seek how the nation handled
urban planning, particularly housing for laborers.86 She became a proponent of
public housing in San Francisco, helping revitalize the San Francisco Housing As-
85Jack Kent, City and Regional Planning for the Metropolitan San Francisco Bay (Berkeley: Institute
of Governmental Studies, 1963), 1–2; quoted in Dyble,, Paying the Toll, 176.
86Janet B. Thiessen, Dorothy Erskine: Graceful Crusader for Our Environment (Dorothy Erskine
Biograph, LCC., 2010), 45–53.
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sociation, originally formed after the 1906 earthquake, in 1938.87 Her interest in
housing led to a growing awareness of the role city planning played in creating
livable spaces for people, and by the late-1950s Erskine had taken an interest in
greenbelt planning. Erskine devoted her energies to CRRP, which played a sig-
nificant role in crafting the California Public Outdoor Recreation Plan in 1960,
and aided in the establishment of the Save San Francisco Bay organization and
served on the board of directors of the Bay Conservation and Development Com-
mission.88
Erskine located in postindustrial capitalism a warped idea about land.
“Land is a resource,” she argued, “not a commodity subject to speculation and
mindless use.”89 She distrusted local decision-makers, writing to Sierra Club ex-
ecutive director Michael McCloskey that the “pressures of self-interest and greed
are too powerful on local agencies to protect the great mass from serious harm.”
Erskine put her faith in federal programs, arguing for their use in reclamation
projects, building recreational areas, improving land values, and preventing air
and water pollution. “Apparently we don’t try to change our system or tinker
with men’s minds too much. . . That might be called ‘socialism,’ ” she wrote. “In-
stead, we put a ‘price tag’ on a social reform at the Federal level and then do the
job. That’s just another business transaction.”90
Part of the solution to the open space problem was the preservation of
agricultural land. The rapid loss of agricultural land—as much as one million
acres left production between 1945 and 1968—led to discussion about defining
city boundaries to protect open lands.91 By the mid-1950s studies were pointing
to the problems of lost agricultural land in the Valley. A study by the California
87Thiessen,, Dorothy Erskine, 57.
88Walker,, The Country in the City, 134–136; Thiessen,, Dorothy Erskine, 117–128.
89Quoted in Walker,, The Country in the City, 136.
90Letter from Dorothy Erskine to Michael McCloskey, April 12, 1969, Folder 4, Carton 2, Cali-
fornia Tomorrow Records MS 3641, California Historical Society; ellipses in original.
91Pincetl,, Transforming California, 147–148.
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State Planning Commission noted the sprawling nature of urbanization in north-
ern Santa Clara County, finding that all of the subdivisions established between
1945 and 1955 covered just seven square miles if combined. But instead of dense
development, subdivisions “dotted over 200 square miles of prime agricultural
land.”92 If such growth continued, the state planning board concluded, Santa
Clara Valley would lose nearly all farmland by 1960.93 Land selling for between
$800 and $1,200 an acre for agricultural uses was fetching upwards of $8,000 an
acre for industrial or residential uses. The disparity between the price of land for
agriculture and the price of land for subdivisions introduced a capital imbalance
for tax assessments. As a result of rising land prices nearby agricultural land,
county tax assessors likewise raised the value of agricultural land and, therefore,
the burden of taxes farmers owed.94
Concerns about the increasing value of agricultural land and threat of ur-
ban sprawl led the state legislature to act. The California Legislature passed the
Land Conservation Act in 1965. Known as the Williamson Act, the state legis-
lation ostensibly provided protections for open space and greenbelts. Under the
Williamson Act, agricultural land had the option to be removed from markets
by entering into a contract with county governments. The contract restricted the
land’s use to agricultural purposes for a minimum of ten years. In return, farm-
ers enjoyed a tax benefit. County assessors valued the land at agricultural value
rather than market value, allowing farmers to pay lower taxes on their land and,
both parties hoped, allowed the land to remain perennially agricultural. Contracts
were renewed annually unless notice for nonrenewal was given. By 1969, twenty-
three counties in California placed more than two million acres of private land
into the agricultural preserve.95
92“Planning for Growth”, 1955, 43.
93“Planning for Growth,” 45.
94“Planning for Growth,” 43—44.
95California Legislature, Joint Committee on Open Space Land, Preliminary Report (Sacramento,
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Despite the availability of state law to control land use, it fell short of its
intended goals in Santa Clara County. Farmers, after all, still had the voluntary
option of selling their land at some point in the future. Farmers oftentimes waited
as land values rose for the right moment to sell, fetching prices well above what
they had originally paid. Open space land was not held as a public good, and
once farmland became a place for subdivisions it no longer served its open space
purpose. The Williamson Act contained the potential for perpetual agricultural re-
serves under its renewable ten-year contracts, but in reality farmers often bowed
to market pressures. Faced with shrinking agricultural land, citizens began seek-
ing alternative and long-term methods for sustaining the presence of open space
throughout the Peninsula. Community organizing continued to shape the local
policies guiding land use with an increasing focus on recreation and public lands.
In 1968, CRRP filed for nonprofit, tax-exempt status and renamed themselves Peo-
ple for Open Space (POS). Their new status as nonprofit allowed them to pursue
a $59,000 Ford Foundation grant to examine the economic impact of open space
in the Bay Area.96 Completed in 1969 and published as both a main report and
as a summary pamphlet, POS laid out a vision for Peninsula open space that ful-
filled their desire to guide places against urban expansion. “A major open space
system can be created only on a regional basis,” argued the study, ” because open
space exists without regard to city or county boundaries. . . . To establish perma-
nent open space, all parts of the region must act together, probably using types of
March 1969), 10; B. Bruce-Biggs, “Land Use and the Environment,” in No Land Is an Island: Individ-
ual Rights and Government Control of Land (San Francisco: The Institute for Contemporary Studies,
1975), 1–13; J. Herbert Snyder, “A Program for Agricultural Land Use in Urbanizing Areas,” Jour-
nal of Farm Economics 48 (December 1966): 1306–1313; Walker,, The Country in the City, 43. See also
Kathleen A. Brosnan, “Crabgrass or Grapes: Urban Sprawl, Agricultural Persistence, and the Fight
for the Napa Valley,” in Cities and Nature in the American West, ed. by Char Miller, (Reno: University
of Nevada Press, 2010), 34–56, 36.
96Kent,, Open Space for the San Francisco Bay Area, 74; “Ideas for Discussion with Ford Founda-
tion,” November 19, 1968, Folder 4, Carton 2, California Tomorrow Records MS 3641, California
Historical Society.
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legislation not currently available to counties or even special districts.“97
People for Open Space applauded the Williamson Act, but remained skep-
tical about its implementation. Finding that “very little high quality agricultural
land has been conserved” and concerned about the lack of a “guarantee of per-
manence,” they conclude that the voluntary contracts were ultimately an unsat-
isfactory solution to open space preservation.98 A more desirable action was for
a regional governmental body to purchase all available open space and regulate
its preservation. Such a plan, they argued, would hardly place a financial burden
onto Bay Area residents. In assessing the costs of such a program that factored
in land value and the offsetting of expenses that would come from providing ur-
ban services to densely-populated areas versus sprawling cities, People for Open
Space estimated that the net costs for each person in the Bay Area would amount
to only $2 to $3 dollars per year—“about the cost of a good bottle of California
wine and a loaf of sourdough French bread.”99
The loss of agricultural land was only one feature among many that moti-
vated environmentalists. Frustrated by the state’s lack of any comprehensive plan-
ning for California and believing that local government was the source of urban
California’s problems, a new nonprofit educational organization called California
Tomorrow entered the political scene with its 1962 publication of California Going,
Going. . . , whose opening sentences reiterated the “serious, progressively disas-
trous lack of coordinated land planning and development” in California.100 Cal-
ifornia Tomorrow was the brainchild of Alfred Heller and Samuel Wood. Heller
97People for Open Space, “The Case for Open Space,” January 1969, 4, Folder 4, Carton 2,
California Tomorrow Records, MS 3641, California Historical Society.
98People for Open Space, “The Case for Open Space,” report, 7, Folder 4 People for Open Space,
Carton 2, California Tomorrow Records MS 3641, California Historical Society.
99People for Open Space, “The Case for Open Space,” report, 10, Folder 4 People for Open
Space, Carton 2, California Tomorrow Records MS 3641, California Historical Society. See also
Association of Bay Area Governments, Regional Open Space Element, Supplemental Report RP-3,
(Berkeley, October 1969), 9–10.
100Samuel E. Wood and Alfred E. Heller, California Going, Going.: Our State’s Struggle to Remain
Beautiful and Productive (Sacramento: California Tomorrow, 1962), 6.
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served as the editor and publisher of the Nevada County Nugget newspaper and
became involved with planning after fighting for a rerouting of a freeway through
Nevada City. Wood got his start working as an official with the Interior and Agri-
culture departments before moving into state government as the staff director
of California legislative committees working on conservation. He helped draft the
bill establishing the State Office of Planning in 1959 and, after leaving government
service, became a consultant and a professor of political science at the University
of California-Berkeley in the Department of City and Regional Planning. Heller
and Wood met through their mutual friend, Berkeley professor Catherine Bauer
Wurster. California Tomorrow reflected a belief in scientific and expert knowledge
in overcoming urban planning and environmental degradation, forcefully argu-
ing for a central regulatory body to solve the state’s rapidly disappearing open
spaces. California Tomorrow urged the state to think about both urban and rural
areas. A year later, Heller and Wood published The Phantom Cities of California,
arguing that weak planning allowed political power to aggregate among regional
actors—phantom cities—that enacted sprawling urban growth. Without regional
planning, Heller and Wood concluded, California was destined to become “un-
sightly intrusions of subdivisions, cars, roads, parking spaces, sewage, exhaust,
strip development, slurbs—sloppy, sleezy, slovenly, slipshod, semi-cities.”101
As part of their efforts towards shaping the state’s conversation about plan-
ning, California Tomorrow published a quarterly magazine Cry California starting
in 1966, dedicated to covering issues of environmental decline, race and class dis-
crimination, housing shortages, and job inequalities. The journal attracted many
leading environmentalist and conservationists including William Bronson, who
served as the journal’s editor, landscape architect Garrett Eckbo, environmental
101Samuel E. Wood and Alfred E. Heller, The Phantom Cities of California (Sacramento: California
Tomorrow, 1963), 5; Kevin Starr, Golden Dreams: California in an Age of Abundance, 1950–1963 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 418–419.
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writer T. H. Watkins, journalist Mel Wax, and an editorial board that included
Wallace Stegner, columnist Neil Morgan, architect Nathaniel Owings, attorney
Clarence Heller, and Caspar Weinberger. The journal had a northern California
tilt, dominated mostly by writers (and issues) facing the San Francisco Bay Area
and surrounding areas.102 California Tomorrow believed that state intervention
into urban growth could allow regional government to act, as political scientist
Stephanie Pincetl has noted, “as a redistributive entity and actively redress rev-
enue and housing inequities.”103
Former Santa Clara County Planning Department director Karl Belser, who
had attempted to limit San Jose’s growth into unincorporated county lands in the
1950s, took to the pages of Cry California to bemoan the state’s lack of coordinated
planning. The mix of federal, state, and local agencies that “dabble in the planning
business” lacked regulatory authority resulting in “fragmented plans” without
clear goals to ensure the protection of open space and maintain quality of life.104
Despite the presence of these various regulatory bodies, Belser asserted, “the bay
is being filled in, air and water are being polluted, hillsides are being mutilated
and prime cropland is being paved over.”105
Belser placed blame for environmental degradation onto the “economic
elite”—“landowners,” “money controllers”, and “mass communication media”—
who “operate in a realm of their own with little concern for any but their private
interests.” To Besler, the laissez-faire approach to land use was a symptom of the
failings of postindustrial capitalism. The public was beholden to the elite’s plans,
not because they agreed with the planners but because they lacked power.106
Adding to the problem of economic elites was the presence of “competitive jeal-
102Starr,, Golden Dreams, 422.
103Pincetl,, Transforming California, 153.
104Karl Belser, “The Planning Fiasco in California,” Cry California (Summer 1967), 10.
105Belser, “Planning Fiasco,” Cry California, 11.
106Belser, “Planning Fiasco,” 11.
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ousy” among local governments who abandoned proper planning and instead
“spend sleepless nights figuring out how to throw the gig into their neighbors.”107
The end result from this lack of coordinated planning resulted in “the most tragic
and dangerous trend” of ignoring the conservation of resources. “What has al-
ready happened should certainly indicate to anyone with common sense that our
state faces not only the disfigurement of its natural beauty,” Belser argued, “but
also the ruin of its primary economy.”108 While governments bicker, “our prime
soils are being lost, our forests are being butchered, our scenic areas are being
raped, and our air and water are being polluted beyond reclamation.”109
Three years later the situation had not improved, and Belser’s warnings
about the lack of planning took on an even more seething tone in the pages of Cry
California. Pointing to the Santa Clara Valley as an example of “slurban” devel-
opment, he wrote of the “flagrant ruination” and “irrelevant urban development
of massive size and questionable quality” that had come to dominate the val-
ley.110 The environmental problems attending such growth had become the pri-
mary concern for Belser. Increased traffic on roadways introduced high levels of
air pollution, exacerbated by the San Francisco Bay’s impenetrable inversion layer
that trapped smog in the Valley. Overdraft on underground water supplies and
the resulting subsidence threatened to ruin underground utilities and stretch the
natural limits of water availability for cities.111 “Wild urban growth,” he wrote,
“attacked the valley much as cancer attacks the human body.”112
By the late 1960s the efforts by conservationists to overcome poor land use
planning was failing. No regional restrictions on urban growth had successfully
reversed the trend of sprawl in Bay Area cities. San Jose continued to expand
107Belser, “Planning Fiasco,” 13.
108Belser, “Planning Fiasco,” 13.
109Belser, “Planning Fiasco,” 13.
110Karl Belser, “The Making of Slurban America,” (Fall 1970), 1.
111Belser, “The Making of Slurban America,” 17.
112Belser, “The Making of Slurban America,” 5.
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rapidly, adding roughly 55,110 acres (or eighty-two square miles) to the city be-
tween 1960 and 1970. California Tomorrow argued in 1969 in a proposed study of
Bay Area open space that
the rapid disappearance of the orchards of the Santa Clara Valley is
perhaps the most dramatic example of the pattern which urban devel-
opment will take unless permanent measures are taken to preserve open
spaces within the urbanized areas. It should be remembered that as re-
cently as 1960, Santa Clara County was considered a model throughout
the country in terms of progressive “greenbelt” ordinances to preserve
agriculture.113
Despite the lobbying, educational, and political efforts of California Tomorrow,
People for Open Space, and other regional environmental organizations, open
space continued shrinking and land converted into urban space. At the state-
wide level, at least, very little action took place in protecting open spaces aside
from the 1972 Coastal Protection Initiative. Not to be deterred, California Tomor-
row published the California Tomorrow Plan in 1971. The California Tomorrow Plan
proposed a comprehensive initiative to address state infrastructure and environ-
ment. The monograph argued that there existed a “California One” and a “Cal-
ifornia Two”—two potential paths that the state could follow given the current
problems of environmental degradation and widespread urbanization. Califor-
nia One imagined a California without any change to these policies. California
One would be unable to meet the state’s energy needs, deteriorate water qual-
ity and accessibility, continue the urbanization of farmland, lose wilderness ar-
eas and open spaces, worsen air quality, increase noise pollution, clog roadways,
cause greater housing shortages, result in underfunded and understaffed schools,
widespread unemployment especially among minorities, fall short in recreational
areas, and emphasize punitive rather than rehabilitative treatment of criminals.114
113“Regional Open Space Study,” August 1, 1968, 1, Carton 2, Folder 4, California Tomorrow
Records MS 3641, California Historical Society.
114California Tomorrow Plan, 24–36.
188
To overcome these challenges, California Tomorrow envisioned a different Cali-
fornia comprised of a State Planning Council to develop comprehensive policies
addressing a wide range of environmental, social, and economic issues in the
state. Under their imagined Planning Council, California Tomorrow envisioned
ten regional governments to absorb the many single-issue agencies and districts,
drawing up regional plans regarding land use, infrastructure, and socioeconomic
issues.115 By devising regional plans rather than piecemeal local decisions, Cali-
fornia Tomorrow leaned on a belief in good government, scientific evidence, and
expert knowledge in solving the state’s urban problems.
”we were going to have a city of 60,000 people in the hills [above Palo Alto],”
Lennie Roberts recalled years after the founding of the Committee for Green
Foothills. “And a number of people got together and decided, well, we’ll be for
something—we’ll be for the Green Foothills.”116 As the political efforts of Cali-
fornia Tomorrow and People for Open Space accelerated, primarily in northern
counties and East Bay communities like Napa and Marin, further south on the
Midpeninsula ideas about restricting urban growth and critiquing environmental
degradation influenced local politics. The legislative efforts of California Tomor-
row and People for Open Space failed to gain much traction at the state level
by the end of the 1960s, but the advocates of urban development for the sake of
“progress” would find their greatest challengers coming out of grassroots politics
and local action.
In Palo Alto, the Committee for Green Foothills initiated a campaign shortly
after their first fight with Stanford University to enact policies for setting aside
lands for recreation. Members of the Committee worked closely with the county in
115California Tomorrow Plan, 46–48. See also Pincetl,, Transforming California, 161–162.
116Roberts quoted in Daniel Press, Saving Open Space: The Politics of Local Preservation in California
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 41.
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establishing the Midpeninsula Regional Open Space District (MROSD). In 1972, a
referendum placed Measure R onto the ballot that would establish the Open Space
District, originally focused on the northwestern portion of Santa Clara County. In-
spired by the San Francisco-based Livingston and Blayney planning agency report
in 1971 that concluded it would be cheaper for open space to be acquired and pre-
served rather than infrastructure extended into the foothills, the Committee for
Green Foothills cited the report as a means for passing the MROSD measure.117
Since MROSD existed as a special district, it required no legislative intervention
by the state—only the approval of county voters.118
The themes identified by Alfred Heller, Dorothy Erskine, Sam Wood, Jack
Kent, and Mel Scott were picked up by a range of intellectuals, journalists, and ob-
servers throughout the 1960s, including William Bronson’s photojournalistic How
to Kill a Golden State (1968), Berkeley-trained biologist Raymond F. Dasmann’s
The Destruction of California (1965), Dorothea Lange and Pirkle Jones’ Death of a
Valley (1960), Richard G. Lillard’s Eden in Jeopardy (1966), and journalist Harold
Gilliam, who served as Secretary of the Interior Stuart Udall’s assistant and pub-
lished a series of books and articles in the San Francisco Chronicle about the Bay
Area.119 Collectively, the intelligentia gave expression to a growing anxiety about
unplanned, runaway urban growth and the environmental, social, economic, and
political chaos that accompanied the lack of planning. Above all, these writers and
advocates argued for a philosophy that fused environmentalism and regulated,
regional urban development.
117Press, Saving Open Space, 42; Walker, The Country in the City, 164.
118California state law defines special districts as “any agency of the state for the local perfor-
mance of governmental or proprietary functions within limited boundaries.” For an explanation
on the role of special district in California, see What’s So Special About Special Districts? A Citizen’s
Guide to Special District in California,, 4th ed., Senate Local Government Committee, October 2010.
119William H. Bronson, How to Kill a Golden State (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); Dasmann,,
; Dorothea Lange and Pirkle Jones, Death of a Valley (Rochester, N.Y.: Aperture, 1960); Richard G.
Lillard, Eden in Jeopardy (New York: Knopf, 1966); Harold Gilliam, For Better or for Worse: The
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Chapter 5
Rejecting the Los Angeles of the North
People in San Jose want limited growth. They don’t want another Los Angeles.
—Janet Gray Hayes
The campaigns for open space throughout the San Francisco peninsula
represented the broadening of suburban environmentalism as postwar liberalism
shifted from its New Deal vision of growth toward an emphasis on quality-of-
life issues, which included a new appreciation for nature. Throughout the Valley,
white middle-class suburbanites fought against suburban sprawl through mea-
sures such as zoning requirements, land trusts, and conservation organizations.
Yet these efforts to control growth not only represented a land ethnic of conser-
vation, but also solidified race and class exclusivity for affluent liberal suburbs.
Scholars have looked at the anti-sprawl politics as a symbol for suburban exclu-
sionary politics. Mike Davis in his study of Los Angeles finds “slow growth” the
“latest incarnation of a middle-class subjectivity that fitfully constitute and recon-
stitutes itself around the defense of household equity and residential privilege.”1
Adam Rome suggests, instead, that suburbanites played a key role in shaping
1Mike Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles (New York: Vintage, 1992),
159; Andrew Hurley, Environmental Inequalities: Class, Race, and Industrial Pollution in Gary, Indiana,
1945–1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Matthew Klingle, Emerald City:
An Environmental History of Seattle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Lily Geismer, Don’t
Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the Democratic Party (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2015), 290–293.
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modern environmentalism.2 In Silicon Valley, the result was a mix of these two
conclusions: suburbanites expressed a genuine concern for environmental degra-
dation through continued urban growth, but by pursuing policies that sought
to preserve their quality-of-life they solidified spatial, environmental, and racial
inequality.3
However, just as issues of environmental and social justice were burgeon-
ing, the changing demographics of Silicon Valley introduced a significant shift
to the political culture. In San Jose, the city’s population ballooned rapidly from
204,196 in 1960 to 445,779 in 1970. Among this expansion came demographic shifts
as the city became more diversified. People of Hispanic origin expanded from
11.4% to 15.1% between 1950 and 1970, while African Americans increased from
0.6% to 2.5% over the same period. By the end of the 1970s, San Jose’s population
grew to 629,442, with Hispanics accounting for 22% of the population, African
Americans 4.6%, and Asian and Pacific Islander 8.5%.4 San Jose was becoming
less homogeneous, and politics had to grapple with an electorate demanding at-
tention to their communities. These shifts were happening throughout Silicon
Valley, shaping how homeowners, suburbanites, politicians, and communities de-
fined their urban spaces. The major target for criticism was the ideology of urban
growth, which was no longer seen as the central goal for a city’s prosperity.
Perhaps no place better represented the crumbling philosophy of growth-
as-progress better than San Jose´. Challenges to San Jose´’s growth interests on the
city council began to mount in the early 1960s as homeowners in the suburban
fringes of the city began opposing the city’s sprawl. In 1962, Virginia Shaffer, a
2Adam Rome, Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmen-
talism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–14.
3A similar argument is advanced by Lily Geismer. See Geismer, Don’t Blame Us, chap. 4. See
also Peter Siskind, “Suburban Growth and Its Discontents: The Logic and Limits of Reform on the
Postwar Northeast Corridor,” in The New Suburban History, ed. by Kevin M. Kruse and Thomas
Sugrue, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 163.
4U.S. Census Bureau, “City of San Jose.”
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Republican and the first woman to be voted onto San Jose´’s city council, rose
to office representing the interests of homeowners and taxpayers.5 The Mercury
News referred to Shaffer as “Madam No” based on a voting record that frequently
opposed rezoning decisions. Shaffer represented the expression of new interests
guiding ideas about the city’s future growth, but to call her platform conservation
would misrepresent her attitude towards urban growth. Although her criticisms
of San Jose´ found sympathy among conservationists, her concerns revolved pri-
marily around slowing growth to ease the tax burden on homeowners and lim-
iting government spending. Shaffer and her homeowner constituency had grown
frustrated by the city’s continual emphasis on growth without paying mind to the
adequacy of city services, high taxes, and development policies that allowed con-
struction on landslide-prone hillsides and floodplains.6 The 1962 elections rattled
the pro-growth advocates in San Jose´. “The election of 1962 cast a shadow that
falls across our political scene even today,” recalled former councilman and mayor
George Starbird. The pro-growth council still had an ally in Dutch Hamann, who
voters retained as city manager after a vote-of-confidence in 1962, but homeown-
ers would be watching the council closely in their decisions about zoning, places
for recreation, taxes, and annexations.7
Poor planning and runaway growth met Shaffer’s ire. Like many of Santa
Clara’s residents, Shaffer was a newcomer to the county. Born in Chicago in 1922,
Shaffer grew up in Wisconsin and attended the University of Wisconsin. In 1946,
she married Harold Shaffer, an engineer, while both were working for Lockheed in
5Philip Trounstine and Terry Christensen, Movers and Shakers: The Study of Community Power
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), 77.
6“Voters Pass on Manager, 3 For Council Tuesday,” San Jose´ Mercury, April 8, 1962; “Voters
Will Decide on Council Posts,” San Jose Mercury, April 10, 1962; “6 Will Vie for S.J. Council in
Runoff!” San Jose´ Mercury, April 11, 1962; Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 100–
101; Glenna Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream: Gender, Class, and Opportunity
in the Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 191–192; Paul Johnston, Success
While Others Fail: Social Movement Unionism and the Public Workplace (Cornell: Cornell University
Press, 1994), 94–95.
7Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 99–101.
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Southern California. They moved to San Jose´ in 1957 after Harold’s transfer to the
Santa Clara County facility.8 Motivated by encroaching commercial developments
in her neighborhood, along with rising taxes and insufficient parks, Shaffer began
attending council meetings in the early 1960s and became active with homeowner
groups displeased with high taxes and industrial development near their commu-
nities.9 Shaffer’s entry into San Jose´ politics was a challenge to the mostly white,
upper-middle-class male political establishment, whose close personal and polit-
ical connections helped smooth the path for developers to promote city growth.
Shaffer entered the political ring in 1962 along with additional anti-incumbent
candidates, including former councilman Clyde Fisher and Joseph L. Pace. Se-
curing the support of homeowners and their concerns about controlling growth,
rising taxes, and zoning, voters placed the challengers on city council seats. The
election, according to the San Jose´ Mercury, was “an upheaval in the city’s political
structure.”10
Developers now found their plans challenged by a vocal and stubborn vot-
ing block. With Shaffer’s ascent to the city council, she objected to the city’s poor
planning and lack of oversight, as well as objecting to the secret “Book of the
Month Club” meetings held away from public scrutiny.11 Her voting record re-
jected projects she felt did not work for residents, such as her vote against moving
city offices to downtown in the mid-1960s.12 When a ballot initiative failed to re-
move City Manager Dutch Hamann from office, Shaffer and her allies launched
8“Virginia Shaffer, 1st Woman to Serve on S.J. City Council,” San Jose´ Mercury News, May 14
1998. Janet Flammang, Women’s Political Voice: How Women Are Transforming the Practice and Study
of Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 41.
9“Fischer, Shaffer, Pace Win City Council Seats,” San Jose´ Mercury, May 9, 1962.
10“Fischer, Shaffer, Pace Win City Council Seats,” San Jose´ Mercury, May 9, 1962. According to
San Jose´ developer Charles W. Davidson, the very engineers that high tech attracted had become
drivers of political change. “Lockheed,” he said, “had come to the valley in the late 1950s, spurred
development in the West Valley and, in 1962, got Shaffer elected.” See “S.J. Recall Effort in ’64
Only a Dim Memory,” San Jose´ Mercury, April 4, 1994.
11On the “Book of the Month Club,” see chapter 3.
12“ ‘Madam No’ Still Says No—First S.J. Councilwoman Eschews Politics Now That She’s Re-
tired,” San Jose´ Mercury, June 5 1989.
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a recall initiative in 1964 in an attempt to ouster four councilmembers closely al-
lied with the city manager. Supporters criticized the “extravagant growth” of the
city, accusing the four councilmembers of ignoring good planning policies, hik-
ing taxes on homeowners, and favoritism in zoning decisions.13 The recall effort,
however, failed to resonate with voters. Occurring on an off-election year, only
nineteenth percent of San Jose´’s eligible voters turned out. They overwhelmingly
supported the recalled candidates.14
Reacting to the growing homeowner resentment for the city’s growth poli-
cies, the pro-growth leadership proposed a removal of the biannual vote of con-
fidence for city manager. Hamann had won the vote of confidence in elections
under his tenure, but the margin of victory was dwindling. They also proposed
making the office of mayor an elected office again, reversing a Progressive Era
measure whereby the mayor was a rotating position selected among the coun-
cil by council members on the basis of seniority.15 Additional measures by the
pro-growth contingent included raising the number of signatures required for
placing initiative and referendums on ballots and granting more administrative
power to the city council. For the pro-growth supporters, these changes were
necessary for the modernization of San Jose´ governance. Yet critics, among them
Shaffer, opposed the measures, seeing them as a power grab that would fail to
help residents.16 The charter revisions received wide support from the pro-growth
13“Arguments for an against Recall of Certain Elective Officers,” City of San Jose´, Municipal,
Recall Election, July 14, 1964, voter pamphlet, clipping file, “San Jose´ - Elections - 1964,” envelope,
California Room, San Jose´ Public Library.
14“S.J. Recall Effort in ’64 Only a Dim Memory,” San Jose´ Mercury, April 4, 1994.
15Placed onto San Jose´’s city charter in 1916, the office of mayor was designed to limit the
mayor’s power by making the position on an equal footing with council members. This move
gave rise to the position of city manager, who inherited most of the former powers of the mayor’s
office that included policy implementation, budget oversight, and labor decisions for municipal
employees. The decision was designed to check against corruption, while the management-style of
city government sought to make government more accountable and less susceptible to cronyism.
“First S.J. City Manager Faced a Tough Task, Too He Wrote Charter, Hired Top Cop, Prepared
Budget,” San Jose Mercury News, January 3, 1995; Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers.
16“Lengthy Ballot in City April–26 Candidates,” North San Jose´ Sun, February 24, 1965, Clipping
File - Santa Clara County,” San Jose´ Elections, 1965, April” envelope, California Room, San Jose´
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coalition of real estate developers, utility companies, and Mercury News publisher
Joseph Ridder. The proposal divided homeowners, and voters passed the revised
charter in 1965.
Shaffer’s time in office was plagued by a male-dominated political culture
and a voting record that challenged the designs of the pro-growth coalition. While
serving on city council, the male majority broke the tradition of rotating the posi-
tions of mayor and vice mayor based on seniority in order to bypass Shaffer five
times. In 1964, the council went so far as to lock Shaffer out of a public coun-
cil meeting.17 “Madam No” increasingly became isolated on the six-member city
council, including among her anti-incumbent allies who swept into office with
her. Yet her ascent to office and attitude toward continued growth represented a
significant shift in San Jose´ politics, reflecting a growing middle-class homeowner
resentment with taxes, zoning, growth, and poor city services. The city’s growing
high-tech professionals helped swing elections, such as in 1967 when Democrat
Joe Colla, a self-described maverick and downtown drugstore owner, won a seat
on the council as an opponent of business-as-usual politics. During the 1969 elec-
tions, homeowners supported a slate of three candidates who had the potential to
become key allies for Shaffer’s policy changes. The newcomers to the city, brought
in by the likes of Hamann, were becoming their biggest challengers.
While the 1964 and 1967 elections destabilized the growth coalition, 1969
promised to crumble their foundation entirely. Two of the three candidates en-
dorsed by Shaffer, David Goglio and Kurt Gross, won their council bids. Goglio,
president of a homeowners’ association and an IBM employee, campaigned against
the city’s growth policies. The incumbent, Louis Solari, a real estate developer and
supporter of Hamann, had originally taken a seat on the council in 1952. Solari
Public Library; “Measures on Ballot Listed,” no source, no date, Clipping File - Santa Clara County,
“San Jose´ Elections, 1965, April” envelope, California Room, San Jose´ Public Library.
17“ ‘Madam No’ Still Says No—First S.J. Councilwoman Eschews Politics Now That She’s Re-
tired,” San Jose´ Mercury, June 5 1989.
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was the longest-serving member on the council and hoped to pick up an unprece-
dented fifth term. Goglio’s win signified a blow to the pro-growth coalition. Kurt
Gross was likewise a growth critic. As a member of the San Jose´ Planning Com-
mission, he criticized his incumbent for his continued support of urban policies
that failed to check the city’s expansion. A third candidate supported by Shaffer
failed to make it past the primaries, but Walter Hays, an attorney with a record
as an outspoken environmentalist and planned-growth advocate, won the third
council seat. Hays wanted San Jose´ to become a more livable city while still attract-
ing high tech industry to the area.18 Hamann, sensing the shifting political winds,
resigned shortly after the 1969 electons and was replaced by Thomas Fletcher, a
controlled-growth manager. Annexations declined sharply after 1970 as the city
council shifted its policy toward urban renewal and a “in-fill” policy to encour-
age development with the existing urban service area. Hamann’s nineteen-year
tenure as city manager ended just as the city’s new council majority rose to chal-
lenge growth interests. “The voices of the builders and doers became lost in the
many-voiced demands of the users,” former Mayor George Starbird lamented.
“The veto was back.”19 The end of growth-as-progress spelled disaster for city
boosters by the end of the 1960s.
San Jose´ was among a wave of no-growth and slow-growth regulations in
the Bay Area. Although San Jose´’s growth control measures never became quite as
strident as those pursued in the northern peninsula cities of Menlo Park, Los Al-
tos Hills, Palo Alto, and Atherton, homeowners demanded new policies to protect
their natural views and aesthetics. Following the nation-wide trend in establish-
ing land use controls to slow urban growth, only a single Bay Area town had
growth control laws in 1972 but by 1975 thirty-one had established new regula-
18“Candidates for Seat 5 View Issues,” San Jose Sun, May 14, 1969.
19Quoted in Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 103.
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tions.20 These regulations sought to preserve a suburban and rural character of
middle-class neighborhoods. For some municipalities on the Peninsula, environ-
mental protections emerged not out of genuine concern for the environment but
as a method for preserving property values or setting down symbolic boundaries
between race and class. In other towns, environmental regulations did reflect a
concern for the environment. Whereas San Jose´ politics in the 1950s sought to
become the “Los Angeles of the North,” in Dutch Hamann’s words, the San Jose´
of the 1970s jettisoned its L.A. envy. “People in San Jose´ want limited growth,”
future Mayor Janet Gray Hayes remarked in 1978. “They don’t want another Los
Angeles.”21 The changing contours of San Jose´’s green political culture grappled
with two decades of unrestrained urban growth, leading voters to support new
local regulations and support local political leaders that made the environment a
key component of their platform.
One method of growth control came in the form of zoning for residential
density. San Jose´ reduced residential density throughout the city from twelve to
eighteen housing units per acre to six to eight units. New policies also required
that no new development could be permitted until developers submitted envi-
ronmental impact statements that specified how they would handle storm runoff,
maintain open space, ensure the availability of city infrastructure, and accessible
schools.22 In 1973, San Jose´ voters passed Measure B that prevented new residen-
20Kenneth Rosen and Lawrence Katz, “Growth Management and Land Use Controls: The San
Francisco Bay Experience,” Real Estate Economics 9, no. 4 (December 1981): 332–333.
21“Sweet Triumph for San Jose´’s Mayor,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 9, 1978, Folder 13,
Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes Papers, San Jose State University Archives and Special Collections.
22Santa Clara County Planning Policy Committee, Zoning and Housing (San Jose´: Santa Clara
County Planning Department, 1970); Santa Clara County Planning Policy Committee, “Urban
Development/Open Space Plan for Santa Clara County, 1973–1978” (Santa Clara County Plan-
ning Department, n.d.), Box 4, Folder 96, League of Women Voters, San Jose´/Santa Clara Chapter
Records, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and Archives; So-
cial Planning Council of Santa Clara County, Inc. and Santa Clara County Planning Department,
“Profile ’70: A Socio-Economic Data Book for Santa Clara County”; San Jose´ City Planning Com-
mission, Master Plan of the City of San Jose´; San Jose´ City Planning Commission, 1981 Annual Re-
view: The General Plan, List of Potential Land Use/Transportation Diagram and Text Amendments; “Gen-
eral Plan Amendment Report, 1981 Annual Review, Text Amendments, Number 139”, 1981, Box
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tial development until adequate school space was provided for future residents.23
Many of these regulations, however, had the unintended affect of offloading the
costs of development and environmental regulations onto consumers, and made
low- and mid-size developments unprofitable for most developers. In response,
developers built pricier housing affordable only to high-income residents.24 Var-
ious maneuvers to build low-income housing in Los Altos Hills, San Jose´, and
elsewhere in Silicon Valley faced challenges by conservationists who complained
that such projects threatened environmental land use regulations.
Yet, Santa Clara County did not continue down the path of a conservative
ascendancy like Southern California experienced. Shaffer represented that strain
of American political culture, formulating a critique of taxes, government auster-
ity, and opposed an attempt to honor the African American civil rights movement
at a Willow Glen library.25 She opposed public housing measures, and outside
of local politics she served on the Republican State Central Committee and was
appointed to California’s planning advisory committee under Governor Ronald
Reagan. She unsuccessfully ran for the State Assembly twice and Congress once,
but her greatest impact remained as an advocate for homeowner interests that
garnered support among local and state conservatives. Yet Shaffer’s quality-of-
life positions put her increasingly out of step with San Jose´’s minority and work-
ing class voters. Even so, San Jose´’s growing high tech professional class largely
avoided the race and class strife experienced by other cities in the 1960s and
1970s. Shaffer represented the interests of high tech professionals and their in-
terests, yet those interests were often willing to let government intervention serve
3, Folder 50, League of Women Voters, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´/Santa Clara Chapter Records,
San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives; San Jose´ City Planning Com-
mission, Conforming Zoning Ordinance and Management Task Force Report (San Jose: City of San Jose´,
July 16, 1981), Box 4, Folder 94, League of Women Voters, San Jose´/Santa Clara Chapter Records,
MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
23Rosen, and Katz, Growth Management and Land Use Controls, 332–333.
24Rosen, and Katz, Growth Management and Land Use Controls, 328–331.
25“Willow Glen residents reject DuBois, Stokely,” Afro-American, March 22, 1969.
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their goals. But the political culture in San Jose´ was different from Orange County,
where anti-unionism, Cold War anti-communism, and rural voters and merchants
helped shape its political culture. San Jose´ had a young population—among the
youngest average aged populations in the nation in the 1970s—but the culture
focused on different issues.26 Quality of life, environmental policies, and a lib-
eral attitude toward civil rights expressed a liberal political culture in Santa Clara
County.
Inheriting the leadership of the growth coalition was Mayor Ron James,
a popular candidate supported widely by both homeowners and business lead-
ers. Yet his tenure was short lived when he decided not to seek re-election in
1971. And in a surprise to voters and political observers alike, Shaffer, who was
expected to make a mayoral run that same year, decided to give up her council
seat at the end of her term. A record thirty-three candidates vied for vacancies,
including fifteen alone contending for the office of the mayor. The frontrunner
for Shaffer’s seat was a self-avowed “suburban housewife” and environmentalist
Janet Gray Hayes. Growth dominated the election, and Hayes made slow growth
the core component of her campaign. A native of Indiana who came to San Jose´ in
1956, Hayes involved herself in local politics almost immediately, becoming a key
member of the League of Women Voters and president of the organization. Hayes
won the council seat carrying 50.9% of the vote. Along with Hayes, vice mayor
Norman Mineta won the mayor’s office—a liberal Democrat and the nation’s first
Asian American mayor who won with “overwhelming support in every commu-
nity sector, ‘establishment’ or otherwise”—and council incumbent Joseph Colla
hung onto his council seat.27 Hayes quickly garnered political support, becom-
26Norman Y. Mineta, “The State of the City,” (Mayor, City of San Jose´, July 8, 1971, City Hall,
City of San Jose´, California, Clipping File–Santa Clara County, “Norman Mineta, 1960 to 1979”
envelope, California Room, San Jose´ Public Library).
27“Race Non-Issue in Mineta Win,” (San Jose´ Mercury News, April 1971 [clipping undated], Clip-
ping File–Santa Clara County, “Norman Mineta, 1960 to 1979” envelope, California Room, San
Jose´ Public Library); “Pick a Winner! Janet Gray Hayes,” (Political advertisement, [unknown pa-
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ing San Jose´’s first female vice mayor. Mayor Mineta also moved to diversified
the city council, appointing Alfredo Garza, Jr., as the city’s first Latino to serve
on the council. Quality of life politics had come to dominate San Jose´ politics. In
a pledge to homeowners, Mineta promised that he would “recreate San Jose´ as
‘The Garden City,’ a term by which it was known not too many years ago.” He
promised
By “The Garden City,” I mean that all our efforts should be directed
toward creating a quality of life in San Jose´ . . . in which the needs of the
people are provided and in which all the people have an opportunity
to participate in determining the delivery of those services.28
The concerns of suburban liberals—controlling growth, the environment, im-
proving the city’s infrastructure, affordable housing, and expanding economic
opportunities—fostered a political culture that fused a suburban liberal vision
with quality of life activism.
When Mineta vacated the mayor’s office after a successful bid to Congress
in 1974, Hayes stepped in to fulfill the suburban liberal vision for San Jose´. Hayes
meshed well with the concerns of San Jose´ voters. Many had become increasingly
suspicious of urban growth and its synonym of progress. In one survey, voters
identified open space, urban growth, and the environment as key challenges fac-
ing the city. Among their top concerns, voters identified pollution, overpopula-
tion, land use planning and zoning, and parks and recreation as major concerns
leading up to the 1974 mayoral elections.29 Sixty-six percent of the survey’s re-
spondents listed protecting the environment as the top task the city needed to take
per], [undated clipping], Clipping File–Santa Clara County, “San Jose´ - Elections 1971 - Recall”
envelope, California Room, San Jose´ Public Library); “Candidates Statements of Qualifications,”
(City of San Jose´ California General Municipal Election, April 13, 1971, voter booklet, Clipping
File–Santa Clara County, “San Jose´ - Elections 1971 - Recall” envelope, California Room, San Jose´
Public Library).
28Mineta, “The State of the City,” 5.
29Diridon Research Corporation, “A Survey of Voter Attitudes in the City of San Jose´,” August
26, 1974, 13, 16, Folder 20, Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University
Library Special Collections and Archives.
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on, and fifty-nine percent felt that curbing growth and protecting open space was
necessary.30 Many city council members began to distance themselves from real
estate interests in the city, identifying an association with developers as a political
liability.31 San Jose´ had become a popular symbol of poor urban growth, lam-
basted by popular media, books, and studies.32 Residents wanted that image—
and reality—corrected.
Hayes faced off against Bart Collins, a 63-year-old former police chief sup-
ported by a pro-growth coalition who she referred to as “Mr. Yesterday.” Of im-
mediate concern, Collins pledged to repeal a construction and conveyance tax
passed by Mineta that required developers to pay for the cost of infrastructure
and services in new developments. Hayes, on the other hand, felt the “pay as you
grow tax” should be kept in place to help curb the city’s growth. Furthermore,
Hayes called for a “smart growth” policy of “in-fill” development, a measure
meant to develop areas within the city’s urban services area that would not re-
quire additional infrastructure to support. For Hayes, this policy had two key
goals: it halted suburban sprawl, and it generated new revenue for the city. Hayes
outlined a vision that called for improving quality of life, controlling growth, pro-
moting economic development, and cutting taxes, along with a progressive stance
on social and environmental issues.
Hayes narrowly won the 1974 mayoral race, carrying the majority of voters
particularly in Eastside and the new neighborhoods of Berryessa, Evergreen, and
West Valley. In one analysis of the election, Collins prevailed among conservative,
30“Survey of Voter Attitudes,” 1–2, 1974, Folder 20, Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-
01, San Jose´ State University.
31“Forerunner,” March 1973, Folder 405, Box 88, Don Edwards Congressional Papers, MSS-1995-
01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
32Stanford Environmental Law Review, San Jose´: Sprawling City; A Study of the Causes and Effects
of Urban Sprawl in San Jose´, California, March 1971; Robert C. Fellmeth, Politics of Land: Ralph Nader’s
Study Group Report on Land Use in California (Grossman Publishers, 1973); “Correcting San Jose´’s
Boomtime Mistake,” Businessweek, September 19, 1970; “Boom Town,” Newsweek, September 14,
1970.
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older, and more affluent parts of the city, while Hayes carried new, outlying areas
of the city—those areas facing the worst of the growth problems.33 Hayes was the
first woman to serve as mayor of a major metropolitan center and among a wave
of female political leaders taking office in Santa Clara County. The San Jose´ chap-
ter of the National Women’s Political Caucus dubbed the county the “feminist
capital of the world” as women assumed positions of power throughout city and
county government, many of whom were prote´ge´s or allies of Hayes.34 Mayor
Hayes and her allies ran on a platform of responsible growth and environmental
consciousness, epitomized by her campaign promise to “make San Jose´ better be-
fore we make it bigger.”35 These women preceded the Proposition 13 anti-growth
and anti-tax revolt, and like Shaffer became a tireless advocate for homeowners
and “smart growth” to reign in urban sprawl.36
According to Janet Flammang, Santa Clara female leaders gained traction
in county politics because of the “association . . . between male candidates and the
growth machines of a booster political elite.” Women were able to juxtapose them-
selves against this political culture as protectors of neighborhoods and torch bear-
ers for clean government.37 Future council member Lu Ryden suggested the rea-
33“Precinct Analysis Shows Who Got the Votes - and Where,” San Jose´ Sun, July 17, 1974, clipping
file, “Janet Gray Hayes” folder, California Room, San Jose´ Public Library. Scholars suggest that one
reason Hayes enjoyed wide support among minorities is because they did not want to see a former
cop become mayor. Trounstine, and Christensen, Movers and Shakers, 104; Janet A. Flammang,
“Female Officials in the Feminist Capital: The Case of Santa Clara County,” The Western Political
Quarterly 38, no. 1 (March 1985): 100.
34“But She Picks Political Ring,” San Jose´ Mercury News, June 13, 1971, Folder 10, Box 1, Janet
Hayes Papers, SJSU; “San Jose´’s First Lady, The Mayor,” San Jose´ Mercury, ca. 1974, Folder 12,
Box 1, Janet Hayes Papers, SJSU; “City Council Race,” San Jose´ Mercury, March 3, 1974, Folder 12,
Box 1, Hayes Papers, SJSU; Flammang; Matthews, Silicon Valley, Women, and the California Dream,
191–195.
35“Let’s Make San Jose´ Better - before We Make It Bigger!” Janet Gray Hayes Campaign Litera-
ture [Fold-out pamphlet 1974] - Janet Gray Hayes papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University
Library Special Collections and Archives.
36Along with Hayes’ election to the mayor’s office, San Jose´ voters elected Larry Pegram to the
city council and Rodney Diridon to the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors. Both candidates
supported slowing growth, expanding the county’s open space holdings, and improving mass
transit and city infrastructure.
37Flammang, 97; “Survey of Voter Attitudes,” Hayes Papers.
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son she and other women got involved in local politics was through their concern
as homemakers. “Being a concerned housewife enabled them to get into neighbor-
hood groups in the first place,” she suggested. Since concerns about parks and
homes were often seen as “women’s work,” suburban politics allowed women
opportunities to become deeply involved in volunteer efforts, civic organizations,
and hone their talents for political activism. But their politics also reflected their
class bias. Many were highly educated and affluent, intensely interested in their
neighborhoods and communities. Many had come to San Jose during the first
wave of migration as their husbands took jobs in electronics, aerospace, and engi-
neering. Also enabling women to join political ranks was a redistricting decision
that made electioneering easier to enter and fund.
Controlling urban growth became a feature of Valley politics stemming
from desire among homeowners to preserve their aesthetic views, one of the very
amenities that drew newcomers to suburbs throughout the Bay Area. In 1970,
City Manager Fletcher hired Rand researchers to study the ways San Jose´ could
curtail growth. The researchers concluded little could be done by the city. While
city leaders accommodated to the demands of developers, the drivers of urban
growth were external—federal investments into suburban homeownership, the
decentralization of industry, and highway construction created a situation where
Santa Clara County followed similar urban trends throughout the country.38 But
land use regulations were popular among homeowners because it promised pro-
tections of aesthetic vistas. The Rand researchers noted a “growing concern for
the natural environment and continued concern for one’s family environment.”
Many homeowners found “their fortunes are tied, not to continued growth . . .
, but to keeping out those who would move in to change the area further and
38Alesch, Local Government’s Ability to Manage Growth in a Metropolitan Context, 10, 15, 18, 49;
Alesch, Growth in San Jose´, viii; Aaron Cavin, “The Borders of Citizenship: The Politics of Race and
Metropolitan Space in Silicon Valley” (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 2012), 500.
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who, by virtue of moving in, would destroy the reasons for which those who
are already in the County moved there.”39 Whether avowed environmentalists or
not, homeowners saw the protection of their environments as a key component
of their suburban lifestyles.40
Hayes’ election to the mayor’s office in 1974 represented a significant chal-
lenge to the development interests in San Jose´. The new mayor promoted a policy
of “smart growth” that attempted to balance industrialization with residential de-
velopment. Under her tenure, Hayes streamlined the city’s permit process and
offered new incentives to businesses looking to develop in the city limits. To a
speech before the Chamber of Commerce in 1978, Hayes boasted of city hall’s
“sympathetic ear” for businesses, helping to attract high tech firms of IBM and
Hewlett-Packard. In 1977 alone, the city issued $70 million in industrial permits,
jumping the average from $7 million to $42 million in the first months of 1975.41
Furthermore, to the approval of her homeowner constituents, Hayes insisted on
new measures to slow suburban sprawl and preserve open space. Hayes insisted
that homeowners would pay less and receive more, lowering the city’s tax rate
from 1.78% to 1.36%.42 While residential taxes dropped, Hayes continued using
the construction and conveyance tax to make up for lost revenue and continue ex-
panding city services and infrastructure. Adding to the city’s coffers were federal
and state money, which helped subsidize redevelopment, upgrade to the sewage
system, and provide training and employment programs.43
39Alesch, “Managing Growth,” 29.
40Alesch, “Managing Growth,” 45; Bernard J. Frieden, “The New Regulation Comes to Subur-
bia,” Public Interest 55 (Spring 1979): 15–27; Bernard J. Frieden, The Environmental Protection Hustle
(Boston: MIT Press, 1979); Cavin, “Borders of Citizenship,” 501–502.
41“State of the City,” Janet Gray Hayes, January 18, 1978.
42“Pocket Summary of Finances, San Jose´, California, for the Fiscal Year 1974-75,” Series I:
Administrative Files, 1974-1982, Box 1, Folder 5, “Financial Statements, 1974-1981,” Janet Gray
Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
Hayes was also likely aware of the growing property tax revolt, and worked hard to keep taxes
low while improving the city’s frugality.
43“Pocket Summary of Finances, San Jose´, California, as of June 30, 1979,” Series I: Administra-
tive Files, 1974-1982, Box 1, Folder 5, “Financial Statements, 1974-1981,” Janet Gray Hayes Papers,
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As the 1978 mayoral campaign approached, Hayes had taken several steps
to improve growth issues in the city. But like 1974, the mayoral campaign re-
mained centered almost exclusively around limiting urban growth—what the San
Francisco Chronicle simply called “The Issue.”44 Hayes, who had risen to promi-
nence on the basis of her commitment to controlling sprawl in San Jose´, was
challenged primarily by city council member Al Garza. A native of East San Jose´
and the oldest of ten siblings, he graduated from San Jose´ State University and
worked as a high school teacher and counselor prior to his appointment on city
council. Garza had connections to the city’s developers, working at a real-estate
title firm to supplement his income. Garza unsuccessfully ran for the council seat
Hayes captured in 1970, but was appointed to the council to fill a seat vacated
by the death of Vice Mayor Kurt Gross in 1971. He successfully ran for reelection
in 1973 and 1976, and took a run at the office of mayor in 1974 but was over-
shadowed between the Hayes-Collins race. Garza took aim at Hayes’ campaign
promises of “better before bigger,” in particular accusing the city’s lack of atten-
tion in providing East Side with the “services and amenities” of the rest of the
city. To Garza, Hayes’ campaign promise four years earlier failed to materialize in
quality-of-life services. He also positioned himself as the candidate speaking for
working-class and minority residents.45
MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archive; “Pocket Summary
of Finances, San Jose´, California, as of June 30, 1980, Series I: Administrative Files, 1974-1982,” Box
1, Folder 5, “Financial Statements, 1974- 1981,” Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´
State University Library Special Collections and Archives; “Pocket Summary of Finances, San Jose´,
California, as of June 30, 1981, Series I: Administrative Files, 1974-1982, Box 1, Folder 5,”Financial
Statements, 1974-1981,” Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library
Special Collections and Archives.
44“A Tough Race for Mayor of Sprawling San Jose´,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 14, 1978,
Folder 13, Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special
Collections and Archives.
45“Garza berates mayor in bid to unseat her,” San Jose´ Mercury, March 6, 1978, Folder 13,
Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collec-
tions and Archives; “Garza on attack in mayor debate,” San Jose´ Mercury, April 27, 1978, Box 13,
Folder 1, Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Special Collections and
Archives; “The Politics of Growth in San Jose´,” California Journal, October 1978, Folder 13, Box 1,
Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Special Collections and Archives.
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Debates around the two candidates positions focused on specific spaces in
the city. Hayes insisted early in the campaign that she was a limited growth—not
anti-growth—candidate, while Garza represented pro-growth interests in the city.
Hayes pointed to her support to various plans included attracting new industry,
using a policy of fill-in to build in areas already adequately served by city services,
an expansion of city parks, and capital improvements. Garza pointed to other
areas of the city, such as Hayes’ approval of a commercial development in the
Evergreen district in southeast San Jose´ where existing roads could not handle the
influx of traffic.[ˆ98] Yet even the pro-growth sympathies of the San Jose´ Mercury
evaporated by the mid-1970s. The Mercury editorialized in support of reelecting
Hayes, arguing that her policy of in-filling, improving the city tax base, promoting
urban redevelopment, and cutting government spending had served to control
growth and take advantage of existing city services.46
A strong anti-incumbent sensibility among San Jose´ voters contributed to a
runoff election between Hayes and Garza after neither managed to gain a majority
vote in the June primaries. What would explain why Hayes failed to capture
re-election despite her popularity? The San Jose´ Mercury identified a “damn-the-
incumbent movement” among voters, a claim it bolstered by pointing to the three
other races among candidates who also failed to garner enough primary votes.47
[ˆ98]: “Garza on attack in mayor debate,” San Jose´ Mercury, April 27, 1978, Box 13, Folder 1, Janet
Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Special Collections and Archives; “Dif-
ference is ‘clear,’ says mayor of rival,” San Jose´ Mercury, May 12, 1978, Folder 13, Box 1, Janet
Gray Hayes Papers, San Jose´ State University Special Collections and Archives; “Five in crowded
mayor’s race; Hayes, Garza emerge as favorites,” San Jose´ Mercury, May 24, 1978, Folder 13, Box 1,
Janet Gray Hayes Papers, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
46“Re-elect Mayor Hayes,” San Jose´ Mercury, May 22, 1978, Folder 13, Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes
Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
47“Santa Clara County and ‘the Revolt’,” San Jose´ Mercury, no date, Series II: Campaign &
Election Materials, 1971-1982, Box 1, Clippings, 1971-1978 Mayoral Reelection Campaign, 1978,
Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and
Archives; “San Jose´’s ‘Unpersuaded’ Electorate,” San Jose´ Mercury, no date, Series II: Campaign
& Election Materials, 1971-1982, Box 1, Clippings, 1971-1978 Mayoral Reelection Campaign, 1978,
Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and
Archives). Hayes received 67,149 votes while Garza carried 54,152. Other candidate also faced
runoffs in the 1978 elections, including Joe Colla, Larry Pegram, and Susanne Wilson.
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The political interest in land use bled into other city and county campaigns,
primarily the Santa Clara County supervisor seat vacated by the retirement of
Sig Sanchez. A runoff between Susanne Wilson, a city council member, and Ivan
Zubow, a South County land developer who funded his campaign out of his own
pockets, exposed political faultlines around growth. Wilson, often described as a
“a Hayes prote´ge´,” emphasized her voting record of slow growth. Zubov charged
that her record failed to reflect her claim arguing that his role as a land developer
made him more than qualified to understand the issues around land use and
growth.48
Builders and developers were central figures in the campaign. The Hayes-
Garza race achieved prominence as the most expensive campaign waged in San
Jose´’s history, supported largely by developer interests pouring money into both
candidates. The Builders and Contractors Committee, comprised of thirty mem-
bers of builders, contractors, bankers, and associated industries, pledged $14,000
to Garza’s campaign and planned donations of $10,000 to Councilman Joe Colla,
who faced a challenge from limited growth advocate Jerry Estruth. Bill Williams,
a member of the Committee and builder for Sea Homes, remarked that he could
“only surmise that the majority of our members felt that those two people [Garza
and Colla] are better for our industry.”49 By the end of the mayoral campaign,
sixty percent of Garza’s political donations came from developers.50 Hayes, Garza,
Estruth, Colla, Zubow, and Wilson all received major contributions from local de-
velopers.51
48“Supervisor runoff to focus on land use,” San Jose´ Mercury June 8, 1978, Folder 13, Box 1,
Janety Gray Hayes Papers, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
49“Builders giving Garza, Colla $24,000,” San Jose´ Mercury, October 13, 1978, Folder 13, Box 1,
Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and
Archives.
50“San Jose´’s future growth main issue in campaign,” San Jose´ Mercury, November 3, 1978.
51“Finding money the key play in the campaign game,” San Jose´ Mercury, October 8, 1978,
Folder 13, Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special
Collections and Archives.
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Bolstering the Hayes campaign were high technology firms. Hayes picked
up an important ally in 1977 when David Packard formed the Santa Clara County
Manufacturers Group (SCCMG), established to represent the business interests of
SCCMG members and aid in planned growth and quality-of-life issues. High tech
industries understood that their middle-class professional employees expected
a certain degree of cultural and natural amenities. By securing those amenities,
firms could attract and retain the best talent. Furthermore, Hayes’ pro-business
approach underscored the friendliness suburban liberalism offered electronics
firms. The new industry was not only transforming the local economy, but had
grown to expand their influence in local politics as well.52
Adding to tensions in the runoff campaign was the specter of Proposition
13. Hayes and her suburban liberal allies opposed the referendum, but the ma-
jority of Santa Clara County voters disagreed and passed the anti-tax measure
in 1978. Nevertheless, Hayes maintained throughout her campaign that San Jose´
could offer the quality-of-life amenities and services middle-class homeowners
desired while also cutting taxes and budgets. While government austerity ap-
pealed to conservative voters, Hayes kept a faith in the role of local, state, and
federal assistance in achieving the goals homeowners hoped to see in the city.
Moreover, Hayes remained committed to her suburban liberal agenda of environ-
mental protection, civil rights, and social programs.
The mayoral campaign became mired in controversy as it entered the final
three months. In a maneuver that rhymed with the Progress Committee’s firing
of the city manager in the 1940s, the pro-growth contingency on the city council
sought to strike at the Hayes campaign by orchestrating an ouster of City Man-
52“Finding Money the Key Play in the Campaign Game,” {TODO}, October 8; Saxenian, “In
Search of Power: The Organization of Business Interests in Silicon Valley and Route 128,” Economy
and Society 18, no. 1 (1989): 33–39, 45–47, 57–61; Annalee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and
Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Harvard University Press, 1996), 47–48.
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Figure 5.1: The perceived cozy relationship between pro-growth members of the San Jose´
city council and developers caught the ire of voters.
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ager Ted Tedesco.53 Tedesco, originally the city manager in Boulder, Colorado,
assumed office in 1972 under Mayor Mineta and had guided San Jose´’s “in-fill”
policy. Tedesco promoted controlled growth, and by extension was an important
ally in the Hayes administration. But in a four-to-three vote, the city council voted
to remove Tedesco from his position. The council members opposing Tedesco—
Garza, David Runyon, a real estate developer, Colla, and Pegram, the council’s
only Republican—overruled the votes of Hayes, Wilson, and Jim Self. Local media
quickly dubbed the pro-growth members the “Fearsome Foursome.” The oppo-
nents of Tedesco were open about their reasoning. Garza explained that Tedesco’s
ouster reflected his unwillingness to serve the will of the council majority, sug-
gesting that the city manager’s slow-growth sensibilities had gotten in the way
of the city’s operation.54 Joe Colla reasoned frankly: “He was anti-growth, and
this is now a pro-growth city.”55 In the midst of the Tedesco ouster, the Fearsome
Foursome pushed through additional pro-growth policies including the abolish-
ment of a city policy tying new growth to adequate streets, adopting a $28 million
road program to build new roads rather than improve existing infrastructure, and
approved a new tax on urban development days before Proposition 13 made it il-
legal.56
In November, the pro-growth agenda of the Fearsome Foursome failed to
resonate with voters. Hayes swept past Garza, who claimed over 70% of the vote,
while Colla was unseated from the council by Estruth, who received 60% of the
53On the Progress Committee, see chapter 3.
54“Challenger Al Garza,” San Jose´ Mercury, October 31, 1978, Folder 13, Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes
Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
55“The Politics of Growth in San Jose´,” California Journal, October 1978, Folder 13, Box 1,
Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and
Archives.
56“It’s a single issue race,” San Jose´ Sun, October 24, 1978, Folder 13, Box 1, Hayes Papers; “A
Tough Race for Mayor of Sprawling San Jose´,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 14, 1978, Folder 13,
Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections
and Archives; letter from Susan Hammer, et al., to Friends, n.d., Folder 13a, Box 1, Janet Gray
Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
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vote. Shortly after the campaigns, David Runyon was forced to resign after a pub-
lic drinking scandal and was replaced by Tom McEnery, another limited-growth
advocate.57 The public rejection of Garza and the pro-growth interests in the city
council solidified the political shift happening throughout California and the West
as concerns about growth and the environment shaped the city’s politics. Jubilant
victors and outside observers saw Hayes’ victory as a sign that the city’s inces-
sant drive for expansion had come to an end. Hayes herself saw her victory as
“a clear mandate” that San Jose´ans were through with the growth-as-progress
philosophy.58
Just as voters helped enable urban growth through their sanction of mu-
nicipal bonds in the 1950s and 1960s coupled with their desire for countryside
living, so to did people begin to have second thoughts about such growth. Inad-
equate city services, high taxes, gridlocked roads, environmental damage, and a
sense that quality of life was declining contributed to a state of alarm and calls
for reform. Voters were motivated to action through various sentiments. Some-
times these reflected genuine ecological concerns, arrived at through their expo-
sure to expert literature. Other times, responses to growth came in the form of
quality-of-life concerns and a loss of aesthetics, a concern that the foothills of the
Santa Cruz and Diablo ranges would be filled with homes or obscured by daily
smog. They frequently tied economic issues to environmental issues. Citing the
Marshall Plan, urban redevelopment, and the moon landings, Dorothy Erskine
pleaded with Michael McCloskey to find out how “can we make environmental
57“Sweet Triumph for San Jose´’s Mayor,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 9, 1978, Folder 13,
Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections
and Archives. Runyon’s campaign had cast him as a “born-again Christian,” but in June was
charged with battery, resisting arrest, and public drunkenness. See “The Politics of Growth in San
Jose.”
58“Sweet Triumph for San Jose´’s Mayor,” San Francisco Chronicle, November 9, 1978, Folder 13,
Box 1, Janet Gray Hayes Papers, MSS-2002-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections
and Archives.
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protection fit this pattern and perhaps save us from war and a worse fate?”59
The political contests over sprawl and growth highlighted how ecological, eco-
nomic, and social issues intertwined in postwar Santa Clara County. The cities
had managed to co-opt regional government, but in the process sparked a grass-
roots protest. They enjoyed the amenities of their surroundings, and when those
were threatened they pushed for reform.60
Yet while Hayes and the suburban liberals appeared to have achieved vic-
tory over the growth-is-progress ideology that had dominated San Jose´ politics
since the 1940s—and most local politics for several municipalities in Santa Clara
County—the case for reform did not always mean more effective government.
Controlled growth advocates succeeded in slowing the city’s expansion, including
the San Jose´ city council’s approval of a 1976 General Plan that was seen as a bridle
on growth, development moratoriums throughout the Peninsula, and successful
efforts and shutting down proposed residential developments.61 Yet local gov-
ernments remained at odds with one another. Despite maneuvers by San Jose´ to
preserve foothills from residential development, for example, proposals by Santa
Clara County planners sought to open up hillsides in the Santa Cruz and Diablo
mountains for residential development. Environmentalists decried the threats of
earthquakes, landslides, and sewer systems that could threaten mountain reser-
voirs, yet to county planners the decision to open up lands for construction only
59Letter from Erskine to to McCloskey, 2, April 12, 1969, California Tomorrow Papers, California
Historical Society.
60“Anti-Sprawl Initiative: The Citizen’s Initiative for Organized Growth and Fiscal Responsibil-
ity, An Initiative Ordinance,” petition, 1978, Folder 115, Box 4, League of Women Voters, San Jose´
State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
61“Rancho San Jose´ Loses in City Vote,” San Jose´ Mercury, January 18, 1978, Folder 115, Box 4,
League of Women Voters, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections
and Archives; letter from Lennie Roberts to LAFCO Commissioners, May 1, 1979, Folder 115,
Box 4, League of Women Voters, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collec-
tions and Archives; “Development Moratorium of West S.J. Considered,” San Jose´ Mercury, August
18, 1978, Folder 115, Box 4, League of Women Voters, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´ State University
Library Special Collections and Archives; League of Women Voters of San Jose´/Santa Clara, Inc., v.
San Jose City Council, Superior Court of California, December 21, 1981, League of Women Voters
Papers, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
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helped to reduce pressure for more development.62 The county’s plans were all
the more troubling to environmentalists following an amended 1980 county Gen-
eral Plan that loosened the slope-density formula that restricted the number of
subdivisions that could appear in a 100-acre lot with an average slope of twenty
degrees. To the editors of the San Jose´ Mercury, county planners lacked “political
will.”63
Developers no longer ruled the Valley’s future. In November 1982, devel-
oper Lee Brandenburg won the approval of the San Jose´ city council to begin
construction on a hillside development, the first such development in the city
since 1976. Brandenburg had built housing developments throughout the South
Bay in Saratoga, Los Gatos, Almaden, Willow Glen, and West San Jose´.64 Bran-
denburg saw himself adding to San Jose´’s cultural and economic capital. Casting
himself as an environmentalist and lifelong member of the Nature Conservancy,
Brandenburg assured the council and critics at a public hearing that he submitted
careful studies of Urban Service Area expansion, archaeological reports, geologi-
cal and seismic investigations, engineering analysis, and traffic analysis to ensure
the development would not become a burden upon the city or its residents. Fur-
thermore, Brandenburg argued, just as he had when one of his proposals came
before the city council in 1978, that such high-end developments would attract
wealthy and powerful residents, many of whom “do business in San Jose´ [but]
don’t live there.”65 Located north of Silver Creek in the southeast end of the city,
62“Increased Density in Hills Urged,” San Jose´ Mercury, n.d., Folder 96, Box 4, League of Women
Voters, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
63“Keep Hillsides Deal,” San Jose´ Mercury News, October 24, 1984, Folder 96, Box 4, League
of Women Voters, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and
Archives.
64“Partial Transcript of Public Hearing on 1981 General Plan Amendments,” November 19, 1981,
1 of 4, 15, Folder 50, Box 3, League of Women Voters, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´ State University
Library Special Collections and Archives.
65“Partial Transcript of Public Hearing on 1981 General Plan Amendments,” November 19, 1981,
3 of 4, 10, Folder 50, Box 3, League of Women Voters, San Jose´ State University Library Special
Collections and Archives.
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the Silver Creek Hills development sought to be a resort complete with an Arnold
Palmer-designed golf course, resort hotel, shops, and 2,610 luxury homes and
condominiums. The League of Women Voters and an ad hoc coalition calling
themselves San Jose´ans for Limited Growth filed suit against the city council, ar-
guing that the city failed to follow state environmental laws and, therefore, their
approval to amend the General Plan for the Brandenburg development was illegal.
Nor, they argued, could the sustainability of the planned community be assured.
Not only would Silver Creek Hills reside on extremely steep hillsides, argued H.G.
Wilshire, a member of the Committee for Green Foothills, but construction would
disturb “underlain . . . rocks that are notoriously difficult to stabilize.” The threats
of landslides and unsuitability of city services to reach the community, Wilshire
concluded, reflected “risk-taking with innocent lives” by the city council.66 In the
end, a county judge overruled the council’s approval. The environmentalists had
won.
shortly after her election as mayor, Janet Gray Hayes spoke before an audi-
ence at the Conference on Bay Area Urban Growth held in San Francisco. Growth
management, Hayes posited, was defined by the three “Ps”—“piecemeal, patch-
work, and prop-up.” Her message that day was the role of politics and cities.
66“Safety first,” n.d., no source, news clipping, Folder 49, Box 3, League of Women Voters, MSS-
2006-09-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives. See also League of
Women Voters of San Jose´/Santa Clara, Inc., and San Jose´ans for Limited Growth v. San Jose´ City Coun-
cil, December 21, 1981, Folder 49, Box 3, League of Women Voters, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´ State
University Library Special Collections and Archives; “Needed: An Environmental Impact Report,”
n.d., no source, news clipping, Folder 49, Box 3, League of Women Voters, MSS-2006-09-01, San
Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives; “Luxury homes, public hearings,”
San Jose´ Mercury News, September 9, 1982, Folder 49, Box 3, League of Women Voters, MSS-2006-09-
01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives; “Hillside Developer Asks
Dismissal of Suit,” San Jose´ Mercury News, April 20, 1982, Folder 49, Box 3, League of Women Vot-
ers, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections and Archives; “Partial
Transcript of Public Hearing on 1981 General Plan Amendments,” November 19, 1981, 3 of 4, 10,
Folder 50, Box 3, League of Women Voters, San Jose´ State University Library Special Collections
and Archives.
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“Political process can be used in a positive way,” she told the audience. “Cities
can’t solve urban problems on their own. Government’s can solve urban prob-
lems on their own. Governmental policies and programs should set the stage for
private initiative and innovation. Both the public and the private sectors have an
obligation for tomorrow. We need less conflict and confrontation, and more coop-
eration and coordination.”67 By the end of the 1980s, cities throughout the Penin-
sula had placed development limits into their urban plans. Local governments
responded to the demands of grassroots activists who expected more from their
political leaders. Local opposition to boosters owed much to the new environ-
mental regulations and environmentalists. Plans to expand cities further into the
foothills drew attention of environmental organizations whose efforts shaped the
proposals. Yet even as environmentalists had halted new development, it could
not reverse the original land grab. Once the political ability to confront powerful
growth interests became viable, the geography of the postindustrial space had
already been set. Capital was fixed in space, shaping suburban and industrial
spaces that introduced uneven impacts on housing and environmental risk. The
consequences of that history would become apparent in the 1980s, as the fol-
lowing chapter explores, when the landscape of industry and the landscape of
suburbs collided over the pollution of space.
67“Presentation by Mayor Janet Gray Hayes, City of San Jose´, California, to the Conference on
Bay Area Urban Growth: Yes or No? Up or Out? A Conference on Revitalizing Bay Area Cities,”
November 1, 1975, 9 and 15, San Francisco Hotel, San Francisco, California, Folder 16, Carton 19,
California Tomorrow Records, California Historical Society.
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Chapter 6
The Tap Water Rebellion
The horizon above San Jose is unmarred by smokestacks, and people here are proud
of that. They have worked hard at making the valley a base of the computer-electronics
industry and an unpolluted place to live. —New York Times, May 20, 1982
When I first became Mayor and we embarked on an economic development program,
there was no doubt in my mind that this was a clean industry. We now know that we
are definitely in the midst of a chemical revolution. —Mayor Janet Gray Hayes
All of this industrial activity is hard to notice, however. Driving from Stanford Uni-
versity in Palo Alto to the green hills east of San Jose, one sees no smokestacks at all,
and hardly anything that even looks like a factory. . . . It has become obvious that the
absence of smokestacks does not mean an absence of environmental problems.
—Judith Ayres, EPA Region 9 Administrator
Construction workers sunk their backhoe into the earth in an early Novem-
ber morning in 1981, making way in the soil for a second underground indus-
trial solvents storage tank for Fairchild Semiconductor’s South San Jose facility.
Digging near an existing storage tank, the workers noticed something about the
soil that did not seem right: the soil was exceptionally wet and had taken on a
rust-colored hue and strange odor. Digging deeper they discovered a leak in the
bottom of the existing storage tank. The leak went undiscovered when the above-
ground gauge that measured the volume of liquid in the tank failed, and the
system normally monitoring incoming chemicals had not been routinely checked.
Concerned about the size of the leak, the construction crew reported their finding
to Fairchild and the Great Oaks Water Company, which operated drinking water
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wells nearby servicing several thousand residents. The water company closed the
wells immediately. Tests confirmed that an industrial solvent containing the car-
cinogen 1,1,1 trichloroethane (TCA) had leaked from the tank and concentrated
in the wells at nearly twenty times the permissible limit established by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency. Nearly 60,000 gallons of toxic chemicals had leaked
from the tank for at least two years.1
juliana ross was only nine months old in 1982 when she had her first open-
heart surgery. When her mother, Lorraine, opened the pages of the San Jose Mer-
cury News on January 20, she saw the news: Fairchild Semiconductor, just a quar-
ter mile from her home, had experienced an environmental catastrophe. Sud-
denly, the neighborhood stories and problems made sense. Her neighbors in the
Los Paseos neighborhood had complained about the water tasting and smelling
funny, but of greater concern were the four children with birth defects, the two
miscarriages, and the one stillbirth that had taken place on her block in the past
three years. And her youngest child, nine months old at the time, faced multiple
congenital heart defects. Lorraine Ross could not help but wonder if the leak and
the health problems were connected.2
News of Fairchild’s chemical leak captured the Bay Area’s attention in
early 1982, and parents whose children had experienced health problems won-
dered about a possible link. Who, Lorraine and her neighbors asked, permit-
1Newspaper clipping, “Water contaminated by leak,” San Jose Mercury, January 20, 1982, Folder
2, Box 11, Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition Records, San Jose State University Special Collections;
“Get Tough Now to Avoid Spills,” Gilroy Dispatch, July 1, 1983; Peter Murphy, “Great Oaks Water
Company Distribution Study,” draft report, Folder 1, Box 11, SVTC, SJSU; “High-Tech: a Stain on
a ‘Clean’ Field,” Los Angeles Times December 22, 1983.
2Newspaper clipping, “Water contaminated by leak,” San Jose Mercury, January 20, 1982, Folder
2, Box 11, Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition Records, San Jose State University Special Collections;
newspaper clipping, “Silicon Valley’s Fear Over Tainted Water,” San Francisco Chronicle, May
16, 1983, Carton 20, Folder 12 Hazardous Waste, California Tomorrow Records, MS 3641, Califor-
nia Historical Society; “Birth defects and chemicals,” San Jose Mercury, February 3, 1982, SVTC
Records, SJSU.
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ted Fairchild to store toxic chemicals just feet away from public wells? Who de-
cided what trace elements found in the water was safe for human consumption?
Why had Fairchild and Great Oaks taken so long to inform the public about
the TCA contamination? The chemicals, Lorraine and her neighbors discovered,
went unregulated. No official requirements were in place for Fairchild to fre-
quently check its storage tanks. The public was unaware of the sorts of chemicals
used by Fairchild and other high tech manufacturers, and news of the problem
only broke when construction workers discovered there was a problem. Investiga-
tions revealed that the problem was even more widespread. At least an additional
36 leaks had occurred throughout the Bay Area, including a tetrachloroethylene
(TCE) leak near an Intel plant that had not used the chemical since 1977.
The Bay Area’s contaminated soil and water led to a significant shift in en-
vironmental thought. Although many of the other leaks did not threaten drinking
water supplies, the widespread presence of toxic leaks concerned many residents
in the Valley. For the first time, residents confronted the reality of Silicon Val-
ley’s dependence on chemicals—that the premise of “clean” industry was not so
clean after all. Stories flooded local headlines: hundreds of chemical leaks and
spills, a chemical explosion at Lockheed that forced the evacuation of 400 people
from Palo Alto, the stories of workers exposed to chemicals that caused hair loss,
respiratory problems, skin infections, and worse. Valley residents came to see the
landscape as tainted. “I’m not anti-semiconductor industry,” Lorraine Ross noted,
“but I don’t want my health adversely affected by their profit-making. Companies
should be willing to invest a portion of their profit to ensure they aren’t dam-
aging the environment.”3 By 1992 studies found at least fifty-seven private and
forty-seven public drinking wells were contaminated, and sixty-six plots of land
were too toxic for people to walk upon. County authorities determined that sixty-
3Susan Benner, “Storm Clouds Over Silicon Valley,” Inc (September 1982), 84.
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Figure 6.1: Fairchild Semiconductor located across from the Los Paseos neighborhood to
the south in South San Jose. San Jose Mercury News, February 3, 1982.
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five of the seventy-nine companies they investigated—including IBM, Hewlett-
Packard, Raytheon, NEC, AMD, Signetics, and many others—had contaminated
the soil beneath their plants. The federal government eventually declared twenty-
nine Superfund sites—more than any other county in the nation—twenty-four of
which resulted from electronics firms.4 Furthermore, the “alphabet soup of toxic
wastes”—TCE, PCB, EBD—had entered the public vocabulary.5
The presence of synthetic and industrial contaminates was a revelation
to Valley suburbanites. In earlier decades, cities had dealt with the problem of
human waste as public health officials learned how to manage the problem. Ex-
perts placed their faith in public health strategies that asserted definition and
control over health threats. Even in San Jose, the city had learned to deal with
its unique problem of sewage and cannery effluence though an efficient sewer
system that could handle massive volumes of detritus. But now cities of the Bay
Area were on the front lines of widespread contamination by high tech toxics,
a situation the region was unaware and unprepared to confront. Concerns over
health transformed thinking about the regional landscape and introduced a new
spatial thinking about human health.
The proximity of pollutants near suburban areas along the Peninsula re-
sulted as a consequence of the Bay Area’s lack of residential and industrial urban
planning. Because Bay Area cities thought little about the layout of their environs,
industrial facilities and warehouses frequently turned up alongside residential
developments rather than isolated from the places where people lived. The natu-
ral boundaries of the Peninsula—the Santa Cruz Mountains to the west and the
San Francisco Bay to the east—also kept suburban areas and industry in close
proximity to one another. They simply lacked the space to expand. The emerging
4David N. Pellow and Lisa Sun-Hee Park, The Silicon Valley of Dreams: Environmental Injustice,
Immigrant Workers, and the High-Tech Global Economy (New York: New York University Press, 2002),
75–76.
5“An underground problem surfaces,” Chicago Tribune, February 29, 1984.
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crisis broadened the coalescing environmental movement, even among those who
never considered themselves environmentalists. The daily lived experiences of the
Bay Area’s suburbanites expected clean tap water and believed that the industries
near their communities were clean and green. The toxic landscape shattered that
perception.
concerns about drinking water were not new in 1982. Water quality, sewage
disposal and treatment, and waste generation have been staple issues of urban
growth. Urban areas depend on access to fresh water for sanitation, industrial
and municipal development, and public health, interlocking both water supply
and water quality. During the nineteenth century, cities often treated nearby water
supplies as public sewers. Property owners and industries faced few challenges
to how they determined their use of water resources until public health advocates
during the Progressive Era challenged the environmental conditions that were
leading to public health problems.6
By December 1970, the month that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) began operating under the administration of William Ruckelshaus, Ameri-
cans were acutely aware of the presence of toxins in their environment. Environ-
mental issues had become a key political issue, made all the more visible with
the first Earth Day held in May 1970. Congress passed several pieces of pollu-
tion legislation aiming to curb the discharge of potentially harmful chemicals.
The Air Quality Act of 1967, the Clean Air Act of 1970, Resource Recovery Act of
1970, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments (FIFRA)
in 1972, and 1972 Clean Water Act sought to mandate new environmental regula-
6Robert Gottleib, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2005), 89–92, 95–97; United States Public Health Service Thomas
Parran and Watson B. Miller, “Public Health Service Drinking Water Standards,” Journal (American
Water Works Association) 35, no. 1 (January 1943): 93–104.
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tions.7
Congress began debate over new drinking water legislation in the early
1970s. The debate took on additional pressure when in 1972 the Environmental
Protection Agency released a study of drinking water supplies in New Orleans.
The study found thirty-six organic chemicals present, some of which were known
carcinogens. An additional study of New Orleans’ contamination by the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund published two years later showed a high incidence of
cancer among people whose primary source of drinking water came from the con-
taminated surface waters. New Orleans’ contaminated waters helped prompt the
passage of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SWDA) in 1974 that established federal
quality standards.8 SWDA established “maximum contaminant levels” (MCLs)
that, in the words of historian Linda Nash, “assumed . . . a level of exposure
below which no adverse health effects would occur in any place, at any time.”9
MCLs also assumed that all relevant and possibly harmful contaminants were
known to science, although few laboratory tests existed for detecting presence of
organic chemicals.10
Throughout the United States, chemical contamination sites were uncov-
ered. In California’s Central Valley, water quality officials discovered the contam-
ination of groundwater by 1,2-dibromo-3-choloropropane (DBCP), a compound
used by farmers as a pesticide. In New York, officials in Long Island had been
dealing with contaminted water since the 1940s that included the presence of the
7Gottleib,, Forcing the Spring, 179–180.
8Linda Nash, Inescapable Ecologies: A History of Environment, Disease, and Knowledge (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2006), 173; Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Envi-
ronmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),
198. Water quality standards trace themselves to the early twentieth century when the U.S. Public
Health Service adopted quality standards for drinking water regarding the presence of E. coli used
to combat the spread of typhoid.
9Nash,, Inescapable Ecologies, 173.
10Nash,, Inescapable Ecologies, 174; William E. Cox, “Evolution of the Safe Drinking Water Act: A
Search for Effective Quality Assurance Strategies and Workable Concepts of Federalism,” William
& Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 21 (Winter 1997): 69–165.
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insecticide aldicarb, cadmium, phenol, hexavalent chromium, and synthetic deter-
gents. Further exacerbating the problem was the sheer volume of new chemical
compounds coming on to the market. In the 1970s, roughly 500 new chemical
compounds appeared on the market each year. These chemicals had few stan-
dards and assessments in place aside from certain previsions within the SWDA
weakly enforced by the EPA. Compounds and chemicals once thought to pose lit-
tle environmental risk had, with their appearance in groundwater, revealed how
widespread the contamination of the country’s drinking water supplies had be-
come.11
The Bay Area’s water landscape transformed after World War II. The two
major rivers, the Guadalupe River and the Coyote Creek, and its tributaries as
well as the San Francisco Bay itself were only the most visible signs of the Bay
Area’s water landscape. Both had been reshaped as urban areas expanded rapidly
in the postwar era, either through the river’s physical re-routing in canals, dams,
and reservoirs, or from higher water levels pouring over their banks due to ur-
ban runoff causing excessive amounts of water. Drinking water was not on the
minds of most residents. Not until the 1980s would the focus turn to the hidden
water trapped between layers of clay and gravel beneath the surface of the cities.
Moreover, groundwater supplies were rarely monitored by either the county or
the state of California. And since high tech industries maintained a perception as
“clean” industry, few thought or were aware that their activities were introducing
chemical contamination.12
11Nash,, Inescapable Ecologies, 175–176; Christopher C. Sellers, Crabgrass Crucible: Suburban Na-
ture and the Rise of Environmentalism in Twentieth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2012), 113–123; Jared N. Day, “Safe Drinking Water–Safe Sites: Interaction Between
the Safe Drinking Water Act and Superfund, 1968–1995,” in Improving Regulation: Cases in Environ-
ment, Health, and Safety, ed. by Paul S. Fischbeck and R. Scott Farrow, (Washington, D.C.: Resources
for the Future, 2001), 17–42, 21–23.
12Craig E. Colten, “A Historical Perspective on Industrial Wastes and Groundwater Contamina-
tion,” Geographical Review 81 (April 1991): 218–223.
224
Figure 6.2: Lorraine Ross and her daughter Juliana. “Silicon Valley’s Fear Over Tainted
Water,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 16, 1983.
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the los paseos neighborhood sparked what one newspaper called the “birth of
an eco-tragedy.”13 Along with the Fairchild leak, the nearby International Busi-
ness Machines facility announced the discovery of a TCA leak shortly after the
Fairchild leak was revealed. Studies would later find that the IBM leak was among
the worst in the South Bay, contaminating twenty-five public and private wells.14
To Lorraine Ross and her neighbors, the presence of chemicals in the suburban
neighborhood was as much a spatial experience as a personal one. “It takes a lot
of nerve for them to invade a pre-existing residential neighborhood, pour danger-
ous chemicals into a leaking tank, poison the surrounding environment and hide
the fact from the people affected by their negligence.”15 Ross helped galvanize
the community into political action, first surveying her neighbors that turned up
a list of seventy-two people who reported birth defects and health problems.16
The problem seemed so widespread to not be a coincidence. Ross presented the
results of her survey to city officials as evidence of a serious problem.17
Lorraine Ross had relocated her family south to the city of Gilroy by 1983,
but she continued to be a vocal presence in the Bay Area’s anti-toxics campaign.
At her new home in Gilroy, the presence of industry near suburban areas contin-
ued to be a spatial experience and informed the political critique of toxics. The
13“Birth of an eco-tragedy” Los Angeles Herald Examiner, February 10, 1982.
14Peter Murphy, “Great Oaks Water Distribution Study,” 1988, 1, Folder 1, Box 11, SVTC records,
SJSU; Ted Smith oral history, Berkeley, 19; Ted Smith and Mike Belliveau, “Responsible action
needed in IBM’s toxic waste cleanup,” San Jose Business Journal, April 7, 1986, Folder 3, Box 18,
Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition
(SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
15Quoted in Pellow, and Park,, The Silicon Valley of Dreams, 74.
16Lorraine Ross, “State Study Confirms Birth Defect Cluster,” Silicon Valley Toxics News (April
1985), 3; “San Jose Hearing Points Up Toxic Risks at Area Plants,” California AFL-CIO News, Febru-
ary 11, 1983.
17“Leaking Chemicals in California’s Silicon Valley Alarm Neighbors,” New York Times, May 20,
1982.
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disk manufacturer Dysan planned a facility at the Santa Teresa Technology Park
in Gilroy. Although not opposed to its construction, Ross warned her new city
that they could not “accept the dictates of Realtors and developers when it comes
to determining the health of our families. You all have the right to talk loudly. It’s
important that Gilroy plan ahead for industry.”18 Communities had to insist on
their health.
The core issue emerging in the anti-toxics campaign was whether scien-
tific evidence existed to support the claim that exposure to industrial solvents
caused the birth defects. The debate over contamination and health originally
coalesced around the lack of scientific evidence to support the neighborhood’s
claim. Fairchild maintained that the length of exposure to the chemicals were not
long enough to cause health effects. Basing their claim on the state standard for
TCA exposure, they argued that those standards were set with long-term and
high-level exposure as the baseline. Fairchild also challenged the timeline of the
chemical leak and its link to birth defects. The company estimated that the leaks
began 18 months before they were discovered and took up to sixteen months to
travel the 2,000 feet to the Great Oaks wells. The birth defects that began three
years prior, Fairchild argued, could not possibly be connected if their leak started
relatively recently and exposed people to such low levels of TCA.19
Residents were unsatisfied by industry’s answers. The concentration of
birth defects in Los Paseos confirmed the presence of a problem, and they linked
the local environment as the most likely cause. Like other parts of the Bay Area’s
environmental activism, women led the way in prompting action by government
officials. Mothers in Los Paseos—Lorraine Ross, Mary Lou Lujan, Julie Bowman,
and others—took on the task of protecting their children and their community.
18“Get tough now to avoid spills,” Gilroy Dispatch, August 1, 1983, Folder 5, Box 10, Santa Clara
County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC)
Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
19“Birth of an eco-tragedy,” Los Angeles Herald Examiner, February 10, 1982.
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They developed their own theories as to what was going on in Los Paseos, and
focused their critique around female bodies and pregnancy. In their view, the spa-
tialized frequency of pregnancy problems were directly related to the local land-
scape. Unconvinced by Fairchild’s argument that the level and length of exposure
was too short, they instead insisted that the only explanation lay with the chem-
ical leak. Families in Los Paseos, Lorraine Ross insisted, felt “like human guinea
pigs whose health is being tested by the ‘high-tech’ companies doing business in
our valley.”20
Under pressure by neighborhood activists, media interest, and political
fallout, the county agreed to study the potential for a link between groundwa-
ter contamination and health problems that plagued Los Paseos in 1982. County
health officials began by looking at birth certificate and infant-death and fetal-
death records to reveal the possibility of a cluster of deaths or illnesses in the city.
Their early report found “no significant difference” between the neighborhood’s
birth disorder rate and the county’s birth disorder rate.21 County water quality of-
ficials also initiated an investigation into tapwater and wellwater throughout the
county. In the South Bay near Los Paseos, water sampling revealed trace levels of
TCA and DCE, but the amounts were below the state action level to shut down
the wells.22
In addition to the birth certificate survey, county health officials formed
20“We Demand Safe Water,” SVTC mailer, n.d., Folder 4, Box 10, Santa Clara County Center for
Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-
04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
21“Study of birth defects continues,” San Jose Mercury News, February 25, 1982, Folder 2, Box 11,
Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition
(SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
22“Environmental News Fact Sheet: Status Report, South Bay Tapwater Sampling Program,”
November 5, 1984, Folder 14, Box 12, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SC-
COSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State Uni-
versity Library Special Collections & Archives; “Proposed South Bay Sampling Event, October
9,” Folder 14, Box 12, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon
Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special
Collections & Archives.
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the Santa Clara County Health Advisory Committee on Environmental Teratol-
ogy and agreed in the spring of 1982 that enough evidence existed for a formal
investigation. The county turned to epidemiology to study the spatial pattern of
disease in San Jose. Epidemiology’s disciplinary history roots itself in studies of
space to understand whether diseases had a spatial component that could explain
health issues in landscapes.23 The goal of the county’s study sought to determine
if lifestyle or environmental features affected the health of the Los Paseos commu-
nity as compared to demographically-similar communities without any known
contamination. The study was released in 1985 with no conclusive evidence to
support the claims of neighborhood activists. The study reached two key conclu-
sions: the neighborhood of Los Paseos experienced higher rates of miscarriages
and a threefold increase in total birth defects compared to nearby communities
that had no known water contamination, and the community experienced a two-
and-a-half times higher rate of major heart defects compared to the rest of the
county. The study, however, made no causal link between the contamination and
the high presence of birth defects, citing the lack of water monitoring prior to
1981 that could provide potential data on a link between health effects and con-
taminated water.24
The study did little to stem public concern and only served to strengthen
the resolve of the anti-toxic activists, who used the conclusion to continue to point
out the presence of an adverse health cluster in San Jose.25 But the widespread
23Nash,, Inescapable Ecologies, 185. See also Neil Pearce, “Traditional Epidemiology, Modern Epi-
demiology, and Public Health,” American Journal of Public Health 86 (May 1996): 678–683; Mervyn
Susser, “Epidemiology in the United States After World War II: The Evolution of Technique,”
Epidemiologic Reviews 7 (1985): 147–177.
24“State Health Department Releases Fairchild Studies,” Department of Health Services News
News, January 16, 1985, 1, Folder 8, Box 12, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health
(SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State
University Library Special Collections & Archives.
25Lorraine Ross, “State Study Confirms Birth Defect Cluster,” Silicon Valley Toxics News (April
1985): 3, Folder 3, Box 18, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and
Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library
Special Collections & Archives.
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presence of toxic contamination throughout the Bay Area and other parts of Cal-
ifornia gave political energy to the state legislature. In 1986, the state legislature
overwhelmingly supported the passage of Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Wa-
ter and Toxic Exposure Act. Prop 65 made it illegal for businesses to knowingly
pollute drinking water with known cancer-causing chemicals and required the
immediate notification of the public to any potential exposure to toxic chemicals.
Industry faced another potent challenge to their “clean” image: the neigh-
borhood of Love Canal in New York. Like the toxic spills in San Jose, the neigh-
borhood of Love Canal in Niagara Falls galvanized community activists in 1978
after decades of chemical dumping by Hooker Chemical led to widespread health
effects in the community. The company had buried nearly 21,000 tons of chemical
waste at the site, and the area became such a concern that the federal govern-
ment relocated 800 families. The disaster at Love Canal led to Congress passing
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), or Superfund Act.26 In the Bay Area, activists pointed to Love Canal
as the potential future for Silicon Valley. The Santa Clara County Labor Council’s
business manager, Peter Cervantes-Gautschi, observed that “we want to prevent
San Jose from being transformed into another Love Canal.”27 These concerns re-
flected a new environmentalism in California, one still grounded locally but con-
cerned about issues beyond the flora and fauna of the region that remained the
bailiwick of other Bay Area conservationists. The Bay Area had become, as Hal
Rothman once phrased it, a symbol of “the toxicity of progress.”28 What made the
26Gottleib,, Forcing the Spring, 246–248; Hal Rothman, Saving the Planet: The American Response to
the Environment in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 192–195.
27“Big Turnout Urged in San Jose to Curb Toxic Contamination,” California AFL-CIO News,
January 28, 1983, Folder 5, Box 10, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH)
and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University
Library Special Collections & Archives. See also “Labor in lead on toxic controls,” Santa Clara
County Labor, February 11, 1983, Folder 5, Box 10, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational
Health (SSOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose
STate University Library Special Collections & Archives.
28Rothman,, Saving the Planet, 195.
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contamination even more insidious was its apparent invisibility. At Love Canal,
toxic wastes oozed to the surface, fires spontaneously ignited during summers,
children tossed chunks of phosphorus against the ground causing white sparks,
and the odor was ever-persistent.29 In Santa Clara County, there were no visible
signs of the toxic landscape.
Anticipating the spread of chemicals in the Valley proved difficult due to
the region’s history. Humans had altered the land in significant ways that affected
the aquifers. One of those ways was the burying of the built environment. During
new construction, many agricultural pipes used for carrying water through fields
or pumping groundwater to the surface were buried. As one study found, these
pipes allowed contaminated water to more easily travel through the clay and
gravel strata:
It is estimated that there are about ten thousand well pipes in the Val-
ley which extend from the surface to a depth of 30 to 150 feet into
the ground. These were well pipes for agricultural uses on the farms.
When the factories were built throughout Silicon Valley, most of these
well pipes were simply buried. No one knows any longer where the
majority of these well pipes are located. After careful searches through
the records of the water authorities and other governmental agencies,
about three thousand old well pipes were located. The unidentified
pipes which remain puncture the clay strata and permit chemically
contaminated ground water to seep into the underground water sup-
plies, whereby toxic substances are distributed far and wide.30
Like the built environment above, the underground complex of aquifers reflected
the relationship between natural and human history. The location and movement
of contamination changed not only due to the geological features of the aquifers
but human history that had altered the hydrological features of the Valley.
29Rothman,, Saving the Planet, 192.
30Quoted in Pellow, and Park,, The Silicon Valley of Dreams, 78. The EPA also suspected that aban-
doned or improperly constructed wells allowed contaminants to reach deep aquifers by giving
contaminated water a conduit to travel deeper into the ground. See “EPA Superfund Factsheet,”
1, Folder 3, Box 11, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon
Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special
Collections & Archives.
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The lack of monitoring and regulation meant no evidence of danger was
detected by county or state water quality officials. By the early 1980s high tech
continued to enjoy a reputation as a clean industry unmarred by the smokestacks—
an aesthetic concern for Bay Area residents—or agricultural runoff problems that
characterized other parts of California and the country’s industrial centers. Hu-
man health, as historian Linda Nash has suggested for the Central Valley of Cali-
fornia, was the only barometer to detect problems.31 Or, as historian Brett Walker
argues, “people really do physiologically experience nations’ policies and prior-
ities” from industrial diseases that become “physical inscriptions of the nation’s
policies on the body.”32 By mid-1982, the problem was undeniable. Reports that
California companies had discharged nearly 1.4 million tons of hazardous wastes
in a single year spurred local and regional government to act.33 The connection
between environment and bodily health focused itself in the Los Paseos neigh-
borhood and would ripple throughout the country.
lorraine ross continued to work with her neighbors and document evidence,
serving as part of a vocal and persistent group of activists that used the contami-
nation of water to argue that industry and urban growth threatened social stabil-
ity, environmental quality, and the health of residents. They located in the region’s
environmental, social, and economic problems the lack of structures present to
protect city’s environs. A coalition of housewives, laborers, environmental ac-
tivists, layers, doctors, businesspeople, and minorities challenged the notion that
high tech industry was “clean” industry and came to dominate the political dis-
31Nash,, Inescapable Ecologies, 181.
32Brett Walker, Toxic Archipelago: A History of Industrial Disease in Japan (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2012).
33“The industries creating the most waste,” Sacramento Union, April 18, 1982, Folder 8, Box 12,
Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition
(SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
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cussion of industry’s value to the Bay Area. Significantly, the political discussion
of the environment began to shift. The previous decades of environmentalists and
conservationists in the Bay Area focused on the health of nature, a point of con-
tention that emerged among the justice-oriented activists of the 1980s. During the
decade, a new environmental critique emerged focusing on environmental justice
and the health of humans.
Ted Smith, a young San Jose attorney, led the way in building bridges be-
tween these groups. Smith’s involvement in environmental issues were personal
as well as professional. A New Yorker by birth, Smith moved to Washington,
D.C., in the late 1960s, where he worked under President Lyndon Johnson’s anti-
poverty VISTA program for two years before moving to the Bay Area to earn a
law degree from Stanford and start his own San Jose practice in 1973.34 His expe-
riences in VISTA and witnessing riots and demonstrations in the Capitol deeply
shaped Smith’s attitudes towards social justice. “I think things were so intense
then,” he recalled, “that I just haven’t been able to put it out of my soul.”35 Smith’s
upbringing exposed him to activism and social justice. His mother was a social
activist, involved with the League of Women Voters, the YWCA, and the World
Youth Convention. “I think some of her experiences and sensibilities were passed
on,” he recalled.36 Environmental issues were not part of Smith’s early political
activism as he directed his energy into the civil rights and peace movements. But
his work on those issues shaped his later thinking about environmental politics
and early legal career.37 Smith began his law practice as a labor lawyer represent-
ing cannery workers facing racial discrimination and injuries on the job, but found
himself drawn more and more to the Bay Area’s electronic industry through his
34Thomas Mahon, Charged Bodies: People, Power, and Paradox in Silicon Valley (New York: New
American Library, 1985), 252.
35Mahon,, Charged Bodies, 261.
36Ted Smith oral history, Berkeley, 2.
37Ted Smith, oral history, Berkeley, 4–6.
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representation of industrial workers. His conviction that industry had destroyed
nature in the Bay Area was formed in the crucible of labor rights. Through his
wife, Amanda Hawes, a legal services attorney and founder of the Project on
Health and Safety in Electronics (PHASE), Smith began to connect with clients in-
jured by chemical exposure inside electronics manufacturing facilities. “The elec-
tronics industry,” Smith observed, “was actually a chemical-handling industry.”38
The number of clients coming to him with disabling injuries, illnesses, and dis-
eases sparked his interest in the industry and the heavy reliance on chemicals
in the manufacture of electronics. Smith believed working conditions and envi-
ronmental concerns went hand-in-hand, and the discovery of the Fairchild leak
provided him with an opportunity to tie the two together and raise awareness on
both issues.39
The issue of toxics and chemical storage continued to gain attention over
the course of 1982. In June, an explosion at IBM’s South San Jose plant from im-
properly stored aluminum waste injured eighteen people. The chip manufacturer
also reported a leak at the same facility that dated back to 1972. Hewlett-Packard
at the Stanford Industrial Park reported five chemical leaks dating back at least
two years at their Palo Alto headquarters. Moffett Airfield’s became one of the
worst contamination areas, with nineteen different sites on the naval air base
eventually identified as toxic spills. One study by the Santa Clara Regional Water
Quality Control Board (RWQCB) found that 85% of the test wells they dug tested
positive for water contamination by industrial solvents. Reports of leaks and spills
became so common that the San Jose Mercury News editorialized in February 1982
38Ted Smith, oral history, Berkeley, 13.
39Ted Smith, oral history, interview by Glenna Matthews, San Jose State University; Mahon,,
Charged Bodies, 252–253; “Ted Smith: Foes Think He’s Anti-Business, but Fans Say He’s Earth’s
Advocate,” The Business Journal Magazine, October 15, 1990, 12, in Folder 3, Box 18, Santa Clara
Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records,
MSS-2007–04–06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives; Smith oral
history, Berkeley, 14.
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Figure 6.3: Ted Smith, “Pioneer Activist for Environmental Justice in Silicon Valley, 1967–
2000,” an oral history conducted in 2000 by Carl Wilmsen, Regional Oral History Office,
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 2003.
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that “if the present pattern continues, this newspaper might have to stop print-
ing a separate story about each Silicon Valley hazardous chemical leak and just
run a daily box score in agate type.” Almost no part of the landscape, it seemed,
remained untouched by industry.40
Keeping the public educated and maintaining a public voice for those af-
fected by industrial contamination and chemical exposure became Smith’s first
priority. In front of the San Jose city hall on November 4, 1982, the Silicon Val-
ley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) announced its establishment. In a letter circulated to
community organizations and individuals, SVTC explained its purpose:
. . . we believe now is the time to pull together a coalition to further
organize around these issues. In recent discussions with representa-
tives from labor, health, environmental and community organizations
and groups, it has been clear that such a coalition is not only essen-
tial but it is feasible to get off the ground in the immediate future. . . .
We proposed the name SILICON VALLEY TOXICS COALITION, the
long-term goal of which would be to maintain our communities and
workplaces free from toxic contamination.41
Formed with the financial and personnel support from the Santa Clara County
40“Anti-spill measures still pend,” San Jose Mercury, July 24, 1982, Folder 5, Box 10, Santa Clara
Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records,
MSS-2007–04–06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives; map of spills
and chemical leaks produced by Citizens for a Better Environment, Folder 4, Box 10, Santa Clara
Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records,
MSS-2007–04–06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives; “Industrial
chemicals in Palo Alto,” Palo Alto Weekly, November 3, 1982, Folder 5, Box 10, Santa Clara Center
for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-
2007–04–06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives; “We Demand Safe
Water,” SVTC mailer, n.d., Folder 4, Box 10, Santa Clara Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH)
and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007–04–06, San Jose State University
Library Special Collections & Archives; “How safe is our drinking water?” San Jose Mercury News,
February 27, 1982, Folder 2, Box 11, Santa Clara Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and
Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007–04–06, San Jose State University Library
Special Collections & Archives.
41“High Tech and Toxics: A Guide for Local Communities” photocopy excerpts, Folder 2, Box 18,
Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition
(SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives,
331; emphasis original. Full publication in High Tech and Toxics, Golden Empire Planning Center,
1985, in Folder 3, Box 18, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and
Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library
Special Collections & Archives.
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Occupational Health and Safety (SCCOSH) organization, SVTC’s immediate goal
was to pass a model toxic wastes ordinance while simultaneously becoming a
key voice in the debate over chemicals in the Bay Area.42 Technology compa-
nies “still promoted themselves as clean industry,” Smith recalled. “So this was
shocking news to people here.”43 As the perception surrounding “clean” industry
collapsed, Smith was determined to keep the pressure on industry.
What gave Smith and others a push to organize more formally—and be-
came SVTC’s first major campaign—was a 1982 proposal by the Santa Clara
County Fire Chiefs’ Association (SCCFCA) to set forth regulations regarding
chemical storage and reporting leaks.44 Firefighters were first responders to chem-
ical spills and leaks, and the Fire Chiefs’ Association wanted to ensure that fire-
fighters knew what they would be dealing with if they arrived at the scene. Along
with a coalition of businesses and trade groups, they formed an organization
called the Industry Environmental Coordinating Committee in the spring of 1982
to codify what was called the Hazardous Materials Model Code to the San Jose
city council. The ordinance aimed to set county-wide standards for the storage
and handling of toxic or flammable chemicals.45 The Hazardous Materials ordi-
nance face stiff resistance from industry, who largely argued against revealing
chemicals stored on their property that potentially threatened to reveal trade se-
crets. Service station owners also objected to some of the stipulations of the model
ordinance, arguing that the new regulations would force smaller business to close
42“Group fights for toxic-waste ordinance,” Peninsula Times Tribune, November 4, 1982, Folder
2, Box 10, Santa Clara Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coali-
tion (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007–04–06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections &
Archives. PHASE renamed itself into SCCOSH in the early 1980s.
43Smith oral history, Matthews, 17.
44Ted Smith, oral history, Matthews, 16; Mahon,, Charged Bodies, 254.
45Clipping, “Group fights for toxic-waste ordinance,” Peninsula Times Tribune, November 4, 1982,
Folder 2, Box 10, Santa Clara Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics
Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007–04–06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections
& Archives; Smith oral history, Berkeley, 16; “Anti-spill measures still pend,” San Jose Mercury
News, July 24, 1982, SVTC Records, SJSU.
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as the regulation costs could not be met. But industry also faced a furious pub-
lic and a media less predisposed to support them. The San Jose Mercury News
was quick to support environmental regulatory measures controlling toxic chem-
icals.46
Despite industrial resistance, the model ordinance passed with widespread
endorsement of the Inter-Governmental Council, a coalition of Bay Area city man-
agers led by Sunnyvale manager Thomas Lewcock, San Jose Mayor Janet Gray
Hayes, the Santa Clara County Regional Water District, and was quickly adopted
by several Peninsula cities.47 However, environmentalists were not completely sat-
isfied with the passage of the final model ordinance. The ordinance had gone far
in protecting employees who disclosed their employer’s chemical disposal prac-
tices, imposed new regulations requiring double-walled storage containers and
new leak detection systems, obtain permits from their home cities for chemical
storage, and required companies to identify all stored chemicals. But a key com-
ponent of the ordinance that environmentalists wanted was the expansion of the
toxic chemicals list to 800 rather than the 30 defined by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency.48
46“Danger: Hazardous Materials,” San Jose Mercury News, February 3, 1982, Folder 5, Box 10,
SVTC, SJSU.
47“Contamination law gets approval from Sunnyvale,” San Jose Mercury News, March 23, 1983,
Folder 5, Box 10, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Val-
ley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special
Collections & Archives; “San Jose OKs ordinance regulating chemical storage,” San Jose Mercury
News, February 23, 1983, Folder 5, Box 10, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health
(SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State
University Library Special Collections & Archives; “Cupertino orders hazardous materials per-
mits,” San Jose Mercury News, August 2, 1983, Folder 5, Box 10, Santa Clara County Center for
Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-
04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
48“Intergovernmental panel endorses stiff rules to protect ground water,” San Jose Mercury News,
February 5, 1983, Folder 5, Box 10, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH)
and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University
Library Special Collections & Archives; “Water tests will begin next week,” San Jose Mercury News,
March 24, 1982, Folder 8, Box 12, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH)
and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University
Library Special Collections & Archives.
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The ordinance’s adoption by several Peninsula cities had repercussions that
spread beyond the borders of the county. In July 1983, Democratic state senator
Byron Sher of Palo Alto introduced Assembly Bill 1362 to the State Legislature
that sought to force industries to meet specific requirements for the storage of
chemicals, require permits and regular inspections of storage tanks, and require
the reporting of leaks within twenty-four hours of their discovery. Sher’s bill was
modeled after the county ordinance, tweaked so that it could be applied to the
entire state. The bill received widespread support from the Sierra Club, Federated
Firefighters of California, SVTC, Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), Health
Officers Organization of California, and the California League of Cities.49 Further-
more, SVTC’s additions for containment, monitoring, and regulations influenced
changes to the Superfund law in the late 1980s. When California Representa-
tive Norman Mineta introduced House Bill 5640 to the floor of the House, Smith
wrote urging Mineta to redefine “imminent hazard” provisions in the Superfund
act and to implement stricter design standards for containing possible leaks.50
Mineta endorsed Smith’s recommendations, adding the two suggestions to the
Superfund amendments. Although the bill failed to make it through the Senate,
the adoption of Santa Clara regulations into federal legislation demonstrates just
how important Silicon Valley’s case had become to anti-toxics legislation.51 “We
are the leader in this because we are the leader in contamination of our ground
water,” Ted Smith told the San Jose Mercury.52 The model ordinance sought to
49“Why We Need AB 1362,” Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition mailer, July 25, 1983, Folder 2, Box 10,
Santa Clara Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC)
Records, MSS-2007–04–06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
50Letter from Ted Smith to Norman Mineta, July 23, 1984, Folder 3, Box 11, Santa Clara Center
for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-
2007–04–06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
51Letter from Norman Mineta to Ted Smith, October 25, 1984, Folder 3, Box 11, Santa Clara
Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records,
MSS-2007–04–06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
52“Intergovernmental panel endorses stiff rules to protect ground water,” San Jose Mercury News,
February 5, 1983.
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tackle the problem, and helped shape local, state, and federal law.
At the heart of the debate over the toxic ordinances was a public policy
dispute about the unknown effects of high technology’s industrial chemicals. The
debate, according to Smith, addressed the question of “who should bear the risks
of scientific uncertainty—the victims of toxic exposure or the manufacturers and
users of toxic chemicals?”53 Smith and others would give voice to a frustration felt
by many in the Bay Area summed up in the debate over “How Clean Is Clean?”
The greatest source of resentment towards state officials came in 1985 when the
state water pollution control board decided not to prosecute IBM for its chemical
leak in South San Jose. In a 4–3 vote, the Board decided that IBM’s $34 million
clean-up plan had shown sufficient evidence that the company was serious about
cleaning up its chemical leak and warranted no further state action.54 Activists
were outraged at the board’s decision. “Here we have a state agency telling the
largest computer company in the world with one of the largest toxic waste spills
in the world that it will not have to pay any penalties,” Ted Smith fumed. “That’s
the wrong message to get out.”55
Who was allowed to define “acceptable risk”? SVTC wanted action against
IBM. Before a public hearing in December 1984, members of SVTC argued that
IBM violated the state’s Nondegredation Policy that called for the “maximum fea-
sible restoration of polluted waters.” IBM had failed to uphold that policy, they
argued. Their position shared support from the Santa Clara County Board of Su-
pervisors, the San Jose City Council, and the Santa Clara Valley Water District.
53Clipping, “Voters should join tap water rebellion,” no source, no date, Folder 6, Box 10,
Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition
(SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
54“State won’t punish IBM for toxic leak,” San Jose Mercury News, February 21, 1985, Folder 8,
Box 12, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics
Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections
& Archives.
55“IBM leak decision criticized,” San Jose Mercury News February 22, 1985, Folder 8, Box 12,
Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition
(SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
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Figure 6.4: Frustration with the argument for “acceptable levels of risk.” Silicon Valley
Toxics News 1 (April 1985): 3.
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Yet the Regional Board voted 6-1 to grant relief to IBM and voted 4-3 to not fine
them for extensive groundwater pollution.56 The issue of “acceptable” exposure
to contaminants had become a key point for SVTC, and they began lobbying for
the state and the Environmental Protection Agency to redefine what counted as
acceptable levels of exposure.57 When the EPA released a study of Silicon Valley
in 1985 presenting an overview of contamination sites, environmentalists charged
that the EPA failed to understand the public health risks.58 SVTC carried the
support of state senators in making their case. In a letter to Governor George
Deukmejian, state senator John Vasconcellos argued that the State Health Depart-
ment was “unable to rule out the possibility that TCA might have been a factor
in the excess rate of birth defects and miscarriages around the Fairchild site.”
If the state failed to fully understand the “potential health risks associated with
TCA,” Vasconcellos argued, then the State Health Department risked violating
its own Action Level regulations. How could the Health Department continue to
treat TCA as having a safe level of exposure, Vasconcellos wondered, if TCA is
discovered to be a carcinogen?59
The debate over carcinogens and safe exposure to chemicals reveals an-
other facet of SVTC’s focus on environmental justice. SVTC framed their concerns
within the language of science, invoking groundwater pollution, epidemiology,
and chemistry in their arguments over the shifting landscapes that intimately and
unknowingly affected communities. The environment took on a different hue for
56“IBM Markets New Product—‘Acceptable Risk’ ”, Silicon Valley Toxics News (April 1985): 8,
Folder 3, Box 18, SVTC records, SJSU.
57“Analysis in Support of Conclusion that Existing ‘Action Level’ for TCA is Too High,” n.d.,
Folder 14, Box 12, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon
Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special
Collections & Archives; “IBM Fouls Our Nest,” Silicon Valley Toxics News 4 (Spring 1986): 1, 5,
1986, Folder 64, Box 3, League of Women Voters, SJSU.
58“SVTC’s Public Voice in Decision Making,” Silicon Valley Toxics News 3 (Winter 1985): 2, Folder
64, Box 3, League of Women Voters, SJSU.
59Letter from John Vasconcellos to George Deukmejian, February 22, 1985, Folder 3, Box 18,
Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition
(SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
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social justice activists, in contrast to the mainstream liberal environmental orga-
nizations and their traditional concerns of conservation. Rather, their energy fo-
cused on health, disease, the disenfranchised, and the structural problems of soci-
ety that exposed communities to dangerous environments. The mainstream envi-
ronmental groups, Ted Smith argued, were “too elitist” and “too often care more
about trees and birds than they do about people.”60 Their claims were grounded
in civil rights and argued for policies that supported equality of health, protection
from toxins, and regulations that ensured safety. They placed faith in local laws
to protect communities without power, and looked to the federal government to
enforce equal protections.
SVTC’s arguments took on a spatiality of their own as well. Not all spaces
were created equal. In their analysis, business and government turned a blind
eye to poor and nonwhite communities, in some cases offloading pollution onto
these communities. Modern space, then, mattered a great deal to SVTC. Where
one lived in the Valley, where one worked in the Valley, could have a tremendous
impact on a person’s health. Health became spatialized as well, used as an in-
dicator for a particular sort of landscape that threatened bodies. Ill health, they
argued, could result from a particular place they occupied rather than individual
causes of disease. In contrast to the claims of public health experts, the modern
landscape did not automatically confer clean spaces.61
Specific spaces were polluted places. South San Jose was only one major
area of concern for the Bay Area’s environmentalists. Another significant contam-
ination site was located in Mountain View in what became known as MEW—an
area of land bounded by Middlefield, Ellis, and Whisman roads. By 1989 the
site was found to have the highest chemical concentrations and largest plumes
60Smith oral history, Berkeley, 6.
61Nash,, Inescapable Ecologies, 204; Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. by Donald
Nicholson-Smith, (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1992), 194–205.
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than any other site in the Valley. The EPA estimates for cleanup varied widely, in
best cases aquifers would be returned to usable states between two and forty-five
years. But the EPA’s worst-case scenario estimated that it could take three hun-
dred years for cleanup to resolve the contamination of surface waters and shal-
low aquifers.62 Even worse was the unforeseen consequence of chemicals mixing
underground. The MEW plume migrated to Moffett Airfield’s space, a nearly
two-mile long and 500 foot deep layer of contamination. The mixing of the MEW
plume and Moffett’s own leaks and spills resulted in the alarming appearance of
a chemical not used by any nearby facilities. In 1989 vinyl chloride was discov-
ered in the groundwater under Moffett. The mixing of perchloroethylenes and
trichloroethylenes with petroleum byproducts on the Moffett site began break-
ing down the compounds into dichloroethylenes and vinyl chloride.63 Chemical
reactions underground were introducing new contaminants and reshaping the
Valley’s subterranean environment.
The spatialized pollution landscape took on greater importance as SVTC,
state and county health officials, and local politicians raced to comprehend the
plume size and spread of chemical leaks. The widespread presence of water-
borne chemicals appeared to be getting out of hand. Despite efforts to identify
leaks and the passage of local laws to regulate the storage of chemicals, local
governments were unprepared to shoulder the burden. In the wake of the leaks,
San Jose established a new Office of Environmental Management tasked with
overseeing the implementation of the city’s hazardous materials ordinance. But
in many cities the hazardous ordinance went unfollowed or difficult to enforce
in cities that had passed the ordinance. Sunnyvale reported in 1986 that only 189
62“Mt. View Sites May Take 300 Years to Clean Up,” Silicon Valley Toxics News 7 (Winter 1989):
4, Folder 64, League of Women Voters; Ted Smith oral history, Berkeley, 27.
63Smith oral history, Berkeley, 62; “Mt. View Sites May Take 300 Years to Clean Up,” Silicon
Valley Toxics News (Winter 1989): 4, Folder 64, Box 3, League of Women Voters, San Jose/Santa
Clara chapter Records, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and
Archives.
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out of 745 companies had passed inspection of hazardous chemicals storage. The
Bayview Industrial Park in south San Francisco was leveled after an illegal fire-
works factory exploded in early April 1986. Firefighters responding to the scene
had no knowledge of what materials were on-site. City fire officials admitted after
the blaze that it had not implemented the hazardous ordinance program passed
by the city. County-wide, cities had processed only forty-nine percent of permit
applications for the storage of chemicals.64
In early 1984 environmentalists were pointing to the federal Superfund
program as a potential solution to the problem of local inadequacies. SVTC ar-
gued that local agencies “simply do not have sufficient resources to solve—much
less control—our toxics crisis.”65 The occasion also allowed Ted Smith, Michael
Belliveau, and Peter Cervantes-Gautschi to criticize the EPA’s seemingly slow re-
sponse to the crisis.66 Although the EPA had identified fifteen to twenty sites as
eligible for the National Priority List (NPL), “not a single site has been listed . . .
as a superfund site,” Smith complained to Representative Norman Mineta. SVTC
appealed to the EPA through the “imminent hazard” provision of Superfund, but
was notified that the Valley’s toxics problem did not qualify. To Smith, any threat
64“Slow progress in cataloging toxic threats,” San Jose Mercury News, April 13, 1986, Folder 5,
Box 10, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics
Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections
& Archives; “Cities lag on enforcing toxics laws,” San Jose Mercury News, January 1, 1986, Folder 5,
Box 10, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics
Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections
& Archives.
65“Groundwater Toxics Crisis in Silicon Valley,” Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition Press Release,
1, Folder 3, Box 11, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon
Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special
Collections & Archives.
66Belliveau claims that the EPA knew about the presence of contaminated water since 1979 but
made no moves to require cleanup of toxic chemicals until 1984. EPA documents seem to confirm
the organization knew about contamination sites in 1979. “EPA explains what it’s doing,” Times
Tribune, August 17, 1984, Folder 8, Box 12, Santa Clara County Center for Occupational Health
(SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State
University Library Special Collections & Archives; Environmental Protection Agency, “Superfund
National Priorities List Sites in the South Bay,” July 1986, 1, Folder 114, Box 4, League of Women
Voters, San Jose/Santa Clara chapter Records, MSS-2006-09-01, San Jose State University Library
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to drinking water should convey an immediate “imminent hazard” and an im-
mediate release of emergency funds.67 Smith’s criticisms of the organization was
echoed by residents. Barbara Fenster, who lived near the IBM leak in San Jose,
asked: “EPA stands for Environmental Protection Agency. I’d be glad to know
what part of the valley the EPA protects, because it sure isn’t drinking water.”68
The Bay Area demanded more help. In an August 1984 letter to William
Ruckelhaus, the director of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Carole
Onorato, the chairwoman of the California State Water Resources Control Board,
Representative Norman Mineta wrote to express his “extreme concern over the
growing problem of hazardous waste leaks in Santa Clara County.” Mineta cut
to the chase: the EPA’s site-by-site evaluation of Superfund sites was inadequate
and too slow-moving. Mineta argued that leaks threatened the health of “several
hundred thousand local residents” and called for “immediate action” to “place
the entire Santa Clara Valley on the Superfund National Priority List.” The leaks
were difficult to identify and the near inability to map the size and number of
plumes meant that “contaminants have continued to spread unchecked.” Despite
collaboration between federal, state, and local officials, Mineta concluded, “effec-
tive action cannot begin without Superfund assistance. The cost of clean up is
simply too great, and time is too short, to rely solely on local and state agen-
cies.”69 The Bay Area’s pollution landscape was no longer though of as localized
67Letter from Ted Smith to Norman Mineta, July 23, 1984, 2, Folder 3, Box 11, Santa Clara
County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC)
Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives; “No
More Poison In Our Water” flier, Silicon Vally Toxics Coalition, Folder 3, Box 11, Santa Clara
County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC)
Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives; “Waste
Sites on Coast Debated,” New York Times, August 19, 1984. See also Smith oral history, Berkeley,
23.
68“EPA explains what it’s doing,” Times Tribune, August 17, 1984, Folder 8, Box 12, Santa Clara
County Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coalition (SVTC)
Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections & Archives.
69Letter from Norman Mineta to William Ruckelshaus and Carole Onorato, August 7, 1984,
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to specific neighborhoods. The problem had become so great that many thought
of the entire place as contaminated.70
Figure 6.5: Bay Area Superfund sites (large circles) and toxic leak sites. Map by author.
Interactive version is at http://dissertation.jasonheppler.org/visualizations/
companies/
The EPA announced in May 1986 that six out of nineteen investigated sites
of Bay Area would be added to the National Priority List. AMD, Intel, Raytheon,
and Westinghouse became declared Superfund sites in Sunnyvale, Mountain View,
and Santa Clara.71 By 1990 the EPA listed twenty-nine Superfund sites on the
National Priority List, twenty-four of which resulted from the mishandling of
chemicals by high tech industries.
a similar approach to the bay area’s pollution landscape focused on air
pollution. The anti-toxics environmentalists, in contrast to the mainstream liberal
environmentalists and their concern over smog, focused their attention on the
Collections & Archives. See also “Waste Sites on Coast Debated,” New York Times, August 19, 1984.
70The Regional Water Quality Control Board also called on the EPA to view the entire Peninsula
as a single Superfund site. See also “EPA explains what it’s doing,” Times Tribune, August 17, 1984,
Folder 8, Box 12, SVTC records, SJSU.
71Environmental Protection Agency, “Superfund National Priorities List Sites in the South Bay,”
July 1986, 1, Folder 114, Box 4, League of Women Voters, Santa Clara chapter Records, MSS-2006-
09-01, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and Archives.
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presence of toxic gases used by the technology sector. Like water, air pollution
had become a political issue by the mid-1960s. Air quality monitoring began in
1955 with 250 stations established in American cities throughout the nation by
1961. Early air quality efforts, under the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS), were
mainly concerned with the presence of smog. According to mid-century experts,
smog threatened both human and non-human nature. Three main air pollutants
were identified as significant health hazards in the 1960s—asbestos, mercury, and
beryllium—and came under federal regulation under the 1970 Clean Air Act.
Throughout the decade the EPA expanded its list of air pollutants that could
introduce hazardous to the public.72
Various gases are used for the manufacturer of semiconductor chips. The
chemical element silicon cannot carry electricity. At an atomic level, silicon leaves
no space for electrons to carry electrical currents and naturally works as an in-
sulator. In the manufacturing process of silicon chips and wafers, manufacturers
adjust the chemical properties of silicon by adding or subtracting electrons that
allows it to carry an electrical charge. Adapting the silicon to carry a charge in-
volves a process called “doping” with “dopant gases”—arsine, phosphine, boron,
and other metal hybrids—in which silicon wafers are exposed to gases that give
them electrical conducting properties.73 Throughout Silicon Valley manufacturers
stored various amounts of compressed doping gases. The concern of environ-
mentalists did not revolve around a lack of regulation regarding potentially toxic
gases. Rather, environmentalists feared what would happen to the Bay Area in
the event of an earthquake or fire. Bay Area manufacturers lacked smokestacks,
but stored vast quantities of chemicals.74
72Hays,, Health, and Permanence Beauty, 195–197.
73N.A. Downie, Industrial Gases (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, 396-397; Roland
Albert Levy, Microelectronic Materials and Processes (New York: Kluwer Academic, 1989), 6–7; Ted
Smith oral history, Berkeley, 53–54.
74“Toxic gas leak is ‘inevitable,’ doctor warns,” San Jose Mercury News June 6, 1982, Folder 5,
Box 10, Santa Clara Center for Occupational Health (SCCOSH) and Silicon Valley Toxics Coali-
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Figure 6.6: Silicon Valley Toxics News 7 (Winter 1989).
Concerns about the presence of toxic gases on the Peninsula led SVTC and
the SCCFCA to pursue a second toxic model ordinance focused on the regula-
tion of gases in 1986. Under a $100,000 budget granted to them by a state bill
proposed by Assemblymen Ernest Konnyu of Saratoga and Byron Sher, the fire
chiefs’ drafted a model bill that laid out similar guidelines as those contained
in the Hazardous Materials Ordinance three years earlier. The draft bill called on
businesses to report the type and volume of gases stored on their property, inform
nearby communities of what materials they stored on-site, and install an alarm
system to alert neighboring communities in the event of a gas leak. Businesses
would be exempt from the alarm system if their storage containers were double-
walled and they maintained air purification systems around storage tanks.75 For
anti-toxics activists and state officials, gas leaks could be more threatening than
liquid chemical leaks. Leaking liquids can be detected and spread slowly enough
tion (SVTC) Records, MSS-2007-04-06, San Jose State University Library Special Collections and
Archives.
75“Toxic Gas Proposal Stirs Row,” San Jose Mercury News, August 8, 1986; “Fire Chiefs Seek Toxic
Gas Controls,” San Jose Mercury News, July 8, 1986.
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that they could be contained and managed, but gas leaks are instantaneous and
spread rapidly.76
Just as Love Canal gave water contamination a sense of urgency, the deadly
gas leak by Union Carbide outside Bhopal, India, in late 1984 that killed more than
2,000 people provided a political impetus for the Bay Area’s toxic gas regulation.
The Konnyu-Sher bill for funding a draft ordinance passed in the shadow of the
Bhopal Incident, one of the worst industrial accidents of the twentieth century.
The Bhopal Disaster occurred in December 1984 when Union Carbide’s pesticide
plant experienced a failure of a holding tank that released thirty metric tons of
methyl isocyanate within an hour. The resulting cloud drifted southward over
Bhopal. Within days, nearby trees dropped all of their leaves, thousands of ani-
mal carcasses needed disposal, and nearly 200,000 people received treatment at
hospitals. A Bhopal-like disaster was the nightmare scenario for the Bay Area’s
anti-toxics environmentalists and only confirmed the need for additional regula-
tion.77
The potential of a toxic gas leak reshaped how environmentalists thought
about space. Whereas the presence of water contamination focused on specific
places, the release of gases obliterated any sense of space affected by pollution.
One study by San Jose State University using the EPA’s air models found that a
gas leak in the Bay Area had the potential to spread as far as twelve-and-a-half
miles.78 Such a leak would nearly encompass the entire city of San Jose and would
certainly cover the narrow stretch of land between the Pacific Ocean and the San
Francisco Bay. Although difficult, water-borne chemical plumes could be mapped
and cleaned-up. The instantaneous release of gases, however, meant that specific
76“Gas leaks, contaminated water are top priorities on the list of threats,” San Jose Mercury News,
December 31, 1989.
77On the Bhopal disaster, see Sheila Jasanoff, “Bhopal’s Trials of Knowledge and Ignorance,”
Isis 98, no. 2 (2007): 344–350; Jasanoff,, .
78“Report Warning of Disaster Readiness at Silicon Valley,” New York Times, February 25, 1987;
Smith, oral history, Berkeley, 53.
250
space mattered less.
Industry immediately rejected the guidelines of the new ordinance, argu-
ing that the fire chiefs’ plan was too strict and costly to implement. A second
draft created in collaboration between industry and Bay Area cities assigned haz-
ard classification to toxic gases, required new storage and alarm systems for de-
tecting and responding to accidental leaks, and a system of neutralizing emission
gases before their release into the air. The law extended to to common gases
like chlorine and ammonia, meaning municipal facilities, sewage treatment, and
swimming pools were subject to the law’s regulations.79 By 1991, all cities in the
Bay Area had adopted the ordinance.
End-of-the-century environmental justice advocates insisted on the spatial-
ity of health. The attention given to bodies, ecology, pollution, and justice, as
Linda Nash has noted, drew upon earlier notions of environmentalism from the
1960s. Rachel Carson and others had insisted that anyone could fall ill to the mod-
ern environment, but environmental justice advocates took those claim further.
Environmental and structural factors, rather than the individuality of genetics,
poor hygiene, poor sanitation, or chance, were pointed to as causes for disease.
By pushing the claim that health and environment went hand-in-hand, justice ac-
tivists went beyond the middle-class and suburban concerns of Carson and oth-
ers. Justice advocates saw in the geography of pollution a racial and class bias that
disproportionately affected non-white and poor communities. While they might
agree with Carson’s claim that nobody was immune to the modern environment’s
potential dangers, they saw a specific geography that offloaded pollution to cer-
tain communities while government and business turned a blind eye.80
79“Landmark Toxics Law Up for OK in Valley,” San Jose Mercury News, January 9, 1989; “Toxic
Containment the County, Industry and the Public Cooperated in Writing is a Worthwhile Plan,”
San Jose Mercury News, January 22, 1990; “Toxic Gas Law Adopted,” San Jose Mercury News, January
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80Nash,, Inescapable Ecologies, 203–204. See also Matthew Klingle, Emerald City: An Environmental
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Silicon Valley’s justice advocates argued that the spatial pattern of health
emerged from a particular form of land use. Rather than seeing the landscape
as a place for business or a place for pleasure, the landscape was redefined as a
place for health (or lack of it). Within this perception of the landscape, the Silicon
Valley Toxics Coalition and others saw Santa Clara Valley as contaminated. The
use of the land for business, however clean and modern it had appeared, proved
to generate a dangerous landscape. The presence of sick bodies or the potential for
adverse health formed a critique of the modern environment that was spatialized.
Certain places in the landscape were more dangerous than others, a point
activists insisted upon as evidence for rendering the “clean” landscape as a per-
petual failure. Human bodies became indicators of a specific kind of landscape
where bodies were inextricably tied to contaminated waters and polluted air. The
locality of the polluted landscape had repercussions through local, county, re-
gional, state, and federal law. Proximity to businesses mattered, but even commu-
nities seemingly distant to the location of industrial parks and business centers
could be affected by migrating chemical plumes or the explosive release of gases.
But by the end of the century, activists no longer saw specific places as
polluted spaces. Criticisms of industrial pollution no longer focused on MEW or
Los Paseos. Instead, justice advocates saw the entire San Francisco Peninsula as
a place under threat. “The danger is that if this can happen in Mountain View,
it can happen anywhere in the valley,” Smith told the San Jose Mercury News in
1986.81 By thinking of the entire region as a Superfund site, by acknowledging the
difficulty in tracking the spread and size of chemical plumes, and the recognition
Economic Justice: Two Chicano Struggles in the Southwest (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996);
Laura Pulido, “Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban Development in
Southern California,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90, no. 1 (March 2000): 12–
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Indiana, 1945–1980 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Pellow, and Park,, The
Silicon Valley of Dreams.
81“Toxics at Deep Level,” San Jose Mercury News, May 4, 1986.
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that toxic gas releases would recognize no discernible boundaries, environmental
justice advocates perceived Silicon Valley as a landscape burdened by the anxiety
of illness.
”we thought we were living with a clean industry,” Lorraine Ross told a
reporter from the San Francisco Chronicle.82 Indeed, a key selling point for promot-
ers and boosters of the Bay Area’s new high technology sector was the cleanliness
of such manufacturing facilities. The language of booster promotion attached the
language of “clean,” the absence of smokestacks, and the prohibition of noise
and emissions to their materials. Preventing pollution was a very real goal for
promoters.
But the booster’s claims for “clean” industry referred to aesthetics. The
process of producing the components that would run the computers of the future
were far from environmentally friendly. “I remember thinking about smokestacks
in other industries,” Mayor Janet Hayes recalled, “I didn’t expect this problem in
my own backyard.”83 IBM, Fairchild Semiconductor, and other companies did not
belch smoke into the air but the use of highly toxic chemicals—trichloroethane,
chlorinated solvents, heavy metal gases—produced serious health problems caus-
ing damage to circulatory and reproduction systems, liver and kidney failure,
and cancers. As investigations by state and federal officials uncovered widespread
chemical spills and the EPA declared Superfund sites, the perception of clean in-
dustry declined while creating an environmental justice wing of the environmen-
tal movement in the Bay Area. The “clean” industries in the garden permanently
altered land and human bodies.
82Newspaper clipping, “Silicon Valley’s Fear Over Tainted Water,” San Francisco Chronicle, May
16, 1983, Carton 20, Folder 12 Hazardous Waste, California Tomorrow Records, MS 3641, Califor-
nia Historical Society.
83Quoted in Pellow, and Park,, The Silicon Valley of Dreams, 76.
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Epilogue: Eco-Region
If America is the land were the world goes in search of miracles and redemption,
California is the land where Americans go. It is America’s America, the symbol of
raw hope and brave (even foolish) invention, where ancient traditions and inhibitions
are abandoned at the border. Its peculiar culture squirts out—on film and menus and
pages and television beams—the trends and tastes that sweep the rest of the country.
—Time, November 18, 1991
The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation anticipated little opposition
to their plans to build the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library on the campus of
Stanford University. Coupled with the Hoover Institution, whose officials advised
Reagan and shared his conservative outlook, the selection of Stanford University
for the presidential library, museum, and public affairs research center seemed
like a natural fit. The Spanish-mission style architecture designed by Hugh A.
Stubbins Jr., would nestle in the hills above the university. Administratively, the
Library would be overseen by the Hoover Institution. Yet when Stanford’s Board
of Trustees approved the plan in February 1984, the outcry was swift. Faculty
and students objected to the library’s presence, fearing it would only serve to
“politicize” Stanford. Critics of the Reagan Library also couched their argument
in the environment. The Reagan Foundation hoped to situate the presidential li-
brary in the foothills on unincorporated Stanford property next to the Center for
Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences, a decision locals and university mem-
bers perceived as a threat to the land. “They want to put it on one of the last
undeveloped hills in the community,” Samuel Brain, a senior researcher in Stan-
ford’s radiology department and a vocal critic of the plan told the New York Times.
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“There are a lot of people who are attached to that hill, and they don’t want it
ruined.” Furthermore, Palo Alto residents worried about the potential of tourists
flooding their town with traffic and upsetting the hill’s seclusion.1
Figure 6.7: Proposed location of the Reagan Presidential Library, next to the Center for
Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences and Institute for Research in the Social Sciences.
The desire to preserve hillsides would serve to motivate political action
nearly a decade later. In 2000, the Committee for Green Foothills helped organize
a campaign against the City of San Jose´ for plans to build a corporate research
park in the Coyote Valley for Cisco Systems. CGF helped create a grassroots orga-
nization called People for Livable and Affordable Neighborhoods (PLAN), which
initiated a referendum campaign in an attempt to halt the campus’s creation. CFG
argued that the Coyote Valley, located at the narrowing of the southern end of the
Santa Clara Valley, served an important agricultural purpose, was used by many
for recreation, and remained an important thoroughfare for wildlife crossing be-
tween the Santa Cruz and Diablo ranges, as well as holding the distinction of
being the largest freshwater wetland in the county. While the referendum man-
aged to secure enough signatures to place a vote on the ballot, the City of San Jose´
disallowed the petition on the grounds that the text of the referendum was incor-
rect.2 The collapse of the dot-com boom in the early 2000s led Cisco to withdraw
its plans. Debates over the Coyote Valley continue between environmentalists and
1“Reagan Library Site Choice Stirs Opposition in Palo Alto,” New York Times, December 24,
1986; “Reagan Library Site in Palo Alto Comes Under Fire,” Los Angeles Times, November 29, 1986.
2The denial of the referendum petition has been charged by environmentalists as a sign of
corruption in San Jose´ Mayor Ron Gonzales’ administration. Gonzales was a supporter of the
project.
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developers, where the land is zoned for light industrial under San Jose´’s mid-
1980s master plan. In 2015, environmentalists won what they hope will become
a widespread move in the Coyote Valley. A new 348-acre park called the Coyote
Valley Open Space Preserve opened in the summer. “There are 1.8 million people
who have access to the last vestiges of the Valley of Heart’s Delight,” Marc Land-
graf, external affairs manager of the Santa Clara County Open Space Authority,
told the San Jose´ Mercury News. “And we want to keep it that way.”3
Figure 6.8: Coyote Valley Open Space Preserve. San Jose´ Mercury News, June 24, 2015.
3“New park in Silicon Valley opens Saturday, rekindling debate over future of Coyote Valley,”
San Jose´ Mercury News, June 24, 2015.
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Figure 6.9: The “Triple Site” in Sunnyvale. Red circles indicate superfund sites; light blue
indicate technology companies; dark blue indicate other toxic leaks and spills. Map by
author. http://dissertation.jasonheppler.org/visualizations/companies/
While particular places were secured as wilderness preserves, other areas
of the county were fraught with the legacy of industrial pollution. At the end
of 2014, the Environmental Protection Agency announced a town hall meeting in
Sunnyvale. The topic: indoor air quality testing of homes. The EPA planned to test
homes and a nearby school for the presence of trichloroethene (TCE) dispersed
into the air from evaporating contaminated groundwater, a process known as “va-
por intrusion.”4 The area, known as the Triple Site under monitoring by the EPA,
were the remediated Superfund sites of AMD Electronics, TRW Microwave, and
Philips Semiconductors.5 Volatile organic compounds were discovered in 1981
leaking from storage tanks on company property at levels past acceptable stan-
dards. Should the EPA discovered vapor intrusion in homes or schools, they will
assist in the installation of mitigation systems to filter and vent the air.6
The hazardous and toxic landscapes lived on in other areas of the Peninsula
4“Sunnyvale: EPA plans on testing indoor air quality for vapor intrusion,” San
Jose´ Mercury News, December 5, 2014 http://www.mercurynews.com/my-town/ci_27080114/
sunnyvale-epa-plans-testing-indoor-air-quality-vapor.
5More about the Triple Sites can be found at http://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/sfund/r9sfdocw.
nsf/3dec8ba3252368428825742600743733/d18e8a81d96408d588257d32005da7f0.
6“EPA School Sampling Update,” EPA Factsheet, August 2014 http://sunnyvale.ca.gov/
Portals/0/Sunnyvale/OCM/CMBlog/2014/Aug25/TripleSiteSchoolsAug2014.pdf.
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Figure 6.10: The extent of TCE contamination in groundwater. EPA, “EPA School
Sampling Update” Factsheet, August 2014 http://sunnyvale.ca.gov/Portals/0/
Sunnyvale/OCM/CMBlog/2014/Aug25/TripleSiteSchoolsAug2014.pdf.
as well. In East Palo Alto, a group calling themselves Youth United for Commu-
nity Action initiated a campaign against the Romic waste treatment facility, argu-
ing that the facility’s presence constituted environmental racism.7 YUCA claimed
that Romic has exacerbated risks of cancer and asthma for East Palo Alto, going
so far as to conduct their own health surveys that found one-out-of-four 13-to-
21 year-olds had asthma and that cancer rates were far higher than average for
the rest of San Mateo County. A 2006 explosion that severely burned employee
Frolian Chan-Liongco, a sudden Romic tanker chemical leak that released fifteen
different chemicals, and decades of hazardous material stored on-site led activists
to argue Romic was no longer welcome in their community. “Romic feels that
since it is located in a community of color that they don’t have to abide by regu-
lations,” argued Annie Loya, an activist with YUCA. “But also it is the regulatory
7For more on Romic and environmental racism, see Chapter 4.
258
system that is failing. The result is that there is a blind eye cast upon how busi-
nesses operate in communities like ours.”8 In 2005, YUAC filed a federal civil
rights suit against Romic claiming “environmental racism” against the California
Department of Toxic Substances Control, arguing that DTSC allowed Romic to
operate with an expired permit and failed to force the company to complete an
environmental impact report.9 A year later, the East Palo Alto City Council voted
to appeal to the State to deny Romic an extension on its operating permit. That
fall, San Mateo County officials made the same case, arguing that Romic con-
stituted “great environmental and public health risks.”10 The state acted in 2007
when DTSC announced it revoked Romic’s permit for handling and storing liq-
uid waste after its investigation of environmental violations included the release
of 4,000 solvents in June 2006 and two incidents of employees seriously burned in
June 2004 and March 2006.
these vignettes are products of the postwar past. During the postwar era,
confrontations over the landscape gave expression to a political project in Santa
Clara County that attempted to meld bucolic naturalism with suburban capital-
ism. Across the landscape changes to the land remain perceptible yet sometimes
invisible: fenced-off military installations, protected wilderness areas, capped wells,
and the small, white PVC pipes that occasionally dot the manicured lawns of busi-
nesses that allows chemical contaminants to evaporate into the air.
The debate over land use in Palo Alto, San Jose, East Palo Alto, and other
Santa Clara County cities reflected a longer debate about western land use, and
specifically about the presence of natural places near urban areas. Richard White’s
8“Silicon Valley’s Dirty Secret,” Metroactive, January 3, 2007 http://www.metroactive.com/
metro/01.03.07/environmental-racism-0701.html; “Waste-facility foes rally at City Hall,” San
Jose´ Mercury News, December 20, 2006.
9“State shuts down chemical plant,” The Daily Journal, May 31, 2007.
10“State shuts down chemical plant,” The Daily Journal, May 31, 2007.
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observation about the West’s public lands—that “land cannot be simultaneously
range, parking lots, and wilderness”—applies to Santa Clara County urban land-
scape.11 People give spaces definition through cultural processes that determine
how land and space should be utilized for economics, shelter, food, and trans-
portation. These are not necessarily historical realities; they are cultural under-
standings of how particular places are defined, used, and protected. Silicon Val-
ley, then, is two types of places. The first conjures images of iPhones, computers,
and Steve Jobs. This Silicon Valley is a set of assumptions and attitudes defined by
technology, invention, innovation, venture funding, and capital revolving around
high technology. But Silicon Valley is also a place positioned in geographic space,
an area of work, leisure, domesticity, and segregation. These two views into Sili-
con Valley—as a geographic place, and as a social construction—illustrate how we
can come to understand the Valley’s spatial history. People of the past attached
meaning to this place through lived experiences and imagined geographies. When
Samuel Brain criticized the plans for the Reagan Library, he was drawing from a
history of people defining the Valley landscape for specific purposes. He also en-
capsulated fifty years of land use debates about whether land should be left in a
“natural” state or put to some other use.
Environmentalism emerging out of the suburbs shaped cities. While city
boosters sought to expand their municipal boundaries under the aegis of growth-
as-progress, suburbanites reacted fiercely when the natural amenities they had
come to enjoy were threatened. Hill regrades, channeled creeks, and high traffic
roads became visible expressions of landscape changes that threatened the aes-
thetics suburbanites had come to enjoy. The shape of the Valley’s cities, in other
words, were shaped by suburban desires for an idyllic urban form that promised
11Richard White, “Trashing the Trails,” in Trails Toward a New Western History, Patricia Nelson
Limerick, Clyde A. Milner II and Charles Rankin, eds. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1991), 37.
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clean industrialization and access to natural amenities. Urban-dwelling knowl-
edge workers turned to these places for their property values, good education for
their children, and quality of life, reflecting the individualist political and class
priorities of suburbanites. But in the process of shaping the city and countryside,
middle– and upper–class environmentalists relied upon or crafted peculiar narra-
tives about place. Socioeconomic, class, racial, and spatial boundaries determined
where suburbanites looked for nature. That nature, more often than not, existed
on the hillsides and in their backyards. The suburban countryside formed the
core of their motivations, leaning on an aesthetic ideal and agricultural mythos to
argue for placing limits on growth and protecting particular places. By the 1990s
environmentalists could claim their efforts a success through the legal efforts to
protect the natural resources of the Bay Area.
But among minority populations in Silicon Valley, “environment” repre-
sented something else: rather than aesthetics and recreation, their pursuit of an
environmental agenda grounded itself in health, housing, and access to livable
metropolitan spaces. In Silicon Valley, as in much of the American West, remark-
able economic growth was accompanied by social and environmental costs. The
decade-long battles over open space, farmland preservation, and toxics contami-
nation were significant challenges for federal, state, county, and local agencies to
manage as people pressured for protection, access, and cleanup of these lands.
But so where the health risks due to air and water quality that disproportionately
affected minority and working-class neighborhoods. Environmentalists were less
inclined to care about issues and places less “natural” than those they identified
with, places often less privileged than those areas occupied by affluent middle-
class knowledge workers. Pressures for growth and preservation continue to col-
lide in places like Coyote Valley and East Palo Alto as debates about health, air
pollution, and wilderness, shaping a public discourse first forged in the battles of
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mid-century environmental politics.
Government officials, civic leaders, and ordinary residents fortified their
ideas for a high tech urbanism in the half-century after World War II, and in
so doing laid conceptual and physical boundaries on the land to promote their
city as “cleaner” than past industrialization. But separating out the idealism of
this urban imagery reveals the mixed legacies that the landscapes of technology
and knowledge impart. With the political project that began in 1940s Santa Clara
County, civic leaders envisioned an urbanism free from the problems plaguing
American cities. For business leaders and residents, Silicon Valley had plenty of
advantages: a lack of racial strife, weak unions, low taxes, abundant land for
development, and a highly-educated white-collar workforce, nestled in the nat-
ural environment of the valley. Like the Gold Rush a century before, this new
California Dream promised a forging of a pastoral vision with a pioneering in-
dustrialization focused around high technology.
Yet these changes introduced new challenges at the verge of the 21st cen-
tury as the economic focus of Silicon Valley drifted from hardware manufacturing
to software development. Warehouses and factories were repurposed as hip devel-
opment shops, building the backbone that would democratize access to the World
Wide Web and personal computers. As manufacturing facilities moved overseas to
cheaper and less-regulated labor markets, thousands of working-class manufac-
turing jobs disappeared. The software-oriented economy also attracted influxes of
new populations, in particular large Asian populations that filtered their way into
middle-class neighborhoods throughout the Peninsula. Environmental challenges
in Silicon Valley have not gone away in this transition. Activists, residents, civic
leaders, and government officials continue to confront the legacies of the region’s
industrial past.
High tech continues to cultivate an image of clean and green—from Google’s
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touting of it’s solar-panel-roofed campus buildings to Apple’s environmental re-
ports on its server farms, while those with the means drive luxury electric or fuel-
efficient cars. Today, places like San Jose´ and Mountain View promote their image
of “sustainable cities” that place an emphasis on bike rentals, friendly pedestrian
environments, electric car charging stations, and the software of “smart cities” that
promises to do a way with messy and inefficient bureaucracies. Digital technology
provides much promise, allowing more flexibility in work, transportation, and
leisure, empowering individuals with access to information, building social capi-
tal and social movements, and opening positive possibilities for the environment
and democratic politics. But this technology also comes with costs—segregation
by education, access to technology, the servers and hardware that create such
possibilities.12 Pressure for urban growth and revitalization will lead to future
controversies over the environmental costs of high tech economies and urban de-
velopment on the western landscape.
12Margaret Pugh O’Mara, “The Environmental Contradictions of High-Tech Urbanism,” in Now
Urbanism: The Future City Is Here, ed. by Jeffrey Hou et al., (London: Routledge, forthcoming),
26–27.
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